From 64b8a7b2363629f4b02c79ac6b1e2e382bf36b20 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wedson Almeida Filho Date: Sat, 21 Nov 2020 01:55:09 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 01/23] bpf: Refactor check_cfg to use a structured loop. ANBZ: #7670 commit 59e2e27d227a0a4e7ec0e22c63ca36a5ad1ab438 upstream. The current implementation uses a number of gotos to implement a loop and different paths within the loop, which makes the code less readable than it would be with an explicit while-loop. This patch also replaces a chain of if/if-elses keyed on the same expression with a switch statement. No change in behaviour is intended. Signed-off-by: Wedson Almeida Filho Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20201121015509.3594191-1-wedsonaf@google.com Signed-off-by: Tianchen Ding --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 179 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 95 insertions(+), 84 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index edd89cc79c87..7bc8936ffee8 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -8514,6 +8514,11 @@ static void init_explored_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx) env->insn_aux_data[idx].prune_point = true; } +enum { + DONE_EXPLORING = 0, + KEEP_EXPLORING = 1, +}; + /* t, w, e - match pseudo-code above: * t - index of current instruction * w - next instruction @@ -8526,10 +8531,10 @@ static int push_insn(int t, int w, int e, struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *insn_state = env->cfg.insn_state; if (e == FALLTHROUGH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | FALLTHROUGH)) - return 0; + return DONE_EXPLORING; if (e == BRANCH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | BRANCH)) - return 0; + return DONE_EXPLORING; if (w < 0 || w >= env->prog->len) { verbose_linfo(env, t, "%d: ", t); @@ -8548,10 +8553,10 @@ static int push_insn(int t, int w, int e, struct bpf_verifier_env *env, if (env->cfg.cur_stack >= env->prog->len) return -E2BIG; insn_stack[env->cfg.cur_stack++] = w; - return 1; + return KEEP_EXPLORING; } else if ((insn_state[w] & 0xF0) == DISCOVERED) { if (loop_ok && env->bpf_capable) - return 0; + return DONE_EXPLORING; verbose_linfo(env, t, "%d: ", t); verbose_linfo(env, w, "%d: ", w); verbose(env, "back-edge from insn %d to %d\n", t, w); @@ -8563,7 +8568,74 @@ static int push_insn(int t, int w, int e, struct bpf_verifier_env *env, verbose(env, "insn state internal bug\n"); return -EFAULT; } - return 0; + return DONE_EXPLORING; +} + +/* Visits the instruction at index t and returns one of the following: + * < 0 - an error occurred + * DONE_EXPLORING - the instruction was fully explored + * KEEP_EXPLORING - there is still work to be done before it is fully explored + */ +static int visit_insn(int t, int insn_cnt, struct bpf_verifier_env *env) +{ + struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi; + int ret; + + /* All non-branch instructions have a single fall-through edge. */ + if (BPF_CLASS(insns[t].code) != BPF_JMP && + BPF_CLASS(insns[t].code) != BPF_JMP32) + return push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, false); + + switch (BPF_OP(insns[t].code)) { + case BPF_EXIT: + return DONE_EXPLORING; + + case BPF_CALL: + ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, false); + if (ret) + return ret; + + if (t + 1 < insn_cnt) + init_explored_state(env, t + 1); + if (insns[t].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) { + init_explored_state(env, t); + ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].imm + 1, BRANCH, + env, false); + } + return ret; + + case BPF_JA: + if (BPF_SRC(insns[t].code) != BPF_K) + return -EINVAL; + + /* unconditional jump with single edge */ + ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].off + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, + true); + if (ret) + return ret; + + /* unconditional jmp is not a good pruning point, + * but it's marked, since backtracking needs + * to record jmp history in is_state_visited(). + */ + init_explored_state(env, t + insns[t].off + 1); + /* tell verifier to check for equivalent states + * after every call and jump + */ + if (t + 1 < insn_cnt) + init_explored_state(env, t + 1); + + return ret; + + default: + /* conditional jump with two edges */ + init_explored_state(env, t); + ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, true); + if (ret) + return ret; + + return push_insn(t, t + insns[t].off + 1, BRANCH, env, true); + } } /* non-recursive depth-first-search to detect loops in BPF program @@ -8571,11 +8643,10 @@ static int push_insn(int t, int w, int e, struct bpf_verifier_env *env, */ static int check_cfg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) { - struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi; int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; int *insn_stack, *insn_state; int ret = 0; - int i, t; + int i; insn_state = env->cfg.insn_state = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL); if (!insn_state) @@ -8591,92 +8662,32 @@ static int check_cfg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) insn_stack[0] = 0; /* 0 is the first instruction */ env->cfg.cur_stack = 1; -peek_stack: - if (env->cfg.cur_stack == 0) - goto check_state; - t = insn_stack[env->cfg.cur_stack - 1]; - - if (BPF_CLASS(insns[t].code) == BPF_JMP || - BPF_CLASS(insns[t].code) == BPF_JMP32) { - u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insns[t].code); - - if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) { - goto mark_explored; - } else if (opcode == BPF_CALL) { - ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, false); - if (ret == 1) - goto peek_stack; - else if (ret < 0) - goto err_free; - if (t + 1 < insn_cnt) - init_explored_state(env, t + 1); - if (insns[t].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) { - init_explored_state(env, t); - ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].imm + 1, BRANCH, - env, false); - if (ret == 1) - goto peek_stack; - else if (ret < 0) - goto err_free; - } - } else if (opcode == BPF_JA) { - if (BPF_SRC(insns[t].code) != BPF_K) { - ret = -EINVAL; - goto err_free; - } - /* unconditional jump with single edge */ - ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].off + 1, - FALLTHROUGH, env, true); - if (ret == 1) - goto peek_stack; - else if (ret < 0) - goto err_free; - /* unconditional jmp is not a good pruning point, - * but it's marked, since backtracking needs - * to record jmp history in is_state_visited(). - */ - init_explored_state(env, t + insns[t].off + 1); - /* tell verifier to check for equivalent states - * after every call and jump - */ - if (t + 1 < insn_cnt) - init_explored_state(env, t + 1); - } else { - /* conditional jump with two edges */ - init_explored_state(env, t); - ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, true); - if (ret == 1) - goto peek_stack; - else if (ret < 0) - goto err_free; + while (env->cfg.cur_stack > 0) { + int t = insn_stack[env->cfg.cur_stack - 1]; - ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].off + 1, BRANCH, env, true); - if (ret == 1) - goto peek_stack; - else if (ret < 0) - goto err_free; - } - } else { - /* all other non-branch instructions with single - * fall-through edge - */ - ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, false); - if (ret == 1) - goto peek_stack; - else if (ret < 0) + ret = visit_insn(t, insn_cnt, env); + switch (ret) { + case DONE_EXPLORING: + insn_state[t] = EXPLORED; + env->cfg.cur_stack--; + break; + case KEEP_EXPLORING: + break; + default: + if (ret > 0) { + verbose(env, "visit_insn internal bug\n"); + ret = -EFAULT; + } goto err_free; + } } -mark_explored: - insn_state[t] = EXPLORED; - if (env->cfg.cur_stack-- <= 0) { + if (env->cfg.cur_stack < 0) { verbose(env, "pop stack internal bug\n"); ret = -EFAULT; goto err_free; } - goto peek_stack; -check_state: for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { if (insn_state[i] != EXPLORED) { verbose(env, "unreachable insn %d\n", i); -- Gitee From 0855a2fa5cf446dd09e6b59287ee625b6dc7f117 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yonghong Song Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2021 15:48:27 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 02/23] bpf: Refactor BPF_PSEUDO_CALL checking as a helper function ANBZ: #7670 commit 23a2d70c7a2f28eb1a8f6bc19d68d23968cad0ce upstream. There is no functionality change. This refactoring intends to facilitate next patch change with BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC. Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210204234827.1628953-1-yhs@fb.com Signed-off-by: Tianchen Ding --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 29 +++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 7bc8936ffee8..2b3c0ebd4ab6 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -228,6 +228,12 @@ static void bpf_map_key_store(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux, u64 state) (poisoned ? BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON : 0ULL); } +static bool bpf_pseudo_call(const struct bpf_insn *insn) +{ + return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && + insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL; +} + struct bpf_call_arg_meta { struct bpf_map *map_ptr; bool raw_mode; @@ -1485,9 +1491,7 @@ static int check_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) /* determine subprog starts. The end is one before the next starts */ for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { - if (insn[i].code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL)) - continue; - if (insn[i].src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) + if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn + i)) continue; if (!env->bpf_capable) { verbose(env, @@ -3291,9 +3295,7 @@ static int check_max_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) continue_func: subprog_end = subprog[idx + 1].start; for (; i < subprog_end; i++) { - if (insn[i].code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL)) - continue; - if (insn[i].src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) + if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn + i)) continue; /* remember insn and function to return to */ ret_insn[frame] = i + 1; @@ -11156,8 +11158,7 @@ static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) return 0; for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { - if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) || - insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) + if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) continue; /* Upon error here we cannot fall back to interpreter but * need a hard reject of the program. Thus -EFAULT is @@ -11260,8 +11261,7 @@ static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { insn = func[i]->insnsi; for (j = 0; j < func[i]->len; j++, insn++) { - if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) || - insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) + if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) continue; subprog = insn->off; insn->imm = BPF_CAST_CALL(func[subprog]->bpf_func) - @@ -11306,8 +11306,7 @@ static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) * later look the same as if they were interpreted only. */ for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { - if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) || - insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) + if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) continue; insn->off = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm; subprog = find_subprog(env, i + insn->off + 1); @@ -11344,8 +11343,7 @@ static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) /* cleanup main prog to be interpreted */ prog->jit_requested = 0; for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { - if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) || - insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) + if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) continue; insn->off = 0; insn->imm = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm; @@ -11380,8 +11378,7 @@ static int fixup_call_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) return -EINVAL; } for (i = 0; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { - if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) || - insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) + if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) continue; depth = get_callee_stack_depth(env, insn, i); if (depth < 0) -- Gitee From dd00b909ce1b85d70f1bde064ef456557376e1b3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yonghong Song Date: Fri, 26 Feb 2021 12:49:20 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 03/23] bpf: Factor out visit_func_call_insn() in check_cfg() ANBZ: #7670 commit efdb22de7dcd3b24b8154b3c3ba496f62afea00c upstream. During verifier check_cfg(), all instructions are visited to ensure verifier can handle program control flows. This patch factored out function visit_func_call_insn() so it can be reused in later patch to visit callback function calls. There is no functionality change for this patch. Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210226204920.3884136-1-yhs@fb.com Signed-off-by: Tianchen Ding --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 2b3c0ebd4ab6..67f7bec0d2a9 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -8573,6 +8573,27 @@ static int push_insn(int t, int w, int e, struct bpf_verifier_env *env, return DONE_EXPLORING; } +static int visit_func_call_insn(int t, int insn_cnt, + struct bpf_insn *insns, + struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + bool visit_callee) +{ + int ret; + + ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, false); + if (ret) + return ret; + + if (t + 1 < insn_cnt) + init_explored_state(env, t + 1); + if (visit_callee) { + init_explored_state(env, t); + ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].imm + 1, BRANCH, + env, false); + } + return ret; +} + /* Visits the instruction at index t and returns one of the following: * < 0 - an error occurred * DONE_EXPLORING - the instruction was fully explored @@ -8593,18 +8614,8 @@ static int visit_insn(int t, int insn_cnt, struct bpf_verifier_env *env) return DONE_EXPLORING; case BPF_CALL: - ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, false); - if (ret) - return ret; - - if (t + 1 < insn_cnt) - init_explored_state(env, t + 1); - if (insns[t].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) { - init_explored_state(env, t); - ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].imm + 1, BRANCH, - env, false); - } - return ret; + return visit_func_call_insn(t, insn_cnt, insns, env, + insns[t].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL); case BPF_JA: if (BPF_SRC(insns[t].code) != BPF_K) -- Gitee From 7894685cf02d04f13f0c9ecc4360cab848afbfb2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yonghong Song Date: Fri, 26 Feb 2021 12:49:22 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 04/23] bpf: Factor out verbose_invalid_scalar() ANBZ: #7670 commit bc2591d63fc91bd5a9aaff145148a224d892bdb8 upstream. Factor out the function verbose_invalid_scalar() to verbose print if a scalar is not in a tnum range. There is no functionality change and the function will be used by later patch which introduced bpf_for_each_map_elem(). Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210226204922.3884375-1-yhs@fb.com Signed-off-by: Tianchen Ding --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 67f7bec0d2a9..40fbf0d51c90 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -388,6 +388,24 @@ __printf(3, 4) static void verbose_linfo(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, env->prev_linfo = linfo; } +static void verbose_invalid_scalar(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + struct bpf_reg_state *reg, + struct tnum *range, const char *ctx, + const char *reg_name) +{ + char tn_buf[48]; + + verbose(env, "At %s the register %s ", ctx, reg_name); + if (!tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off)) { + tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); + verbose(env, "has value %s", tn_buf); + } else { + verbose(env, "has unknown scalar value"); + } + tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), *range); + verbose(env, " should have been in %s\n", tn_buf); +} + static bool type_is_pkt_pointer(enum bpf_reg_type type) { return type == PTR_TO_PACKET || @@ -8436,17 +8454,7 @@ static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) } if (!tnum_in(range, reg->var_off)) { - char tn_buf[48]; - - verbose(env, "At program exit the register R0 "); - if (!tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off)) { - tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); - verbose(env, "has value %s", tn_buf); - } else { - verbose(env, "has unknown scalar value"); - } - tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), range); - verbose(env, " should have been in %s\n", tn_buf); + verbose_invalid_scalar(env, reg, &range, "program exit", "R0"); return -EINVAL; } -- Gitee From 674138f0ccf7f6abe8d129eba0d18f6418de7954 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yonghong Song Date: Fri, 26 Feb 2021 12:49:23 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 05/23] bpf: Refactor check_func_call() to allow callback function ANBZ: #7670 commit 1435137573f9c75455903e8cd01f84d6e092ea16 upstream. Later proposed bpf_for_each_map_elem() helper has callback function as one of its arguments. This patch refactored check_func_call() to permit callback function which sets callee state. Different callback functions may have different callee states. There is no functionality change for this patch. Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210226204923.3884627-1-yhs@fb.com Signed-off-by: Tianchen Ding --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 40fbf0d51c90..74387345a852 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -5141,13 +5141,19 @@ static void clear_caller_saved_regs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, } } -static int check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, - int *insn_idx) +typedef int (*set_callee_state_fn)(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + struct bpf_func_state *caller, + struct bpf_func_state *callee, + int insn_idx); + +static int __check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, + int *insn_idx, int subprog, + set_callee_state_fn set_callee_state_cb) { struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; struct bpf_func_info_aux *func_info_aux; struct bpf_func_state *caller, *callee; - int i, err, subprog, target_insn; + int err; bool is_global = false; if (state->curframe + 1 >= MAX_CALL_FRAMES) { @@ -5156,14 +5162,6 @@ static int check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, return -E2BIG; } - target_insn = *insn_idx + insn->imm; - subprog = find_subprog(env, target_insn + 1); - if (subprog < 0) { - verbose(env, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n", - target_insn + 1); - return -EFAULT; - } - caller = state->frame[state->curframe]; if (state->frame[state->curframe + 1]) { verbose(env, "verifier bug. Frame %d already allocated\n", @@ -5218,11 +5216,9 @@ static int check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, if (err) return err; - /* copy r1 - r5 args that callee can access. The copy includes parent - * pointers, which connects us up to the liveness chain - */ - for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++) - callee->regs[i] = caller->regs[i]; + err = set_callee_state_cb(env, caller, callee, *insn_idx); + if (err) + return err; clear_caller_saved_regs(env, caller->regs); @@ -5230,7 +5226,7 @@ static int check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, state->curframe++; /* and go analyze first insn of the callee */ - *insn_idx = target_insn; + *insn_idx = env->subprog_info[subprog].start - 1; if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { verbose(env, "caller:\n"); @@ -5241,6 +5237,36 @@ static int check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, return 0; } +static int set_callee_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + struct bpf_func_state *caller, + struct bpf_func_state *callee, int insn_idx) +{ + int i; + + /* copy r1 - r5 args that callee can access. The copy includes parent + * pointers, which connects us up to the liveness chain + */ + for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++) + callee->regs[i] = caller->regs[i]; + return 0; +} + +static int check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, + int *insn_idx) +{ + int subprog, target_insn; + + target_insn = *insn_idx + insn->imm + 1; + subprog = find_subprog(env, target_insn); + if (subprog < 0) { + verbose(env, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n", + target_insn); + return -EFAULT; + } + + return __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx, subprog, set_callee_state); +} + static int prepare_func_exit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *insn_idx) { struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; -- Gitee From 4e0d08960c0f414f2f71114cd105f66c06ef44c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yonghong Song Date: Fri, 26 Feb 2021 12:49:24 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 06/23] bpf: Change return value of verifier function add_subprog() ANBZ: #7670 commit 282a0f46d6cda7cf843cd77c9b53b4d1d9e31302 upstream. Currently, verifier function add_subprog() returns 0 for success and negative value for failure. Change the return value to be the subprog number for success. This functionality will be used in the next patch to save a call to find_subprog(). Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210226204924.3884848-1-yhs@fb.com Signed-off-by: Tianchen Ding --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 74387345a852..e59b41946bf9 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -1484,7 +1484,7 @@ static int add_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off) } ret = find_subprog(env, off); if (ret >= 0) - return 0; + return ret; if (env->subprog_cnt >= BPF_MAX_SUBPROGS) { verbose(env, "too many subprograms\n"); return -E2BIG; @@ -1492,7 +1492,7 @@ static int add_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off) env->subprog_info[env->subprog_cnt++].start = off; sort(env->subprog_info, env->subprog_cnt, sizeof(env->subprog_info[0]), cmp_subprogs, NULL); - return 0; + return env->subprog_cnt - 1; } static int check_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) -- Gitee From d44c745b75c34e99bd8c5fd7d825095f50daba51 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yonghong Song Date: Fri, 26 Feb 2021 12:49:25 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 07/23] bpf: Add bpf_for_each_map_elem() helper ANBZ: #7670 commit 69c087ba6225b574afb6e505b72cb75242a3d844 upstream. The bpf_for_each_map_elem() helper is introduced which iterates all map elements with a callback function. The helper signature looks like long bpf_for_each_map_elem(map, callback_fn, callback_ctx, flags) and for each map element, the callback_fn will be called. For example, like hashmap, the callback signature may look like long callback_fn(map, key, val, callback_ctx) There are two known use cases for this. One is from upstream ([1]) where a for_each_map_elem helper may help implement a timeout mechanism in a more generic way. Another is from our internal discussion for a firewall use case where a map contains all the rules. The packet data can be compared to all these rules to decide allow or deny the packet. For array maps, users can already use a bounded loop to traverse elements. Using this helper can avoid using bounded loop. For other type of maps (e.g., hash maps) where bounded loop is hard or impossible to use, this helper provides a convenient way to operate on all elements. For callback_fn, besides map and map element, a callback_ctx, allocated on caller stack, is also passed to the callback function. This callback_ctx argument can provide additional input and allow to write to caller stack for output. If the callback_fn returns 0, the helper will iterate through next element if available. If the callback_fn returns 1, the helper will stop iterating and returns to the bpf program. Other return values are not used for now. Currently, this helper is only available with jit. It is possible to make it work with interpreter with so effort but I leave it as the future work. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210122205415.113822-1-xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210226204925.3884923-1-yhs@fb.com [dtcccc: Adjust defination of bpf_arg_type since we've already picked 0f8040e40c03 ("bpf: Replace ARG_XXX_OR_NULL with ARG_XXX | PTR_MAYBE_NULL"). For KABI compatibility, build a new enum bpf_reg_type_extra. Merge 80847a71b270 ("bpf: Undo ptr_to_map_key alu sanitation for now") in this commit to solve conflicts. Add comments for bpf uapi and known_types for bpf_helpers_doc to generate helper id correctly.] Signed-off-by: Tianchen Ding --- include/linux/bpf.h | 22 +++- include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 3 + include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 110 +++++++++++++++++++ kernel/bpf/bpf_iter.c | 16 +++ kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 2 + kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 191 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 2 + scripts/bpf_helpers_doc.py | 4 + tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 110 +++++++++++++++++++ 9 files changed, 445 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h index 86eceebef02c..1026c2708d9c 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf.h @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ struct seq_operations; struct bpf_iter_aux_info; struct bpf_local_storage; struct bpf_local_storage_map; +struct bpf_func_state; extern struct idr btf_idr; extern spinlock_t btf_idr_lock; @@ -136,8 +137,11 @@ struct bpf_map_ops { /* bpf_iter info used to open a seq_file */ const struct bpf_iter_seq_info *iter_seq_info; - CK_KABI_RESERVE(1) - CK_KABI_RESERVE(2) + CK_KABI_USE(1, int (*map_set_for_each_callback_args)(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + struct bpf_func_state *caller, + struct bpf_func_state *callee)) + CK_KABI_USE(2, int (*map_for_each_callback)(struct bpf_map *map, void *callback_fn, + void *callback_ctx, u64 flags)) CK_KABI_RESERVE(3) CK_KABI_RESERVE(4) }; @@ -332,6 +336,8 @@ enum bpf_arg_type { ARG_CONST_ALLOC_SIZE_OR_ZERO, /* number of allocated bytes requested */ ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID_SOCK_COMMON, /* pointer to in-kernel sock_common or bpf-mirrored bpf_sock */ ARG_PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID, /* pointer to in-kernel percpu type */ + ARG_PTR_TO_FUNC, /* pointer to a bpf program function */ + ARG_PTR_TO_STACK, /* pointer to stack */ __BPF_ARG_TYPE_MAX, /* Extended arg_types. */ @@ -340,6 +346,7 @@ enum bpf_arg_type { ARG_PTR_TO_CTX_OR_NULL = PTR_MAYBE_NULL | ARG_PTR_TO_CTX, ARG_PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL = PTR_MAYBE_NULL | ARG_PTR_TO_SOCKET, ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_MEM_OR_NULL = PTR_MAYBE_NULL | ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_MEM, + ARG_PTR_TO_STACK_OR_NULL = PTR_MAYBE_NULL | ARG_PTR_TO_STACK, /* This must be the last entry. Its purpose is to ensure the enum is * wide enough to hold the higher bits reserved for bpf_type_flag. @@ -478,7 +485,15 @@ enum bpf_reg_type { */ __BPF_REG_TYPE_LIMIT = BPF_TYPE_LIMIT, }; -static_assert(__BPF_REG_TYPE_MAX <= BPF_BASE_TYPE_LIMIT); + +/* For KABI compatibility, we build a new enum bpf_reg_type. */ +enum bpf_reg_type_extra { + BPF_REG_TYPE_EXTRA_START = __BPF_REG_TYPE_MAX - 1, + PTR_TO_FUNC, /* reg points to a bpf program function */ + PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, /* reg points to a map element key */ + __BPF_REG_TYPE_EXTRA_MAX, +}; +static_assert(__BPF_REG_TYPE_EXTRA_MAX <= BPF_BASE_TYPE_LIMIT); /* The information passed from prog-specific *_is_valid_access * back to the verifier. @@ -1995,6 +2010,7 @@ extern const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_snprintf_btf_proto; extern const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_per_cpu_ptr_proto; extern const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_this_cpu_ptr_proto; extern const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_ktime_get_coarse_ns_proto; +extern const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_for_each_map_elem_proto; const struct bpf_func_proto *bpf_tracing_func_proto( enum bpf_func_id func_id, const struct bpf_prog *prog); diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h index 7c0770263d7d..f5d8d46f2f2c 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h @@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ struct bpf_reg_state { /* Max size from any of the above. */ unsigned long raw; + + u32 subprogno; /* for PTR_TO_FUNC */ }; /* Fixed part of pointer offset, pointer types only */ s32 off; @@ -199,6 +201,7 @@ struct bpf_func_state { int acquired_refs; struct bpf_reference_state *refs; int allocated_stack; + bool in_callback_fn; struct bpf_stack_state *stack; CK_KABI_RESERVE(1) diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h index 47a04320a614..bde0cb21d7f7 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h @@ -393,6 +393,15 @@ enum bpf_link_type { * is struct/union. */ #define BPF_PSEUDO_BTF_ID 3 +/* insn[0].src_reg: BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC + * insn[0].imm: insn offset to the func + * insn[1].imm: 0 + * insn[0].off: 0 + * insn[1].off: 0 + * ldimm64 rewrite: address of the function + * verifier type: PTR_TO_FUNC. + */ +#define BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC 4 /* when bpf_call->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL, bpf_call->imm == pc-relative * offset to another bpf function @@ -3830,6 +3839,104 @@ union bpf_attr { * The **hash_algo** is returned on success, * **-EOPNOTSUP** if IMA is disabled or **-EINVAL** if * invalid arguments are passed. + * + * struct socket *bpf_sock_from_file(struct file *file) + * Description + * If the given file represents a socket, returns the associated + * socket. + * Return + * A pointer to a struct socket on success or NULL if the file is + * not a socket. + * + * long bpf_check_mtu(void *ctx, u32 ifindex, u32 *mtu_len, s32 len_diff, u64 flags) + * Description + * Check ctx packet size against exceeding MTU of net device (based + * on *ifindex*). This helper