From 460177bd500454bb6c2bd7a2af999496a97ebf29 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mathy Vanhoef Date: Mon, 7 Jun 2021 22:38:54 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 1/9] mac80211: prevent mixed key and fragment cache attacks Signed-off-by: Kong Zhiquan ---------------------------------------------------- commit 94034c40ab4a3fcf581fbc7f8fdf4e29943c4a24 upstream. Simultaneously prevent mixed key attacks (CVE-2020-24587) and fragment cache attacks (CVE-2020-24586). This is accomplished by assigning a unique color to every key (per interface) and using this to track which key was used to decrypt a fragment. When reassembling frames, it is now checked whether all fragments were decrypted using the same key. To assure that fragment cache attacks are also prevented, the ID that is assigned to keys is unique even over (re)associations and (re)connects. This means fragments separated by a (re)association or (re)connect will not be reassembled. Because mac80211 now also prevents the reassembly of mixed encrypted and plaintext fragments, all cache attacks are prevented. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.3f8290e59823.I622a67769ed39257327a362cfc09c812320eb979@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang --- net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h | 1 + net/mac80211/key.c | 7 +++++++ net/mac80211/key.h | 2 ++ net/mac80211/rx.c | 6 ++++++ 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h index a879d8071712..d26fc59e8c47 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h +++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h @@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ struct ieee80211_fragment_entry { u8 rx_queue; bool check_sequential_pn; /* needed for CCMP/GCMP */ u8 last_pn[6]; /* PN of the last fragment if CCMP was used */ + unsigned int key_color; }; diff --git a/net/mac80211/key.c b/net/mac80211/key.c index f20bb39f492d..6775d6cb7d3d 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/key.c +++ b/net/mac80211/key.c @@ -653,6 +653,7 @@ int ieee80211_key_link(struct ieee80211_key *key, struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, struct sta_info *sta) { + static atomic_t key_color = ATOMIC_INIT(0); struct ieee80211_local *local = sdata->local; struct ieee80211_key *old_key; int idx = key->conf.keyidx; @@ -688,6 +689,12 @@ int ieee80211_key_link(struct ieee80211_key *key, key->sdata = sdata; key->sta = sta; + /* + * Assign a unique ID to every key so we can easily prevent mixed + * key and fragment cache attacks. + */ + key->color = atomic_inc_return(&key_color); + increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata); ieee80211_key_replace(sdata, sta, pairwise, old_key, key); diff --git a/net/mac80211/key.h b/net/mac80211/key.h index ebdb80b85dc3..d8e187bcb751 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/key.h +++ b/net/mac80211/key.h @@ -127,6 +127,8 @@ struct ieee80211_key { } debugfs; #endif + unsigned int color; + /* * key config, must be last because it contains key * material as variable length member diff --git a/net/mac80211/rx.c b/net/mac80211/rx.c index 5e56719f999c..e99880bafc25 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/rx.c +++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c @@ -2134,6 +2134,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) * next fragment has a sequential PN value. */ entry->check_sequential_pn = true; + entry->key_color = rx->key->color; memcpy(entry->last_pn, rx->key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); @@ -2175,6 +2176,11 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP && rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256)) return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; + + /* Prevent mixed key and fragment cache attacks */ + if (entry->key_color != rx->key->color) + return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; + memcpy(pn, entry->last_pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); for (i = IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN - 1; i >= 0; i--) { pn[i]++; -- Gitee From 0897cced22348963c07dd73a100e0e012904aa29 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johannes Berg Date: Mon, 7 Jun 2021 22:38:58 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 2/9] mac80211: add fragment cache to sta_info Signed-off-by: Kong Zhiquan -------------------------------------------------------- commit 3a11ce08c45b50d69c891d71760b7c5b92074709 upstream. Prior patches protected against fragmentation cache attacks by coloring keys, but this shows that it can lead to issues when multiple stations use the same sequence number. Add a fragment cache to struct sta_info (in addition to the one in the interface) to separate fragments for different stations properly. This then automatically clear most of the fragment cache when a station disconnects (or reassociates) from an AP, or when client interfaces disconnect from the network, etc. On the way, also fix the comment there since this brings us in line with the recommendation in 802.11-2016 ("An AP should support ..."). Additionally, remove a useless condition (since there's no problem purging an already empty list). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.fc35046b0d52.I1ef101e3784d13e8f6600d83de7ec9a3a45bcd52@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang --- net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h | 26 ++++-------------------- net/mac80211/iface.c | 11 +++------- net/mac80211/rx.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- net/mac80211/sta_info.c | 6 +++++- net/mac80211/sta_info.h | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h index d26fc59e8c47..32a5bf40d91b 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h +++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h @@ -53,12 +53,6 @@ struct ieee80211_local; #define IEEE80211_ENCRYPT_HEADROOM 8 #define IEEE80211_ENCRYPT_TAILROOM 18 -/* IEEE 802.11 (Ch. 9.5 Defragmentation) requires support for concurrent - * reception of at least three fragmented frames. This limit can be increased - * by changing this define, at the cost of slower frame reassembly and - * increased memory use (about 2 kB of RAM per entry). */ -#define IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX 4 - /* power level hasn't been configured (or set to automatic) */ #define IEEE80211_UNSET_POWER_LEVEL INT_MIN @@ -91,19 +85,6 @@ extern const u8 ieee80211_ac_to_qos_mask[IEEE80211_NUM_ACS]; #define IEEE80211_MAX_NAN_INSTANCE_ID 255 -struct ieee80211_fragment_entry { - struct sk_buff_head skb_list; - unsigned long first_frag_time; - u16 seq; - u16 extra_len; - u16 last_frag; - u8 rx_queue; - bool check_sequential_pn; /* needed for CCMP/GCMP */ - u8 last_pn[6]; /* PN of the last fragment if CCMP was used */ - unsigned int key_color; -}; - - struct ieee80211_bss { u32 device_ts_beacon, device_ts_presp; @@ -885,9 +866,7 @@ struct ieee80211_sub_if_data { char name[IFNAMSIZ]; - /* Fragment table for host-based reassembly */ - struct ieee80211_fragment_entry fragments[IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX]; - unsigned int fragment_next; + struct ieee80211_fragment_cache frags; /* TID bitmap for NoAck policy */ u16 noack_map; @@ -2204,4 +2183,7 @@ extern const struct ethtool_ops ieee80211_ethtool_ops; #define debug_noinline #endif +void ieee80211_init_frag_cache(struct ieee80211_fragment_cache *cache); +void ieee80211_destroy_frag_cache(struct ieee80211_fragment_cache *cache); + #endif /* IEEE80211_I_H */ diff --git a/net/mac80211/iface.c b/net/mac80211/iface.c index 152d4365f961..080f6ff98ce4 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/iface.c +++ b/net/mac80211/iface.c @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ * Copyright 2008, Johannes Berg * Copyright 2013-2014 Intel Mobile Communications GmbH * Copyright (c) 2016 Intel Deutschland GmbH - * Copyright (C) 2018 Intel Corporation + * Copyright (C) 2018-2021 Intel Corporation * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as @@ -1111,16 +1111,12 @@ static void ieee80211_set_multicast_list(struct net_device *dev) */ static void ieee80211_teardown_sdata(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata) { - int i; - /* free extra data */ ieee80211_free_keys(sdata, false); ieee80211_debugfs_remove_netdev(sdata); - for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX; i++) - __skb_queue_purge(&sdata->fragments[i].skb_list); - sdata->fragment_next = 0; + ieee80211_destroy_frag_cache(&sdata->frags); if (ieee80211_vif_is_mesh(&sdata->vif)) ieee80211_mesh_teardown_sdata(sdata); @@ -1826,8 +1822,7 @@ int ieee80211_if_add(struct ieee80211_local *local, const char *name, sdata->wdev.wiphy = local->hw.wiphy; sdata->local = local; - for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX; i++) - skb_queue_head_init(&sdata->fragments[i].skb_list); + ieee80211_init_frag_cache(&sdata->frags); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sdata->key_list); diff --git a/net/mac80211/rx.c b/net/mac80211/rx.c index e99880bafc25..43e7972debe4 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/rx.c +++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c @@ -2009,19 +2009,34 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) return result; } +void ieee80211_init_frag_cache(struct ieee80211_fragment_cache *cache) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(cache->entries); i++) + skb_queue_head_init(&cache->entries[i].skb_list); +} + +void ieee80211_destroy_frag_cache(struct ieee80211_fragment_cache *cache) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(cache->entries); i++) + __skb_queue_purge(&cache->entries[i].skb_list); +} + static inline struct ieee80211_fragment_entry * -ieee80211_reassemble_add(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, +ieee80211_reassemble_add(struct ieee80211_fragment_cache *cache, unsigned int frag, unsigned int seq, int rx_queue, struct sk_buff **skb) { struct ieee80211_fragment_entry *entry; - entry = &sdata->fragments[sdata->fragment_next++]; - if (sdata->fragment_next >= IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX) - sdata->fragment_next = 0; + entry = &cache->entries[cache->next++]; + if (cache->next >= IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX) + cache->next = 0; - if (!skb_queue_empty(&entry->skb_list)) - __skb_queue_purge(&entry->skb_list); + __skb_queue_purge(&entry->skb_list); __skb_queue_tail(&entry->skb_list, *skb); /* no need for locking */ *skb = NULL; @@ -2036,14 +2051,14 @@ ieee80211_reassemble_add(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, } static inline struct ieee80211_fragment_entry * -ieee80211_reassemble_find(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, +ieee80211_reassemble_find(struct ieee80211_fragment_cache *cache, unsigned int frag, unsigned int seq, int rx_queue, struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr) { struct ieee80211_fragment_entry *entry; int i, idx; - idx = sdata->fragment_next; + idx = cache->next; for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX; i++) { struct ieee80211_hdr *f_hdr; @@ -2051,7 +2066,7 @@ ieee80211_reassemble_find(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, if (idx < 0) idx = IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX - 1; - entry = &sdata->fragments[idx]; + entry = &cache->entries[idx]; if (skb_queue_empty(&entry->skb_list) || entry->seq != seq || entry->rx_queue != rx_queue || entry->last_frag + 1 != frag) @@ -2081,6 +2096,7 @@ ieee80211_reassemble_find(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, static ieee80211_rx_result debug_noinline ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) { + struct ieee80211_fragment_cache *cache = &rx->sdata->frags; struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr; u16 sc; __le16 fc; @@ -2102,6 +2118,9 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) goto out_no_led; } + if (rx->sta) + cache = &rx->sta->frags; + if (likely(!ieee80211_has_morefrags(fc) && frag == 0)) goto out; @@ -2120,7 +2139,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) if (frag == 0) { /* This is the first fragment of a new frame. */ - entry = ieee80211_reassemble_add(rx->sdata, frag, seq, + entry = ieee80211_reassemble_add(cache, frag, seq, rx->seqno_idx, &(rx->skb)); if (rx->key && (rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP || @@ -2153,7 +2172,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) /* This is a fragment for a frame that should already be pending in * fragment cache. Add this fragment to the end of the pending entry. */ - entry = ieee80211_reassemble_find(rx->sdata, frag, seq, + entry = ieee80211_reassemble_find(cache, frag, seq, rx->seqno_idx, hdr); if (!entry) { I802_DEBUG_INC(rx->local->rx_handlers_drop_defrag); diff --git a/net/mac80211/sta_info.c b/net/mac80211/sta_info.c index 9968b8a976f1..5c345853940f 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/sta_info.c +++ b/net/mac80211/sta_info.c @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ * Copyright 2006-2007 Jiri Benc * Copyright 2013-2014 Intel Mobile Communications GmbH * Copyright (C) 2015 - 2017 Intel Deutschland GmbH - * Copyright (C) 2018-2020 Intel Corporation + * Copyright (C) 2018-2021 Intel Corporation * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as @@ -351,6 +351,8 @@ struct sta_info *sta_info_alloc(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, u64_stats_init(&sta->rx_stats.syncp); + ieee80211_init_frag_cache(&sta->frags); + sta->sta_state = IEEE80211_STA_NONE; /* Mark TID as unreserved */ @@ -1020,6 +1022,8 @@ static void __sta_info_destroy_part2(struct sta_info *sta) rate_control_remove_sta_debugfs(sta); ieee80211_sta_debugfs_remove(sta); + ieee80211_destroy_frag_cache(&sta->frags); + cleanup_single_sta(sta); } diff --git a/net/mac80211/sta_info.h b/net/mac80211/sta_info.h index 9a04327d71d1..b6e37af56146 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/sta_info.h +++ b/net/mac80211/sta_info.h @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ * Copyright 2002-2005, Devicescape Software, Inc. * Copyright 2013-2014 Intel Mobile Communications GmbH * Copyright(c) 2015-2017 Intel Deutschland GmbH + * Copyright(c) 2020-2021 Intel Corporation * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as @@ -411,6 +412,33 @@ struct ieee80211_sta_rx_stats { u64 msdu[IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS + 1]; }; +/* + * IEEE 802.11-2016 (10.6 "Defragmentation") recommends support for "concurrent + * reception of at least one MSDU per access category per associated STA" + * on APs, or "at least one MSDU per access category" on other interface types. + * + * This limit can be increased by changing this define, at the cost of slower + * frame reassembly and increased memory use while fragments are pending. + */ +#define IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX 4 + +struct ieee80211_fragment_entry { + struct sk_buff_head skb_list; + unsigned long first_frag_time; + u16 seq; + u16 extra_len; + u16 last_frag; + u8 rx_queue; + bool check_sequential_pn; /* needed for CCMP/GCMP */ + u8 last_pn[6]; /* PN of the last fragment if CCMP was used */ + unsigned int key_color; +}; + +struct ieee80211_fragment_cache { + struct ieee80211_fragment_entry entries[IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX]; + unsigned int next; +}; + /* * The bandwidth threshold below which the per-station CoDel parameters will be * scaled to be more lenient (to prevent starvation of slow stations). This @@ -482,6 +510,7 @@ struct ieee80211_sta_rx_stats { * @pcpu_rx_stats: per-CPU RX statistics, assigned only if the driver needs * this (by advertising the USES_RSS hw flag) * @status_stats: TX status statistics + * @frags: fragment cache */ struct sta_info { /* General information, mostly static */ @@ -583,6 +612,8 @@ struct sta_info { struct cfg80211_chan_def tdls_chandef; + struct ieee80211_fragment_cache frags; + /* keep last! */ struct ieee80211_sta sta; }; -- Gitee From 71a46cade16abed0e022217f92a85a3c586fa463 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johannes Berg Date: Mon, 7 Jun 2021 22:39:00 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 3/9] mac80211: prevent attacks on TKIP/WEP as well Signed-off-by: KOng Zhiquan ------------------------------------------------------ commit 7e44a0b597f04e67eee8cdcbe7ee706c6f5de38b upstream. Similar to the issues fixed in previous patches, TKIP and WEP should be protected even if for TKIP we have the Michael MIC protecting it, and WEP is broken anyway. However, this also somewhat protects potential other algorithms that drivers might implement. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.430e8c202313.Ia37e4e5b6b3eaab1a5ae050e015f6c92859dbe27@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang --- net/mac80211/rx.c | 12 ++++++++++++ net/mac80211/sta_info.h | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/mac80211/rx.c b/net/mac80211/rx.c index 43e7972debe4..5adc884b411c 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/rx.c +++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c @@ -2153,6 +2153,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) * next fragment has a sequential PN value. */ entry->check_sequential_pn = true; + entry->is_protected = true; entry->key_color = rx->key->color; memcpy(entry->last_pn, rx->key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], @@ -2165,6 