will likely be used in combination + * with helpers that adjust/change the packet size. + * + * The argument *len_diff* can be used for querying with a planned + * size change. This allows to check MTU prior to changing packet + * ctx. Providing an *len_diff* adjustment that is larger than the + * actual packet size (resulting in negative packet size) will in + * principle not exceed the MTU, why it is not considered a + * failure. Other BPF-helpers are needed for performing the + * planned size change, why the responsability for catch a negative + * packet size belong in those helpers. + * + * Specifying *ifindex* zero means the MTU check is performed + * against the current net device. This is practical if this isn't + * used prior to redirect. + * + * The Linux kernel route table can configure MTUs on a more + * specific per route level, which is not provided by this helper. + * For route level MTU checks use the **bpf_fib_lookup**\ () + * helper. + * + * *ctx* is either **struct xdp_md** for XDP programs or + * **struct sk_buff** for tc cls_act programs. + * + * The *flags* argument can be a combination of one or more of the + * following values: + * + * **BPF_MTU_CHK_SEGS** + * This flag will only works for *ctx* **struct sk_buff**. + * If packet context contains extra packet segment buffers + * (often knows as GSO skb), then MTU check is harder to + * check at this point, because in transmit path it is + * possible for the skb packet to get re-segmented + * (depending on net device features). This could still be + * a MTU violation, so this flag enables performing MTU + * check against segments, with a different violation + * return code to tell it apart. Check cannot use len_diff. + * + * On return *mtu_len* pointer contains the MTU value of the net + * device. Remember the net device configured MTU is the L3 size, + * which is returned here and XDP and TX length operate at L2. + * Helper take this into account for you, but remember when using + * MTU value in your BPF-code. On input *mtu_len* must be a valid + * pointer and be initialized (to zero), else verifier will reject + * BPF program. + * + * Return + * * 0 on success, and populate MTU value in *mtu_len* pointer. + * + * * < 0 if any input argument is invalid (*mtu_len* not updated) + * + * MTU violations return positive values, but also populate MTU + * value in *mtu_len* pointer, as this can be needed for + * implementing PMTU handing: + * + * * **BPF_MTU_CHK_RET_FRAG_NEEDED** + * * **BPF_MTU_CHK_RET_SEGS_TOOBIG** + * + * long bpf_for_each_map_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *callback_fn, void *callback_ctx, u64 flags) + * Description + * For each element in **map**, call **callback_fn** function with + * **map**, **callback_ctx** and other map-specific parameters. + * The **callback_fn** should be a static function and + * the **callback_ctx** should be a pointer to the stack. + * The **flags** is used to control certain aspects of the helper. + * Currently, the **flags** must be 0. + * + * The following are a list of supported map types and their + * respective expected callback signatures: + * + * BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH, BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH, + * BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_HASH, BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_PERCPU_HASH, + * BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY, BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY + * + * long (\*callback_fn)(struct bpf_map \*map, const void \*key, void \*value, void \*ctx); + * + * For per_cpu maps, the map_value is the value on the cpu where the + * bpf_prog is running. + * + * If **callback_fn** return 0, the helper will continue to the next + * element. If return value is 1, the helper will skip the rest of + * elements and return. Other return values are not used now. + * + * Return + * The number of traversed map elements for success, **-EINVAL** for + * invalid **flags**. */ #define __BPF_FUNC_MAPPER(FN) \ FN(unspec), \ @@ -3994,6 +4101,9 @@ union bpf_attr { FN(bprm_opts_set), \ FN(ktime_get_coarse_ns), \ FN(ima_inode_hash), \ + FN(sock_from_file), \ + FN(check_mtu), \ + FN(for_each_map_elem), \ /* */ /* integer value in 'imm' field of BPF_CALL instruction selects which helper diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_iter.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_iter.c index e8957e911de3..10319005b95b 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_iter.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_iter.c @@ -661,3 +661,19 @@ int bpf_iter_run_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog, void *ctx) */ return ret == 0 ? 0 : -EAGAIN; } + +BPF_CALL_4(bpf_for_each_map_elem, struct bpf_map *, map, void *, callback_fn, + void *, callback_ctx, u64, flags) +{ + return map->ops->map_for_each_callback(map, callback_fn, callback_ctx, flags); +} + +const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_for_each_map_elem_proto = { + .func = bpf_for_each_map_elem, + .gpl_only = false, + .ret_type = RET_INTEGER, + .arg1_type = ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR, + .arg2_type = ARG_PTR_TO_FUNC, + .arg3_type = ARG_PTR_TO_STACK_OR_NULL, + .arg4_type = ARG_ANYTHING, +}; diff --git a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c index 896e08917d42..08444b2af754 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c @@ -716,6 +716,8 @@ bpf_base_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id) return &bpf_ringbuf_discard_proto; case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_query: return &bpf_ringbuf_query_proto; + case BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem: + return &bpf_for_each_map_elem_proto; default: break; } diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index e59b41946bf9..e04c464d2c27 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -234,6 +234,12 @@ static bool bpf_pseudo_call(const struct bpf_insn *insn) insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL; } +static bool bpf_pseudo_func(const struct bpf_insn *insn) +{ + return insn->code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW) && + insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC; +} + struct bpf_call_arg_meta { struct bpf_map *map_ptr; bool raw_mode; @@ -246,6 +252,7 @@ struct bpf_call_arg_meta { int func_id; u32 btf_id; u32 ret_btf_id; + u32 subprogno; }; struct btf *btf_vmlinux; @@ -425,6 +432,7 @@ static bool reg_type_not_null(enum bpf_reg_type type) return type == PTR_TO_SOCKET || type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK || type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE || + type == PTR_TO_MAP_KEY || type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON; } @@ -535,6 +543,8 @@ static const char *reg_type_str(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, [PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID] = "percpu_ptr_", [PTR_TO_MEM] = "mem", [PTR_TO_BUF] = "buf", + [PTR_TO_FUNC] = "func", + [PTR_TO_MAP_KEY] = "map_key", }; if (type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL) { @@ -622,6 +632,7 @@ static void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, if (type_is_pkt_pointer(t)) verbose(env, ",r=%d", reg->range); else if (base_type(t) == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP || + base_type(t) == PTR_TO_MAP_KEY || base_type(t) == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) verbose(env, ",ks=%d,vs=%d", reg->map_ptr->key_size, @@ -1509,6 +1520,19 @@ static int check_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) /* determine subprog starts. The end is one before the next starts */ for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { + if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn + i)) { + if (!env->bpf_capable) { + verbose(env, + "function pointers are allowed for CAP_BPF and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"); + return -EPERM; + } + ret = add_subprog(env, i + insn[i].imm + 1); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + /* remember subprog */ + insn[i + 1].imm = ret; + continue; + } if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn + i)) continue; if (!env->bpf_capable) { @@ -2231,6 +2255,8 @@ static bool is_spillable_regtype(enum bpf_reg_type type) case PTR_TO_BUF: case PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID: case PTR_TO_MEM: + case PTR_TO_FUNC: + case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: return true; default: return false; @@ -2811,6 +2837,10 @@ static int __check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, reg = &cur_regs(env)[regno]; switch (reg->type) { + case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: + verbose(env, "invalid access to map key, key_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", + mem_size, off, size); + break; case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: verbose(env, "invalid access to map value, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", mem_size, off, size); @@ -3212,6 +3242,9 @@ static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS: pointer_desc = "flow keys "; break; + case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: + pointer_desc = "key "; + break; case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: pointer_desc = "value "; break; @@ -3313,7 +3346,7 @@ static int check_max_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) continue_func: subprog_end = subprog[idx + 1].start; for (; i < subprog_end; i++) { - if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn + i)) + if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn + i) && !bpf_pseudo_func(insn + i)) continue; /* remember insn and function to return to */ ret_insn[frame] = i + 1; @@ -3767,7 +3800,19 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn /* for access checks, reg->off is just part of off */ off += reg->off; - if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { + if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_KEY) { + if (t == BPF_WRITE) { + verbose(env, "write to change key R%d not allowed\n", regno); + return -EACCES; + } + + err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size, + reg->map_ptr->key_size, false); + if (err) + return err; + if (value_regno >= 0) + mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); + } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into map\n", value_regno); @@ -4156,6 +4201,9 @@ static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: return check_packet_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, zero_size_allowed); + case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: + return check_mem_region_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, + reg->map_ptr->key_size, false); case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: if (check_map_access_type(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, meta && meta->raw_mode ? BPF_WRITE : @@ -4353,6 +4401,7 @@ static const struct bpf_reg_types map_key_value_types = { PTR_TO_STACK, PTR_TO_PACKET, PTR_TO_PACKET_META, + PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, }, }; @@ -4384,6 +4433,7 @@ static const struct bpf_reg_types mem_types = { PTR_TO_STACK, PTR_TO_PACKET, PTR_TO_PACKET_META, + PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, PTR_TO_MEM, PTR_TO_BUF, @@ -4395,6 +4445,7 @@ static const struct bpf_reg_types int_ptr_types = { PTR_TO_STACK, PTR_TO_PACKET, PTR_TO_PACKET_META, + PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, }, }; @@ -4407,6 +4458,8 @@ static const struct bpf_reg_types const_map_ptr_types = { .types = { CONST_PTR_T static const struct bpf_reg_types btf_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_BTF_ID } }; static const struct bpf_reg_types spin_lock_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE } }; static const struct bpf_reg_types percpu_btf_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID } }; +static const struct bpf_reg_types func_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_FUNC } }; +static const struct bpf_reg_types stack_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_STACK } }; static const struct bpf_reg_types *compatible_reg_types[__BPF_ARG_TYPE_MAX] = { [ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY] = &map_key_value_types, @@ -4430,6 +4483,8 @@ static const struct bpf_reg_types *compatible_reg_types[__BPF_ARG_TYPE_MAX] = { [ARG_PTR_TO_INT] = &int_ptr_types, [ARG_PTR_TO_LONG] = &int_ptr_types, [ARG_PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID] = &percpu_btf_ptr_types, + [ARG_PTR_TO_FUNC] = &func_ptr_types, + [ARG_PTR_TO_STACK] = &stack_ptr_types, }; static int check_reg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, @@ -4633,6 +4688,8 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg, verbose(env, "verifier internal error\n"); return -EFAULT; } + } else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_FUNC) { + meta->subprogno = reg->subprogno; } else if (arg_type_is_mem_ptr(arg_type)) { /* The access to this pointer is only checked when we hit the * next is_mem_size argument below. @@ -5267,6 +5324,35 @@ static int check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, return __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx, subprog, set_callee_state); } +static int set_map_elem_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + struct bpf_func_state *caller, + struct bpf_func_state *callee, + int insn_idx) +{ + struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx]; + struct bpf_map *map; + int err; + + if (bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(insn_aux)) { + verbose(env, "tail_call abusing map_ptr\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + map = BPF_MAP_PTR(insn_aux->map_ptr_state); + if (!map->ops->map_set_for_each_callback_args || + !map->ops->map_for_each_callback) { + verbose(env, "callback function not allowed for map\n"); + return -ENOTSUPP; + } + + err = map->ops->map_set_for_each_callback_args(env, caller, callee); + if (err) + return err; + + callee->in_callback_fn = true; + return 0; +} + static int prepare_func_exit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *insn_idx) { struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; @@ -5289,8 +5375,22 @@ static int prepare_func_exit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *insn_idx) state->curframe--; caller = state->frame[state->curframe]; - /* return to the caller whatever r0 had in the callee */ - caller->regs[BPF_REG_0] = *r0; + if (callee->in_callback_fn) { + /* enforce R0 return value range [0, 1]. */ + struct tnum range = tnum_range(0, 1); + + if (r0->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { + verbose(env, "R0 not a scalar value\n"); + return -EACCES; + } + if (!tnum_in(range, r0->var_off)) { + verbose_invalid_scalar(env, r0, &range, "callback return", "R0"); + return -EINVAL; + } + } else { + /* return to the caller whatever r0 had in the callee */ + caller->regs[BPF_REG_0] = *r0; + } /* Transfer references to the caller */ err = transfer_reference_state(caller, callee); @@ -5343,7 +5443,8 @@ record_func_map(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem && func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem && func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem && - func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem) + func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem && + func_id != BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem) return 0; if (map == NULL) { @@ -5422,17 +5523,20 @@ static int check_reference_leak(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) return state->acquired_refs ? -EINVAL : 0; } -static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id, int insn_idx) +static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, + int *insn_idx_p) { const struct bpf_func_proto *fn = NULL; enum bpf_return_type ret_type; enum bpf_type_flag ret_flag; struct bpf_reg_state *regs; struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta; + int insn_idx = *insn_idx_p; bool changes_data; - int i, err; + int i, err, func_id; /* find function prototype */ + func_id = insn->imm; if (func_id < 0 || func_id >= __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID) { verbose(env, "invalid func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id), func_id); @@ -5528,6 +5632,13 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id, int insn return -EINVAL; } + if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem) { + err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno, + set_map_elem_callback_state); + if (err < 0) + return -EINVAL; + } + /* reset caller saved regs */ for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) { mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); @@ -8254,6 +8365,24 @@ static int check_ld_imm(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) return 0; } + if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC) { + struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; + u32 subprogno = insn[1].imm; + + if (!aux->func_info) { + verbose(env, "missing btf func_info\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + if (aux->func_info_aux[subprogno].linkage != BTF_FUNC_STATIC) { + verbose(env, "callback function not static\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + dst_reg->type = PTR_TO_FUNC; + dst_reg->subprogno = subprogno; + return 0; + } + map = env->used_maps[aux->map_index]; mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); dst_reg->map_ptr = map; @@ -8638,6 +8767,9 @@ static int visit_insn(int t, int insn_cnt, struct bpf_verifier_env *env) struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi; int ret; + if (bpf_pseudo_func(insns + t)) + return visit_func_call_insn(t, insn_cnt, insns, env, true); + /* All non-branch instructions have a single fall-through edge. */ if (BPF_CLASS(insns[t].code) != BPF_JMP && BPF_CLASS(insns[t].code) != BPF_JMP32) @@ -9255,6 +9387,7 @@ static bool regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *rold, */ return false; } + case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: /* a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE could be safe to use as a * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL into the same map. @@ -10081,10 +10214,9 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) err = check_func_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); else - err = check_helper_call(env, insn->imm, env->insn_idx); + err = check_helper_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); if (err) return err; - } else if (opcode == BPF_JA) { if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || insn->imm != 0 || @@ -10439,6 +10571,12 @@ static int resolve_pseudo_ldimm64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) goto next_insn; } + if (insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC) { + aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i]; + aux->ptr_type = PTR_TO_FUNC; + goto next_insn; + } + /* In final convert_pseudo_ld_imm64() step, this is * converted into regular 64-bit imm load insn. */ @@ -10564,9 +10702,13 @@ static void convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; int i; - for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) - if (insn->code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) - insn->src_reg = 0; + for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { + if (insn->code != (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) + continue; + if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC) + continue; + insn->src_reg = 0; + } } /* single env->prog->insni[off] instruction was replaced with the range @@ -11203,6 +11345,12 @@ static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) return 0; for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { + if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) { + env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm = insn->imm; + /* subprog is encoded in insn[1].imm */ + continue; + } + if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) continue; /* Upon error here we cannot fall back to interpreter but @@ -11306,6 +11454,12 @@ static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { insn = func[i]->insnsi; for (j = 0; j < func[i]->len; j++, insn++) { + if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) { + subprog = insn[1].imm; + insn[0].imm = (u32)(long)func[subprog]->bpf_func; + insn[1].imm = ((u64)(long)func[subprog]->bpf_func) >> 32; + continue; + } if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) continue; subprog = insn->off; @@ -11351,6 +11505,11 @@ static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) * later look the same as if they were interpreted only. */ for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { + if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) { + insn[0].imm = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm; + insn[1].imm = find_subprog(env, i + insn[0].imm + 1); + continue; + } if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) continue; insn->off = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm; @@ -11423,6 +11582,14 @@ static int fixup_call_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) return -EINVAL; } for (i = 0; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { + if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) { + /* When JIT fails the progs with callback calls + * have to be rejected, since interpreter doesn't support them yet. + */ + verbose(env, "callbacks are not allowed in non-JITed programs\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) continue; depth = get_callee_stack_depth(env, insn, i); diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c index 9e76c49041c6..238847081a24 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c @@ -1354,6 +1354,8 @@ bpf_tracing_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, const struct bpf_prog *prog) return &bpf_per_cpu_ptr_proto; case BPF_FUNC_this_cpu_ptr: return &bpf_this_cpu_ptr_proto; + case BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem: + return &bpf_for_each_map_elem_proto; default: return NULL; } diff --git a/scripts/bpf_helpers_doc.py b/scripts/bpf_helpers_doc.py index 8b829748d488..867ada23281c 100755 --- a/scripts/bpf_helpers_doc.py +++ b/scripts/bpf_helpers_doc.py @@ -437,6 +437,8 @@ class PrinterHelpers(Printer): 'struct path', 'struct btf_ptr', 'struct inode', + 'struct socket', + 'struct file', ] known_types = { '...', @@ -482,6 +484,8 @@ class PrinterHelpers(Printer): 'struct path', 'struct btf_ptr', 'struct inode', + 'struct socket', + 'struct file', } mapped_types = { 'u8': '__u8', diff --git a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h index baa42a75aed4..60e00df77507 100644 --- a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h +++ b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h @@ -393,6 +393,15 @@ enum bpf_link_type { * is struct/union. */ #define BPF_PSEUDO_BTF_ID 3 +/* insn[0].src_reg: BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC + * insn[0].imm: insn offset to the func + * insn[1].imm: 0 + * insn[0].off: 0 + * insn[1].off: 0 + * ldimm64 rewrite: address of the function + * verifier type: PTR_TO_FUNC. + */ +#define BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC 4 /* when bpf_call->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL, bpf_call->imm == pc-relative * offset to another bpf function @@ -3830,6 +3839,104 @@ union bpf_attr { * The **hash_algo** is returned on success, * **-EOPNOTSUP** if IMA is disabled or **-EINVAL** if * invalid arguments are passed. + * + * struct socket *bpf_sock_from_file(struct file *file) + * Description + * If the given file represents a socket, returns the associated + * socket. + * Return + * A pointer to a struct socket on success or NULL if the file is + * not a socket. + * + * long bpf_check_mtu(void *ctx, u32 ifindex, u32 *mtu_len, s32 len_diff, u64 flags) + * Description + * Check ctx packet size against exceeding MTU of net device (based + * on *ifindex*). This helper will likely be used in combination + * with helpers that adjust/change the packet size. + * + * The argument *len_diff* can be used for querying with a planned + * size change. This allows to check MTU prior to changing packet + * ctx. Providing an *len_diff* adjustment that is larger than the + * actual packet size (resulting in negative packet size) will in + * principle not exceed the MTU, why it is not considered a + * failure. Other BPF-helpers are needed for performing the + * planned size change, why the responsability for catch a negative + * packet size belong in those helpers. + * + * Specifying *ifindex* zero means the MTU check is performed + * against the current net device. This is practical if this isn't + * used prior to redirect. + * + * The Linux kernel route table can configure MTUs on a more + * specific per route level, which is not provided by this helper. + * For route level MTU checks use the **bpf_fib_lookup**\ () + * helper. + * + * *ctx* is either **struct xdp_md** for XDP programs or + * **struct sk_buff** for tc cls_act programs. + * + * The *flags* argument can be a combination of one or more of the + * following values: + * + * **BPF_MTU_CHK_SEGS** + * This flag will only works for *ctx* **struct sk_buff**. + * If packet context contains extra packet segment buffers + * (often knows as GSO skb), then MTU check is harder to + * check at this point, because in transmit path it is + * possible for the skb packet to get re-segmented + * (depending on net device features). This could still be + * a MTU violation, so this flag enables performing MTU + * check against segments, with a different violation + * return code to tell it apart. Check cannot use len_diff. + * + * On return *mtu_len* pointer contains the MTU value of the net + * device. Remember the net device configured MTU is the L3 size, + * which is returned here and XDP and TX length operate at L2. + * Helper take this into account for you, but remember when using + * MTU value in your BPF-code. On input *mtu_len* must be a valid + * pointer and be initialized (to zero), else verifier will reject + * BPF program. + * + * Return + * * 0 on success, and populate MTU value in *mtu_len* pointer. + * + * * < 0 if any input argument is invalid (*mtu_len* not updated) + * + * MTU violations return positive values, but also populate MTU + * value in *mtu_len* pointer, as this can be needed for + * implementing PMTU handing: + * + * * **BPF_MTU_CHK_RET_FRAG_NEEDED** + * * **BPF_MTU_CHK_RET_SEGS_TOOBIG** + * + * long bpf_for_each_map_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *callback_fn, void *callback_ctx, u64 flags) + * Description + * For each element in **map**, call **callback_fn** function with + * **map**, **callback_ctx** and other map-specific parameters. + * The **callback_fn** should be a static function and + * the **callback_ctx** should be a pointer to the stack. + * The **flags** is used to control certain aspects of the helper. + * Currently, the **flags** must be 0. + * + * The following are a list of supported map types and their + * respective expected callback signatures: + * + * BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH, BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH, + * BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_HASH, BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_PERCPU_HASH, + * BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY, BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY + * + * long (\*callback_fn)(struct bpf_map \*map, const void \*key, void \*value, void \*ctx); + * + * For per_cpu maps, the map_value is the value on the cpu where the + * bpf_prog is running. + * + * If **callback_fn** return 0, the helper will continue to the next + * element. If return value is 1, the helper will skip the rest of + * elements and return. Other return values are not used now. + * + * Return + * The number of traversed map elements for success, **-EINVAL** for + * invalid **flags**. */ #define __BPF_FUNC_MAPPER(FN) \ FN(unspec), \ @@ -3994,6 +4101,9 @@ union bpf_attr { FN(bprm_opts_set), \ FN(ktime_get_coarse_ns), \ FN(ima_inode_hash), \ + FN(sock_from_file), \ + FN(check_mtu), \ + FN(for_each_map_elem), \ /* */ /* integer value in 'imm' field of BPF_CALL instruction selects which helper -- Gitee From aeeb6995ecc8f367034acdc642b06a5c94145961 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yonghong Song Date: Fri, 26 Feb 2021 12:49:27 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 08/23] bpf: Add hashtab support for bpf_for_each_map_elem() helper ANBZ: #7670 commit 314ee05e2fc601a7bece14376547d2b7a04bab67 upstream. This patch added support for hashmap, percpu hashmap, lru hashmap and percpu lru hashmap. Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210226204927.3885020-1-yhs@fb.com Signed-off-by: Tianchen Ding --- include/linux/bpf.h | 4 +++ kernel/bpf/hashtab.c | 65 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 96 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h index 1026c2708d9c..96a37fff0503 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf.h @@ -1477,6 +1477,10 @@ void bpf_iter_map_show_fdinfo(const struct bpf_iter_aux_info *aux, int bpf_iter_map_fill_link_info(const struct bpf_iter_aux_info *aux, struct bpf_link_info *info); +int map_set_for_each_callback_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + struct bpf_func_state *caller, + struct bpf_func_state *callee); + int bpf_percpu_hash_copy(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value); int bpf_percpu_array_copy(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value); int bpf_percpu_hash_update(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value, diff --git a/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c b/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c index cccabeb0f0f1..6452d4bbf02a 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c @@ -1982,6 +1982,63 @@ static const struct bpf_iter_seq_info iter_seq_info = { .seq_priv_size = sizeof(struct bpf_iter_seq_hash_map_info), }; +static int bpf_for_each_hash_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *callback_fn, + void *callback_ctx, u64 flags) +{ + struct bpf_htab *htab = container_of(map, struct bpf_htab, map); + struct hlist_nulls_head *head; + struct hlist_nulls_node *n; + struct htab_elem *elem; + u32 roundup_key_size; + int i, num_elems = 0; + void __percpu *pptr; + struct bucket *b; + void *key, *val; + bool is_percpu; + u64 ret = 0; + + if (flags != 0) + return -EINVAL; + + is_percpu = htab_is_percpu(htab); + + roundup_key_size = round_up(map->key_size, 8); + /* disable migration so percpu value prepared here will be the + * same as the one seen by the bpf program with bpf_map_lookup_elem(). + */ + if (is_percpu) + migrate_disable(); + for (i = 0; i < htab->n_buckets; i++) { + b = &htab->buckets[i]; + rcu_read_lock(); + head = &b->head; + hlist_nulls_for_each_entry_rcu(elem, n, head, hash_node) { + key = elem->key; + if (is_percpu) { + /* current cpu value for percpu map */ + pptr = htab_elem_get_ptr(elem, map->key_size); + val = this_cpu_ptr(pptr); + } else { + val = elem->key + roundup_key_size; + } + num_elems++; + ret = BPF_CAST_CALL(callback_fn)((u64)(long)map, + (u64)(long)key, (u64)(long)val, + (u64)(long)callback_ctx, 0); + /* return value: 0 - continue, 1 - stop and return */ + if (ret) { + rcu_read_unlock(); + goto out; + } + } + rcu_read_unlock(); + } +out: + if (is_percpu) + migrate_enable(); + return num_elems; +} + static int htab_map_btf_id; const struct bpf_map_ops htab_map_ops = { .map_meta_equal = bpf_map_meta_equal, @@ -1995,6 +2052,8 @@ const struct bpf_map_ops htab_map_ops = { .map_delete_elem = htab_map_delete_elem, .map_gen_lookup = htab_map_gen_lookup, .map_seq_show_elem = htab_map_seq_show_elem, + .map_set_for_each_callback_args = map_set_for_each_callback_args, + .map_for_each_callback = bpf_for_each_hash_elem, BATCH_OPS(htab), .map_btf_name = "bpf_htab", .map_btf_id = &htab_map_btf_id, @@ -2015,6 +2074,8 @@ const struct bpf_map_ops htab_lru_map_ops = { .map_delete_elem = htab_lru_map_delete_elem, .map_gen_lookup = htab_lru_map_gen_lookup, .map_seq_show_elem = htab_map_seq_show_elem, + .map_set_for_each_callback_args = map_set_for_each_callback_args, + .map_for_each_callback = bpf_for_each_hash_elem, BATCH_OPS(htab_lru), .map_btf_name = "bpf_htab", .map_btf_id = &htab_lru_map_btf_id, @@ -2135,6 +2196,8 @@ const struct bpf_map_ops htab_percpu_map_ops = { .map_update_elem = htab_percpu_map_update_elem, .map_delete_elem = htab_map_delete_elem, .map_seq_show_elem = htab_percpu_map_seq_show_elem, + .map_set_for_each_callback_args = map_set_for_each_callback_args, + .map_for_each_callback = bpf_for_each_hash_elem, BATCH_OPS(htab_percpu), .map_btf_name = "bpf_htab", .map_btf_id = &htab_percpu_map_btf_id, @@ -2153,6 +2216,8 @@ const struct bpf_map_ops htab_lru_percpu_map_ops = { .map_update_elem = htab_lru_percpu_map_update_elem, .map_delete_elem = htab_lru_map_delete_elem, .map_seq_show_elem = htab_percpu_map_seq_show_elem, + .map_set_for_each_callback_args = map_set_for_each_callback_args, + .map_for_each_callback = bpf_for_each_hash_elem, BATCH_OPS(htab_lru_percpu), .map_btf_name = "bpf_htab", .map_btf_id = &htab_lru_percpu_map_btf_id, diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index e04c464d2c27..b0c75106bb53 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -5294,6 +5294,33 @@ static int __check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn return 0; } +int map_set_for_each_callback_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + struct bpf_func_state *caller, + struct bpf_func_state *callee) +{ + /* bpf_for_each_map_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *callback_fn, + * void *callback_ctx, u64 flags); + * callback_fn(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value, + * void *callback_ctx); + */ + callee->regs[BPF_REG_1] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1]; + + callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].type = PTR_TO_MAP_KEY; + __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_2]); + callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].map_ptr = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr; + + callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; + __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]); + callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].map_ptr = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr; + + /* pointer to stack or null */ + callee->regs[BPF_REG_4] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_3]; + + /* unused */ + __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); + return 0; +} + static int set_callee_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *caller, struct bpf_func_state *callee, int insn_idx) -- Gitee From 2a497c93c8dbc82daf1795a06be6b50902678de2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yonghong Song Date: Fri, 26 Feb 2021 12:49:28 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 09/23] bpf: Add arraymap support for bpf_for_each_map_elem() helper ANBZ: #7670 commit 06dcdcd4b9e84ee78d865c928b1d43bb71829251 upstream. This patch added support for arraymap and percpu arraymap. Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210226204928.3885192-1-yhs@fb.com Signed-off-by: Tianchen Ding --- kernel/bpf/arraymap.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c index 36c68dcea236..d7559a75e4c4 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c @@ -641,6 +641,42 @@ static const struct bpf_iter_seq_info iter_seq_info = { .seq_priv_size = sizeof(struct bpf_iter_seq_array_map_info), }; +static int bpf_for_each_array_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *callback_fn, + void *callback_ctx, u64 flags) +{ + u32 i, key, num_elems = 0; + struct bpf_array *array; + bool is_percpu; + u64 ret = 0; + void *val; + + if (flags != 0) + return -EINVAL; + + is_percpu = map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY; + array = container_of(map, struct bpf_array, map); + if (is_percpu) + migrate_disable(); + for (i = 0; i < map->max_entries; i++) { + if (is_percpu) + val = this_cpu_ptr(array->pptrs[i]); + else + val = array->value + array->elem_size * i; + num_elems++; + key = i; + ret = BPF_CAST_CALL(callback_fn)((u64)(long)map, + (u64)(long)&key, (u64)(long)val, + (u64)(long)callback_ctx, 0); + /* return value: 0 - continue, 1 - stop and return */ + if (ret) + break; + } + + if (is_percpu) + migrate_enable(); + return num_elems; +} + static int array_map_btf_id; const struct bpf_map_ops array_map_ops = { .map_meta_equal = array_map_meta_equal, @@ -659,6 +695,8 @@ const struct bpf_map_ops array_map_ops = { .map_check_btf = array_map_check_btf, .map_lookup_batch = generic_map_lookup_batch, .map_update_batch = generic_map_update_batch, + .map_set_for_each_callback_args = map_set_for_each_callback_args, + .map_for_each_callback = bpf_for_each_array_elem, .map_btf_name = "bpf_array", .map_btf_id = &array_map_btf_id, .iter_seq_info = &iter_seq_info, @@ -676,6 +714,8 @@ const struct bpf_map_ops percpu_array_map_ops = { .map_delete_elem = array_map_delete_elem, .map_seq_show_elem = percpu_array_map_seq_show_elem, .map_check_btf = array_map_check_btf, + .map_set_for_each_callback_args = map_set_for_each_callback_args, + .map_for_each_callback = bpf_for_each_array_elem, .map_btf_name = "bpf_array", .map_btf_id = &percpu_array_map_btf_id, .iter_seq_info = &iter_seq_info, -- Gitee From d66f529c7c9fd92f24f13ab5017486dafe1a3dce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yonghong Song Date: Fri, 26 Feb 2021 12:49:29 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 10/23] libbpf: Move function is_ldimm64() earlier in libbpf.c ANBZ: #7670 commit b8f871fa32ad392759bc70090fa8c60d9f10625c upstream. Move function is_ldimm64() close to the beginning of libbpf.c, so it can be reused by later code and the next patch as well. There is no functionality change. Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210226204929.3885295-1-yhs@fb.com Signed-off-by: Tianchen Ding --- tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c b/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c index 78326b8aa4a4..babe37e113f4 100644 --- a/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c +++ b/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c @@ -556,6 +556,11 @@ static bool insn_is_subprog_call(const struct bpf_insn *insn) insn->off == 0; } +static bool is_ldimm64(struct bpf_insn *insn) +{ + return insn->code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW); +} + static int bpf_object__init_prog(struct bpf_object *obj, struct bpf_program *prog, const char *name, size_t sec_idx, const char *sec_name, @@ -3380,7 +3385,7 @@ static int bpf_program__record_reloc(struct bpf_program *prog, return 0; } - if (insn->code != (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) { + if (!is_ldimm64(insn)) { pr_warn("prog '%s': invalid relo against '%s' for insns[%d].code 0x%x\n", prog->name, sym_name, insn_idx, insn->code); return -LIBBPF_ERRNO__RELOC; @@ -5431,11 +5436,6 @@ static void bpf_core_poison_insn(struct bpf_program *prog, int relo_idx, insn->imm = 195896080; /* => 0xbad2310 => "bad relo" */ } -static bool is_ldimm64(struct bpf_insn *insn) -{ - return insn->code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW); -} - static int insn_bpf_size_to_bytes(struct bpf_insn *insn) { switch (BPF_SIZE(insn->code)) { -- Gitee From fdeb969086e47c536a476d0e64682c2df330e862 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yonghong Song Date: Fri, 26 Feb 2021 12:49:30 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 11/23] libbpf: Support subprog address relocation ANBZ: #7670 commit 53eddb5e04ac5c53a4ccef9f1f900562a5a75246 upstream. A new relocation RELO_SUBPROG_ADDR is added to capture subprog addresses loaded with ld_imm64 insns. Such ld_imm64 insns are marked with BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC and will be passed to kernel. For bpf_for_each_map_elem() case, kernel will check that the to-be-used subprog address must be a static function and replace it with proper actual jited func address. Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210226204930.3885367-1-yhs@fb.com Signed-off-by: Tianchen Ding --- tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 61 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c b/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c index babe37e113f4..081839278a52 100644 --- a/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c +++ b/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c @@ -186,6 +186,7 @@ enum reloc_type { RELO_CALL, RELO_DATA, RELO_EXTERN, + RELO_SUBPROG_ADDR, }; struct reloc_desc { @@ -561,6 +562,11 @@ static bool is_ldimm64(struct bpf_insn *insn) return insn->code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW); } +static bool insn_is_pseudo_func(struct bpf_insn *insn) +{ + return is_ldimm64(insn) && insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC; +} + static int bpf_object__init_prog(struct bpf_object *obj, struct bpf_program *prog, const char *name, size_t sec_idx, const char *sec_name, @@ -2964,6 +2970,23 @@ static bool sym_is_extern(const GElf_Sym *sym) GELF_ST_TYPE(sym->st_info) == STT_NOTYPE; } +static bool sym_is_subprog(const GElf_Sym *sym, int text_shndx) +{ + int bind = GELF_ST_BIND(sym->st_info); + int type = GELF_ST_TYPE(sym->st_info); + + /* in .text section */ + if (sym->st_shndx != text_shndx) + return false; + + /* local function */ + if (bind == STB_LOCAL && type == STT_SECTION) + return true; + + /* global function */ + return bind == STB_GLOBAL && type == STT_FUNC; +} + static int find_extern_btf_id(const struct btf *btf, const char *ext_name) { const struct btf_type *t; @@ -3420,6 +3443,23 @@ static int bpf_program__record_reloc(struct bpf_program *prog, return -LIBBPF_ERRNO__RELOC; } + /* loading subprog addresses */ + if (sym_is_subprog(sym, obj->efile.text_shndx)) { + /* global_func: sym->st_value = offset in the section, insn->imm = 0. + * local_func: sym->st_value = 0, insn->imm = offset in the section. + */ + if ((sym->st_value % BPF_INSN_SZ) || (insn->imm % BPF_INSN_SZ)) { + pr_warn("prog '%s': bad subprog addr relo against '%s' at offset %zu+%d\n", + prog->name, sym_name, (size_t)sym->st_value, insn->imm); + return -LIBBPF_ERRNO__RELOC; + } + + reloc_desc->type = RELO_SUBPROG_ADDR; + reloc_desc->insn_idx = insn_idx; + reloc_desc->sym_off = sym->st_value; + return 0; + } + type = bpf_object__section_to_libbpf_map_type(obj, shdr_idx); sym_sec_name = elf_sec_name(obj, elf_sec_by_idx(obj, shdr_idx)); @@ -6046,6 +6086,10 @@ bpf_object__relocate_data(struct bpf_object *obj, struct bpf_program *prog) } relo->processed = true; break; + case RELO_SUBPROG_ADDR: + insn[0].src_reg = BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC; + /* will be handled as a follow up pass */ + break; case RELO_CALL: /* will be handled as a follow up pass */ break; @@ -6232,11 +6276,11 @@ bpf_object__reloc_code(struct bpf_object *obj, struct bpf_program *main_prog, for (insn_idx = 0; insn_idx < prog->sec_insn_cnt; insn_idx++) { insn = &main_prog->insns[prog->sub_insn_off + insn_idx]; - if (!insn_is_subprog_call(insn)) + if (!insn_is_subprog_call(insn) && !insn_is_pseudo_func(insn)) continue; relo = find_prog_insn_relo(prog, insn_idx); - if (relo && relo->type != RELO_CALL) { + if (relo && relo->type != RELO_CALL && relo->type != RELO_SUBPROG_ADDR) { pr_warn("prog '%s': unexpected relo for insn #%zu, type %d\n", prog->name, insn_idx, relo->type); return -LIBBPF_ERRNO__RELOC; @@ -6248,8 +6292,22 @@ bpf_object__reloc_code(struct bpf_object *obj, struct bpf_program *main_prog, * call always has imm = -1, but for static functions * relocation is against STT_SECTION and insn->imm * points to a start of a static function + * + * for subprog addr relocation, the relo->sym_off + insn->imm is + * the byte offset in the corresponding section. */ - sub_insn_idx = relo->sym_off / BPF_INSN_SZ + insn->imm + 1; + if (relo->type == RELO_CALL) + sub_insn_idx = relo->sym_off / BPF_INSN_SZ + insn->imm + 1; + else + sub_insn_idx = (relo->sym_off + insn->imm) / BPF_INSN_SZ; + } else if (insn_is_pseudo_func(insn)) { + /* + * RELO_SUBPROG_ADDR relo is always emitted even if both + * functions are in the same section, so it shouldn't reach here. + */ + pr_warn("prog '%s': missing subprog addr relo for insn #%zu\n", + prog->name, insn_idx); + return -LIBBPF_ERRNO__RELOC; } else { /* if subprogram call is to a static function within * the same ELF section, there won't be any relocation -- Gitee From 7e1eeef2d9229ee41bb35936113dd154d1d45241 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yonghong Song Date: Fri, 26 Feb 2021 12:49:31 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 12/23] bpftool: Print subprog address properly ANBZ: #7670 commit f1f9f0d8d737b9a1c5d15635bf5696643626fd39 upstream. With later hashmap example, using bpftool xlated output may look like: int dump_task(struct bpf_iter__task * ctx): ; struct task_struct *task = ctx->task; 0: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 +8) ; if (task == (void *)0 || called > 0) ... 19: (18) r2 = subprog[+17] 30: (18) r2 = subprog[+25] ... 36: (95) exit __u64 check_hash_elem(struct bpf_map * map, __u32 * key, __u64 * val, struct callback_ctx * data): ; struct bpf_iter__task *ctx = data->ctx; 37: (79) r5 = *(u64 *)(r4 +0) ... 55: (95) exit __u64 check_percpu_elem(struct bpf_map * map, __u32 * key, __u64 * val, void * unused): ; check_percpu_elem(struct bpf_map *map, __u32 *key, __u64 *val, void *unused) 56: (bf) r6 = r3 ... 83: (18) r2 = subprog[-47] Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210226204931.3885458-1-yhs@fb.com Signed-off-by: Tianchen Ding --- tools/bpf/bpftool/xlated_dumper.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/tools/bpf/bpftool/xlated_dumper.c b/tools/bpf/bpftool/xlated_dumper.c index 8608cd68cdd0..6fc3e6f7f40c 100644 --- a/tools/bpf/bpftool/xlated_dumper.c +++ b/tools/bpf/bpftool/xlated_dumper.c @@ -196,6 +196,9 @@ static const char *print_imm(void *private_data, else if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUE) snprintf(dd->scratch_buff, sizeof(dd->scratch_buff), "map[id:%u][0]+%u", insn->imm, (insn + 1)->imm); + else if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC) + snprintf(dd->scratch_buff, sizeof(dd->scratch_buff), + "subprog[%+d]", insn->imm); else snprintf(dd->scratch_buff, sizeof(dd->scratch_buff), "0x%llx", (unsigned long long)full_imm); -- Gitee From 484040ad81dc799a462c7225dc0b00bfb92c213f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yonghong Song Date: Fri, 26 Feb 2021 12:49:33 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 13/23] selftests/bpf: Add hashmap test for bpf_for_each_map_elem() helper ANBZ: #7670 commit 9de7f0fdab326a37c9f741f0f6c0f1cbc320a5ab upstream. A test case is added for hashmap and percpu hashmap. The test also exercises nested bpf_for_each_map_elem() calls like bpf_prog: bpf_for_each_map_elem(func1) func1: bpf_for_each_map_elem(func2) func2: $ ./test_progs -n 45 #45/1 hash_map:OK #45 for_each:OK Summary: 1/1 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210226204933.3885657-1-yhs@fb.com Signed-off-by: Tianchen Ding --- .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/for_each.c | 73 ++++++++++++++ .../bpf/progs/for_each_hash_map_elem.c | 95 +++++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.h | 11 +++ 3 files changed, 179 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/for_each.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/for_each_hash_map_elem.c diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/for_each.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/for_each.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..aa847cd9f71f --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/for_each.c @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* Copyright (c) 2021 Facebook */ +#include +#include +#include "for_each_hash_map_elem.skel.h" + +static unsigned int duration; + +static void test_hash_map(void) +{ + int i, err, hashmap_fd, max_entries, percpu_map_fd; + struct for_each_hash_map_elem *skel; + __u64 *percpu_valbuf = NULL; + __u32 key, num_cpus, retval; + __u64 val; + + skel = for_each_hash_map_elem__open_and_load(); + if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "for_each_hash_map_elem__open_and_load")) + return; + + hashmap_fd = bpf_map__fd(skel->maps.hashmap); + max_entries = bpf_map__max_entries(skel->maps.hashmap); + for (i = 0; i < max_entries; i++) { + key = i; + val = i + 1; + err = bpf_map_update_elem(hashmap_fd, &key, &val, BPF_ANY); + if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "map_update")) + goto out; + } + + num_cpus = bpf_num_possible_cpus(); + percpu_map_fd = bpf_map__fd(skel->maps.percpu_map); + percpu_valbuf = malloc(sizeof(__u64) * num_cpus); + if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(percpu_valbuf, "percpu_valbuf")) + goto out; + + key = 1; + for (i = 0; i < num_cpus; i++) + percpu_valbuf[i] = i + 1; + err = bpf_map_update_elem(percpu_map_fd, &key, percpu_valbuf, BPF_ANY); + if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "percpu_map_update")) + goto out; + + err = bpf_prog_test_run(bpf_program__fd(skel->progs.test_pkt_access), + 1, &pkt_v4, sizeof(pkt_v4), NULL, NULL, + &retval, &duration); + if (CHECK(err || retval, "ipv4", "err %d errno %d retval %d\n", + err, errno, retval)) + goto out; + + ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->hashmap_output, 4, "hashmap_output"); + ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->hashmap_elems, max_entries, "hashmap_elems"); + + key = 1; + err = bpf_map_lookup_elem(hashmap_fd, &key, &val); + ASSERT_ERR(err, "hashmap_lookup"); + + ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->percpu_called, 1, "percpu_called"); + ASSERT_LT(skel->bss->cpu, num_cpus, "num_cpus"); + ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->percpu_map_elems, 1, "percpu_map_elems"); + ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->percpu_key, 1, "percpu_key"); + ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->percpu_val, skel->bss->cpu + 1, "percpu_val"); + ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->percpu_output, 100, "percpu_output"); +out: + free(percpu_valbuf); + for_each_hash_map_elem__destroy(skel); +} + +void test_for_each(void) +{ + if (test__start_subtest("hash_map")) + test_hash_map(); +} diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/for_each_hash_map_elem.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/for_each_hash_map_elem.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..913dd91aafff --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/for_each_hash_map_elem.c @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* Copyright (c) 2021 Facebook */ +#include "vmlinux.h" +#include + +char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL"; + +struct { + __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH); + __uint(max_entries, 3); + __type(key, __u32); + __type(value, __u64); +} hashmap SEC(".maps"); + +struct { + __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH); + __uint(max_entries, 1); + __type(key, __u32); + __type(value, __u64); +} percpu_map SEC(".maps"); + +struct callback_ctx { + struct __sk_buff *ctx; + int input; + int output; +}; + +static __u64 +check_hash_elem(struct bpf_map *map, __u32 *key, __u64 *val, + struct callback_ctx *data) +{ + struct __sk_buff *skb = data->ctx; + __u32 k; + __u64 v; + + if (skb) { + k = *key; + v = *val; + if (skb->len == 10000 && k == 10 && v == 10) + data->output = 3; /* impossible path */ + else + data->output = 4; + } else { + data->output = data->input; + bpf_map_delete_elem(map, key); + } + + return 0; +} + +__u32 cpu = 0; +__u32 percpu_called = 0; +__u32 percpu_key = 0; +__u64 percpu_val = 0; +int percpu_output = 0; + +static __u64 +check_percpu_elem(struct bpf_map *map, __u32 *key, __u64 *val, + struct callback_ctx *unused) +{ + struct callback_ctx data; + + percpu_called++; + cpu = bpf_get_smp_processor_id(); + percpu_key = *key; + percpu_val = *val; + + data.ctx = 0; + data.input = 100; + data.output = 0; + bpf_for_each_map_elem(&hashmap, check_hash_elem, &data, 0); + percpu_output = data.output; + + return 0; +} + +int hashmap_output = 0; +int hashmap_elems = 0; +int percpu_map_elems = 0; + +SEC("classifier") +int test_pkt_access(struct __sk_buff *skb) +{ + struct callback_ctx data; + + data.ctx = skb; + data.input = 10; + data.output = 0; + hashmap_elems = bpf_for_each_map_elem(&hashmap, check_hash_elem, &data, 0); + hashmap_output = data.output; + + percpu_map_elems = bpf_for_each_map_elem(&percpu_map, check_percpu_elem, + (void *)0, 0); + return 0; +} diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.h b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.h index 91ca714ef1d5..0400ae1eb354 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.h @@ -185,6 +185,17 @@ extern int test__join_cgroup(const char *path); ___ok; \ }) +#define ASSERT_LT(actual, expected, name) ({ \ + static int duration = 0; \ + typeof(actual) ___act = (actual); \ + typeof(expected) ___exp = (expected); \ + bool ___ok = ___act < ___exp; \ + CHECK(!___ok, (name), \ + "unexpected %s: actual %lld >= expected %lld\n", \ + (name), (long long)(___act), (long long)(___exp)); \ + ___ok; \ +}) + #define ASSERT_STREQ(actual, expected, name) ({ \ static int duration = 0; \ const char *___act = actual; \ -- Gitee From e5a62d90b27fa4f2d5e97b8ec38d797925af9a8f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yonghong Song Date: Fri, 26 Feb 2021 12:49:34 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 14/23] selftests/bpf: Add arraymap test for bpf_for_each_map_elem() helper ANBZ: #7670 commit 6b9e3331347ee9e84fe5c71d3eba7ec204f9bb25 upstream. A test is added for arraymap and percpu arraymap. The test also exercises the early return for the helper which does not traverse all elements. $ ./test_progs -n 45 #45/1 hash_map:OK #45/2 array_map:OK #45 for_each:OK Summary: 1/2 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210226204934.3885756-1-yhs@fb.com Signed-off-by: Tianchen Ding --- .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/for_each.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++ .../bpf/progs/for_each_array_map_elem.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 118 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/for_each_array_map_elem.c diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/for_each.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/for_each.c index aa847cd9f71f..68eb12a287d4 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/for_each.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/for_each.c @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ #include #include #include "for_each_hash_map_elem.skel.h" +#include "for_each_array_map_elem.skel.h" static unsigned int duration; @@ -66,8 +67,64 @@ static void test_hash_map(void) for_each_hash_map_elem__destroy(skel); } +static void test_array_map(void) +{ + __u32 key, num_cpus, max_entries, retval; + int i, arraymap_fd, percpu_map_fd, err; + struct for_each_array_map_elem *skel; + __u64 *percpu_valbuf = NULL; + __u64 val, expected_total; + + skel = for_each_array_map_elem__open_and_load(); + if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "for_each_array_map_elem__open_and_load")) + return; + + arraymap_fd = bpf_map__fd(skel->maps.arraymap); + expected_total = 0; + max_entries = bpf_map__max_entries(skel->maps.arraymap); + for (i = 0; i < max_entries; i++) { + key = i; + val = i + 1; + /* skip the last iteration for expected total */ + if (i != max_entries - 1) + expected_total += val; + err = bpf_map_update_elem(arraymap_fd, &key, &val, BPF_ANY); + if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "map_update")) + goto out; + } + + num_cpus = bpf_num_possible_cpus(); + percpu_map_fd = bpf_map__fd(skel->maps.percpu_map); + percpu_valbuf = malloc(sizeof(__u64) * num_cpus); + if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(percpu_valbuf, "percpu_valbuf")) + goto out; + + key = 0; + for (i = 0; i < num_cpus; i++) + percpu_valbuf[i] = i + 1; + err = bpf_map_update_elem(percpu_map_fd, &key, percpu_valbuf, BPF_ANY); + if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "percpu_map_update")) + goto out; + + err = bpf_prog_test_run(bpf_program__fd(skel->progs.test_pkt_access), + 1, &pkt_v4, sizeof(pkt_v4), NULL, NULL, + &retval, &duration); + if (CHECK(err || retval, "ipv4", "err %d errno %d retval %d\n", + err, errno, retval)) + goto out; + + ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->arraymap_output, expected_total, "array_output"); + ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->cpu + 1, skel->bss->percpu_val, "percpu_val"); + +out: + free(percpu_valbuf); + for_each_array_map_elem__destroy(skel); +} + void test_for_each(void) { if (test__start_subtest("hash_map")) test_hash_map(); + if (test__start_subtest("array_map")) + test_array_map(); } diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/for_each_array_map_elem.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/for_each_array_map_elem.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..75e8e1069fe7 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/for_each_array_map_elem.c @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* Copyright (c) 2021 Facebook */ +#include "vmlinux.h" +#include + +char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL"; + +struct { + __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY); + __uint(max_entries, 3); + __type(key, __u32); + __type(value, __u64); +} arraymap SEC(".maps"); + +struct { + __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY); + __uint(max_entries, 1); + __type(key, __u32); + __type(value, __u64); +} percpu_map SEC(".maps"); + +struct callback_ctx { + int output; +}; + +static __u64 +check_array_elem(struct bpf_map *map, __u32 *key, __u64 *val, + struct callback_ctx *data) +{ + data->output += *val; + if (*key == 1) + return 1; /* stop the iteration */ + return 0; +} + +__u32 cpu = 0; +__u64 percpu_val = 0; + +static __u64 +check_percpu_elem(struct bpf_map *map, __u32 *key, __u64 *val, + struct callback_ctx *data) +{ + cpu = bpf_get_smp_processor_id(); + percpu_val = *val; + return 0; +} + +u32 arraymap_output = 0; + +SEC("classifier") +int test_pkt_access(struct __sk_buff *skb) +{ + struct callback_ctx data; + + data.output = 0; + bpf_for_each_map_elem(&arraymap, check_array_elem, &data, 0); + arraymap_output = data.output; + + bpf_for_each_map_elem(&percpu_map, check_percpu_elem, (void *)0, 0); + return 0; +} -- Gitee From 61041473ad2e5cd5a9d43e545634feaf1772f4fc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Martin KaFai Lau Date: Fri, 5 Nov 2021 18:40:14 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 15/23] bpf: Stop caching subprog index in the bpf_pseudo_func insn ANBZ: #7670 commit 3990ed4c426652fcd469f8c9dc08156294b36c28 upstream. This patch is to fix an out-of-bound access issue when jit-ing the bpf_pseudo_func insn (i.e. ld_imm64 with src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC) In jit_subprog(), it currently reuses the subprog index cached in insn[1].imm. This subprog index is an index into a few array related to subprogs. For example, in jit_subprog(), it is an index to the newly allocated 'struct bpf_prog **func' array. The subprog index was cached in insn[1].imm after add_subprog(). However, this could become outdated (and too big in this case) if some subprogs are completely removed during dead code elimination (in adjust_subprog_starts_after_remove). The cached index in insn[1].imm is not updated accordingly and causing out-of-bound issue in the later jit_subprog(). Unlike bpf_pseudo_'func' insn, the current bpf_pseudo_'call' insn is handling the DCE properly by calling find_subprog(insn->imm) to figure out the index instead of caching the subprog index. The existing bpf_adj_branches() will adjust the insn->imm whenever insn is added or removed. Instead of having two ways handling subprog index, this patch is to make bpf_pseudo_func works more like bpf_pseudo_call. First change is to stop caching the subprog index result in insn[1].imm after add_subprog(). The verification process will use find_subprog(insn->imm) to figure out the subprog index. Second change is in bpf_adj_branches() and have it to adjust the insn->imm for the bpf_pseudo_func insn also whenever insn is added or removed. Third change is in jit_subprog(). Like the bpf_pseudo_call handling, bpf_pseudo_func temporarily stores the find_subprog() result in insn->off. It is fine because the prog's insn has been finalized at this point. insn->off will be reset back to 0 later to avoid confusing the userspace prog dump tool. Fixes: 69c087ba6225 ("bpf: Add bpf_for_each_map_elem() helper") Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20211106014014.651018-1-kafai@fb.com Signed-off-by: Tianchen Ding --- include/linux/bpf.h | 6 ++++++ kernel/bpf/core.c | 7 +++++++ kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 29 ++++++++++++----------------- 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h index 96a37fff0503..a195032b32c5 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf.h @@ -516,6 +516,12 @@ bpf_ctx_record_field_size(struct bpf_insn_access_aux *aux, u32 size) aux->ctx_field_size = size; } +static inline bool bpf_pseudo_func(const struct bpf_insn *insn) +{ + return insn->code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW) && + insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC; +} + struct bpf_prog_ops { int (*test_run)(struct bpf_prog *prog, const union bpf_attr *kattr, union bpf_attr __user *uattr); diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c index 01ebf529b79d..7196eaab3336 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/core.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c @@ -396,6 +396,13 @@ static int bpf_adj_branches(struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 pos, s32 end_old, i = end_new; insn = prog->insnsi + end_old; } + if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) { + ret = bpf_adj_delta_to_imm(insn, pos, end_old, + end_new, i, probe_pass); + if (ret) + return ret; + continue; + } code = insn->code; if ((BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP && BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP32) || diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index b0c75106bb53..f3e6d4ebab1f 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -234,12 +234,6 @@ static bool bpf_pseudo_call(const struct bpf_insn *insn) insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL; } -static bool bpf_pseudo_func(const struct bpf_insn *insn) -{ - return insn->code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW) && - insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC; -} - struct bpf_call_arg_meta { struct bpf_map *map_ptr; bool raw_mode; @@ -1529,8 +1523,6 @@ static int check_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) ret = add_subprog(env, i + insn[i].imm + 1); if (ret < 0) return ret; - /* remember subprog */ - insn[i + 1].imm = ret; continue; } if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn + i)) @@ -8394,7 +8386,8 @@ static int check_ld_imm(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC) { struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; - u32 subprogno = insn[1].imm; + u32 subprogno = find_subprog(env, + env->insn_idx + insn->imm + 1); if (!aux->func_info) { verbose(env, "missing btf func_info\n"); @@ -11372,14 +11365,9 @@ static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) return 0; for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { - if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) { - env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm = insn->imm; - /* subprog is encoded in insn[1].imm */ + if (!bpf_pseudo_func(insn) && !bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) continue; - } - if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) - continue; /* Upon error here we cannot fall back to interpreter but * need a hard reject of the program. Thus -EFAULT is * propagated in any case. @@ -11400,6 +11388,12 @@ static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm = insn->imm; /* point imm to __bpf_call_base+1 from JITs point of view */ insn->imm = 1; + if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) + /* jit (e.g. x86_64) may emit fewer instructions + * if it learns a u32 imm is the same as a u64 imm. + * Force a non zero here. + */ + insn[1].imm = 1; } err = bpf_prog_alloc_jited_linfo(prog); @@ -11482,7 +11476,7 @@ static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) insn = func[i]->insnsi; for (j = 0; j < func[i]->len; j++, insn++) { if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) { - subprog = insn[1].imm; + subprog = insn->off; insn[0].imm = (u32)(long)func[subprog]->bpf_func; insn[1].imm = ((u64)(long)func[subprog]->bpf_func) >> 32; continue; @@ -11534,7 +11528,8 @@ static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) { insn[0].imm = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm; - insn[1].imm = find_subprog(env, i + insn[0].imm + 1); + insn[1].imm = insn->off; + insn->off = 0; continue; } if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) -- Gitee From fc81d740e9504b859b846602e0459256a3ef4549 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hou Tao Date: Fri, 31 Dec 2021 23:10:18 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 16/23] bpf, arm64: Use emit_addr_mov_i64() for BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC ANBZ: #7670 commit e4a41c2c1fa916547e63440c73a51a5eb06247af upstream. The following error is reported when running "./test_progs -t for_each" under arm64: bpf_jit: multi-func JIT bug 58 != 56 [...] JIT doesn't support bpf-to-bpf calls The root cause is the size of BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC instruction increases from 2 to 3 after the address of called bpf-function is settled and there are two bpf-to-bpf calls in test_pkt_access. The generated instructions are shown below: 0x48: 21 00 C0 D2 movz x1, #0x1, lsl #32 0x4c: 21 00 80 F2 movk x1, #0x1 0x48: E1 3F C0 92 movn x1, #0x1ff, lsl #32 0x4c: 41 FE A2 F2 movk x1, #0x17f2, lsl #16 0x50: 81 70 9F F2 movk x1, #0xfb84 Fixing it by using emit_addr_mov_i64() for BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC, so the size of jited image will not change. Fixes: 69c087ba6225 ("bpf: Add bpf_for_each_map_elem() helper") Signed-off-by: Hou Tao Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20211231151018.3781550-1-houtao1@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Tianchen Ding --- arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c index c68b7eb185ea..6352528621d1 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +++ b/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c @@ -946,7 +946,10 @@ static int build_insn(const struct bpf_insn *insn, struct jit_ctx *ctx, u64 imm64; imm64 = (u64)insn1.imm << 32 | (u32)imm; - emit_a64_mov_i64(dst, imm64, ctx); + if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) + emit_addr_mov_i64(dst, imm64, ctx); + else + emit_a64_mov_i64(dst, imm64, ctx); return 1; } -- Gitee From e83ac7b59ed08357a702737b7138e5dba967c40e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Borkmann Date: Mon, 10 Jan 2022 14:05:49 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 17/23] bpf: Generalize check_ctx_reg for reuse with other types ANBZ: #7670 commit be80a1d3f9dbe5aee79a325964f7037fe2d92f30 upstream. Generalize the check_ctx_reg() helper function into a more generic named one so that it can be reused for other register types as well to check whether their offset is non-zero. No functional change. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: John Fastabend Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: Tianchen Ding --- include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 4 ++-- kernel/bpf/btf.c | 2 +- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 21 +++++++++++---------- 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h index f5d8d46f2f2c..879195f7fb05 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h @@ -490,8 +490,8 @@ bpf_prog_offload_replace_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, void bpf_prog_offload_remove_insns(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, u32 cnt); -int check_ctx_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, - const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int regno); +int check_ptr_off_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int regno); /* this lives here instead of in bpf.h because it needs to dereference tgt_prog */ static inline u64 bpf_trampoline_compute_key(const struct bpf_prog *tgt_prog, diff --git a/kernel/bpf/btf.c b/kernel/bpf/btf.c index 009e61f3bea0..fba28f17e61a 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/btf.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/btf.c @@ -5206,7 +5206,7 @@ int btf_check_func_arg_match(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog, i, btf_kind_str[BTF_INFO_KIND(t->info)]); goto out; } - if (check_ctx_reg(env, ®[i + 1], i + 1)) + if (check_ptr_off_reg(env, ®[i + 1], i + 1)) goto out; continue; } diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index f3e6d4ebab1f..a2fbebe0b2b7 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -3403,16 +3403,16 @@ static int get_callee_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, } #endif -int check_ctx_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, - const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int regno) +int check_ptr_off_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int regno) { - /* Access to ctx or passing it to a helper is only allowed in - * its original, unmodified form. + /* Access to this pointer-typed register or passing it to a helper + * is only allowed in its original, unmodified form. */ if (reg->off) { - verbose(env, "dereference of modified ctx ptr R%d off=%d disallowed\n", - regno, reg->off); + verbose(env, "dereference of modified %s ptr R%d off=%d disallowed\n", + reg_type_str(env, reg->type), regno, reg->off); return -EACCES; } @@ -3420,7 +3420,8 @@ int check_ctx_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, char tn_buf[48]; tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); - verbose(env, "variable ctx access var_off=%s disallowed\n", tn_buf); + verbose(env, "variable %s access var_off=%s disallowed\n", + reg_type_str(env, reg->type), tn_buf); return -EACCES; } @@ -3870,7 +3871,7 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn return -EACCES; } - err = check_ctx_reg(env, reg, regno); + err = check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno); if (err < 0) return err; @@ -4610,7 +4611,7 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg, return err; if (type == PTR_TO_CTX) { - err = check_ctx_reg(env, reg, regno); + err = check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno); if (err < 0) return err; } @@ -8506,7 +8507,7 @@ static int check_ld_abs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) return err; } - err = check_ctx_reg(env, ®s[ctx_reg], ctx_reg); + err = check_ptr_off_reg(env, ®s[ctx_reg], ctx_reg); if (err < 0) return err; -- Gitee From 508870a634943e0abe9e30942b60bbfb5a8cf525 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Borkmann Date: Mon, 10 Jan 2022 14:40:40 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 18/23] bpf: Generally fix helper register offset check ANBZ: #7670 commit 6788ab23508bddb0a9d88e104284922cb2c22b77 upstream. Right now the assertion on check_ptr_off_reg() is only enforced for register types PTR_TO_CTX (and open coded also for PTR_TO_BTF_ID), however, this is insufficient since many other PTR_TO_* register types such as PTR_TO_FUNC do not handle/expect register offsets when passed to helper functions. Given this can slip-through easily when adding new types, make this an explicit allow-list and reject all other current and future types by default if this is encountered. Also, extend check_ptr_off_reg() to handle PTR_TO_BTF_ID as well instead of duplicating it. For PTR_TO_BTF_ID, reg->off is used for BTF to match expected BTF ids if struct offset is used. This part still needs to be allowed, but the dynamic off from the tnum must be rejected. Fixes: 69c087ba6225 ("bpf: Add bpf_for_each_map_elem() helper") Fixes: eaa6bcb71ef6 ("bpf: Introduce bpf_per_cpu_ptr()") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: John Fastabend Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: Tianchen Ding --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index a2fbebe0b2b7..9774d240406e 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -3403,14 +3403,15 @@ static int get_callee_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, } #endif -int check_ptr_off_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, - const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int regno) +static int __check_ptr_off_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int regno, + bool fixed_off_ok) { /* Access to this pointer-typed register or passing it to a helper * is only allowed in its original, unmodified form. */ - if (reg->off) { + if (!fixed_off_ok && reg->off) { verbose(env, "dereference of modified %s ptr R%d off=%d disallowed\n", reg_type_str(env, reg->type), regno, reg->off); return -EACCES; @@ -3428,6 +3429,12 @@ int check_ptr_off_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, return 0; } +int check_ptr_off_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int regno) +{ + return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, false); +} + static int __check_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const char *buf_info, const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, @@ -4542,12 +4549,6 @@ static int check_reg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, kernel_type_name(*arg_btf_id)); return -EACCES; } - - if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) { - verbose(env, "R%d is a pointer to in-kernel struct with non-zero offset\n", - regno); - return -EACCES; - } } return 0; @@ -4610,10 +4611,26 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg, if (err) return err; - if (type == PTR_TO_CTX) { - err = check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno); + switch ((u32)type) { + case SCALAR_VALUE: + /* Pointer types where reg offset is explicitly allowed: */ + case PTR_TO_PACKET: + case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: + case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: + case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: + case PTR_TO_MEM: + case PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY: + case PTR_TO_BUF: + case PTR_TO_BUF | MEM_RDONLY: + case PTR_TO_STACK: + break; + /* All the rest must be rejected: */ + default: + err = __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, + type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID); if (err < 0) return err; + break; } skip_type_check: -- Gitee From e9a27e30522b0130eb9620258d8b8809374e8d5f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Borkmann Date: Fri, 14 Jan 2022 13:58:36 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 19/23] bpf: Mark PTR_TO_FUNC register initially with zero offset ANBZ: #7670 commit d400a6cf1c8a57cdf10f35220ead3284320d85ff upstream. Similar as with other pointer types where we use ldimm64, clear the register content to zero first, and then populate the PTR_TO_FUNC type and subprogno number. Currently this is not done, and leads to reuse of stale register tracking data. Given for special ldimm64 cases we always clear the register offset, make it common for all cases, so it won't be forgotten in future. Fixes: 69c087ba6225 ("bpf: Add bpf_for_each_map_elem() helper") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: John Fastabend Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: Tianchen Ding --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 9774d240406e..8cee53963fc4 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -8383,9 +8383,13 @@ static int check_ld_imm(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) return 0; } - if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_BTF_ID) { - mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); + /* All special src_reg cases are listed below. From this point onwards + * we either succeed and assign a corresponding dst_reg->type after + * zeroing the offset, or fail and reject the program. + */ + mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); + if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_BTF_ID) { dst_reg->type = aux->btf_var.reg_type; switch (base_type(dst_reg->type)) { case PTR_TO_MEM: @@ -8422,7 +8426,6 @@ static int check_ld_imm(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) } map = env->used_maps[aux->map_index]; - mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); dst_reg->map_ptr = map; if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUE) { -- Gitee From 27988b0922c6ee474e0b74e90c15ca185ce0f811 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi Date: Sat, 19 Mar 2022 13:38:25 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 20/23] bpf: Reject writes for PTR_TO_MAP_KEY in check_helper_mem_access ANBZ: #7670 commit 7b3552d3f9f6897851fc453b5131a967167e43c2 upstream. It is not permitted to write to PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, but the current code in check_helper_mem_access would allow for it, reject this case as well, as helpers taking ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM also take PTR_TO_MAP_KEY. Fixes: 69c087ba6225 ("bpf: Add bpf_for_each_map_elem() helper") Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220319080827.73251-4-memxor@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: Tianchen Ding --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 8cee53963fc4..9ff7dde5ec9e 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -4202,6 +4202,11 @@ static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, return check_packet_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, zero_size_allowed); case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: + if (meta && meta->raw_mode) { + verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", regno, + reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); + return -EACCES; + } return check_mem_region_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, reg->map_ptr->key_size, false); case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: -- Gitee From 40596a2e3556443d30b19e152434f8a2b0c50c05 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexei Starovoitov Date: Thu, 12 May 2022 18:10:24 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 21/23] bpf: Fix combination of jit blinding and pointers to bpf subprogs. ANBZ: #7670 commit 4b6313cf99b0d51b49aeaea98ec76ca8161ecb80 upstream. The combination of jit blinding and pointers to bpf subprogs causes: [ 36.989548] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000100000001 [ 36.990342] #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode [ 36.990968] #PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page [ 36.994859] RIP: 0010:0x100000001 [ 36.995209] Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0xffffffd7. [ 37.004091] Call Trace: [ 37.004351] [ 37.004576] ? bpf_loop+0x4d/0x70 [ 37.004932] ? bpf_prog_3899083f75e4c5de_F+0xe3/0x13b The jit blinding logic didn't recognize that ld_imm64 with an address of bpf subprogram is a special instruction and proceeded to randomize it. By itself it wouldn't have been an issue, but jit_subprogs() logic relies on two step process to JIT all subprogs and then JIT them again when addresses of all subprogs are known. Blinding process in the first JIT phase caused second JIT to miss adjustment of special ld_imm64. Fix this issue by ignoring special ld_imm64 instructions that don't have user controlled constants and shouldn't be blinded. Fixes: 69c087ba6225 ("bpf: Add bpf_for_each_map_elem() helper") Reported-by: Andrii Nakryiko Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220513011025.13344-1-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Tianchen Ding --- kernel/bpf/core.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c index 7196eaab3336..3365fe5f5f24 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/core.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c @@ -1161,6 +1161,16 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_jit_blind_constants(struct bpf_prog *prog) insn = clone->insnsi; for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { + if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) { + /* ld_imm64 with an address of bpf subprog is not + * a user controlled constant. Don't randomize it, + * since it will conflict with jit_subprogs() logic. + */ + insn++; + i++; + continue; + } + /* We temporarily need to hold the original ld64 insn * so that we can still access the first part in the * second blinding run. -- Gitee From 7bc6291862f37caf9786f786f8a20287e04c19e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2022 03:31:25 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 22/23] bpf: Fix reference state management for synchronous callbacks ANBZ: #7670 commit 9d9d00ac29d0ef7ce426964de46fa6b380357d0a upstream. Currently, verifier verifies callback functions (sync and async) as if they will be executed once, (i.e. it explores execution state as if the function was being called once). The next insn to explore is set to start of subprog and the exit from nested frame is handled using curframe > 0 and prepare_func_exit. In case of async callback it uses a customized variant of push_stack simulating a kind of branch to set up custom state and execution context for the async callback. While this approach is simple and works when callback really will be executed only once, it is unsafe for all of our current helpers which are for_each style, i.e. they execute the callback multiple times. A callback releasing acquired references of the caller may do so multiple times, but currently verifier sees it as one call inside the frame, which then returns to caller. Hence, it thinks it released some reference that the cb e.g. got access through callback_ctx (register filled inside cb from spilled typed register on stack). Similarly, it may see that an acquire call is unpaired inside the callback, so the caller will copy the reference state of callback and then will have to release the register with new ref_obj_ids. But again, the callback may execute multiple times, but the verifier will only account for acquired references for a single symbolic execution of the callback, which will cause leaks. Note that for async callback case, things are different. While currently we have bpf_timer_set_callback which only executes it once, even for multiple executions it would be safe, as reference state is NULL and check_reference_leak would force program to release state before BPF_EXIT. The state is also unaffected by analysis for the caller frame. Hence async callback is safe. Since we want the reference state to be accessible, e.g. for pointers loaded from stack through callback_ctx's PTR_TO_STACK, we still have to copy caller's reference_state to callback's bpf_func_state, but we enforce that whatever references it adds to that reference_state has been released before it hits BPF_EXIT. This requires introducing a new callback_ref member in the reference state to distinguish between caller vs callee references. Hence, check_reference_leak now errors out if it sees we are in callback_fn and we have not released callback_ref refs. Since there can be multiple nested callbacks, like frame 0 -> cb1 -> cb2 etc. we need to also distinguish between whether this particular ref belongs to this callback frame or parent, and only error for our own, so we store state->frameno (which is always non-zero for callbacks). In short, callbacks can read parent reference_state, but cannot mutate it, to be able to use pointers acquired by the caller. They must only undo their changes (by releasing their own acquired_refs before BPF_EXIT) on top of caller reference_state before returning (at which point the caller and callback state will match anyway, so no need to copy it back to caller). Fixes: 69c087ba6225 ("bpf: Add bpf_for_each_map_elem() helper") Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220823013125.24938-1-memxor@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: Tianchen Ding --- include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 11 ++++++++++ kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h index 879195f7fb05..169df564bf92 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h @@ -178,6 +178,17 @@ struct bpf_reference_state { * is used purely to inform the user of a reference leak. */ int insn_idx; + /* There can be a case like: + * main (frame 0) + * cb (frame 1) + * func (frame 3) + * cb (frame 4) + * Hence for frame 4, if callback_ref just stored boolean, it would be + * impossible to distinguish nested callback refs. Hence store the + * frameno and compare that to callback_ref in check_reference_leak when + * exiting a callback function. + */ + int callback_ref; }; /* state of the program: diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 9ff7dde5ec9e..b8d8f6d90860 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -809,6 +809,7 @@ static int acquire_reference_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) id = ++env->id_gen; state->refs[new_ofs].id = id; state->refs[new_ofs].insn_idx = insn_idx; + state->refs[new_ofs].callback_ref = state->in_callback_fn ? state->frameno : 0; return id; } @@ -821,6 +822,9 @@ static int release_reference_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, int ptr_id) last_idx = state->acquired_refs - 1; for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) { if (state->refs[i].id == ptr_id) { + /* Cannot release caller references in callbacks */ + if (state->in_callback_fn && state->refs[i].callback_ref != state->frameno) + return -EINVAL; if (last_idx && i != last_idx) memcpy(&state->refs[i], &state->refs[last_idx], sizeof(*state->refs)); @@ -5434,10 +5438,17 @@ static int prepare_func_exit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *insn_idx) caller->regs[BPF_REG_0] = *r0; } - /* Transfer references to the caller */ - err = transfer_reference_state(caller, callee); - if (err) - return err; + /* callback_fn frame should have released its own additions to parent's + * reference state at this point, or check_reference_leak would + * complain, hence it must be the same as the caller. There is no need + * to copy it back. + */ + if (!callee->in_callback_fn) { + /* Transfer references to the caller */ + err = transfer_reference_state(caller, callee); + if (err) + return err; + } *insn_idx = callee->callsite + 1; if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { @@ -5556,13 +5567,20 @@ record_func_key(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, static int check_reference_leak(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) { struct bpf_func_state *state = cur_func(env); + bool refs_lingering = false; int i; + if (state->frameno && !state->in_callback_fn) + return 0; + for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) { + if (state->in_callback_fn && state->refs[i].callback_ref != state->frameno) + continue; verbose(env, "Unreleased reference id=%d alloc_insn=%d\n", state->refs[i].id, state->refs[i].insn_idx); + refs_lingering = true; } - return state->acquired_refs ? -EINVAL : 0; + return refs_lingering ? -EINVAL : 0; } static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, @@ -10291,6 +10309,16 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) return -EINVAL; } + /* We must do check_reference_leak here before + * prepare_func_exit to handle the case when + * state->curframe > 0, it may be a callback + * function, for which reference_state must + * match caller reference state when it exits. + */ + err = check_reference_leak(env); + if (err) + return err; + if (state->curframe) { /* exit from nested function */ err = prepare_func_exit(env, &env->insn_idx); @@ -10300,10 +10328,6 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) continue; } - err = check_reference_leak(env); - if (err) - return err; - err = check_return_code(env); if (err) return err; -- Gitee From f02a9cab0c957395f5489ae2272d2951db0f2dfe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wang Yufen Date: Tue, 8 Nov 2022 13:11:31 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 23/23] bpf: Fix memory leaks in __check_func_call ANBZ: #7670 commit eb86559a691cea5fa63e57a03ec3dc9c31e97955 upstream. kmemleak reports this issue: unreferenced object 0xffff88817139d000 (size 2048): comm "test_progs", pid 33246, jiffies 4307381979 (age 45851.820s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: [<0000000045f075f0>] kmalloc_trace+0x27/0xa0 [<0000000098b7c90a>] __check_func_call+0x316/0x1230 [<00000000b4c3c403>] check_helper_call+0x172e/0x4700 [<00000000aa3875b7>] do_check+0x21d8/0x45e0 [<000000001147357b>] do_check_common+0x767/0xaf0 [<00000000b5a595b4>] bpf_check+0x43e3/0x5bc0 [<0000000011e391b1>] bpf_prog_load+0xf26/0x1940 [<0000000007f765c0>] __sys_bpf+0xd2c/0x3650 [<00000000839815d6>] __x64_sys_bpf+0x75/0xc0 [<00000000946ee250>] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [<0000000000506b7f>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd The root case here is: In function prepare_func_exit(), the callee is not released in the abnormal scenario after "state->curframe--;". To fix, move "state->curframe--;" to the very bottom of the function, right when we free callee and reset frame[] pointer to NULL, as Andrii suggested. In addition, function __check_func_call() has a similar problem. In the abnormal scenario before "state->curframe++;", the callee also should be released by free_func_state(). Fixes: 69c087ba6225 ("bpf: Add bpf_for_each_map_elem() helper") Fixes: fd978bf7fd31 ("bpf: Add reference tracking to verifier") Signed-off-by: Wang Yufen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1667884291-15666-1-git-send-email-wangyufen@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau Signed-off-by: Tianchen Ding --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 14 +++++++++----- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index b8d8f6d90860..32eea9c57a0e 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -5290,11 +5290,11 @@ static int __check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn /* Transfer references to the callee */ err = transfer_reference_state(callee, caller); if (err) - return err; + goto err_out; err = set_callee_state_cb(env, caller, callee, *insn_idx); if (err) - return err; + goto err_out; clear_caller_saved_regs(env, caller->regs); @@ -5311,6 +5311,11 @@ static int __check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn print_verifier_state(env, callee); } return 0; + +err_out: + free_func_state(callee); + state->frame[state->curframe + 1] = NULL; + return err; } int map_set_for_each_callback_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, @@ -5419,8 +5424,7 @@ static int prepare_func_exit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *insn_idx) return -EINVAL; } - state->curframe--; - caller = state->frame[state->curframe]; + caller = state->frame[state->curframe - 1]; if (callee->in_callback_fn) { /* enforce R0 return value range [0, 1]. */ struct tnum range = tnum_range(0, 1); @@ -5459,7 +5463,7 @@ static int prepare_func_exit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *insn_idx) } /* clear everything in the callee */ free_func_state(callee); - state->frame[state->curframe + 1] = NULL; + state->frame[state->curframe--] = NULL; return 0; } -- Gitee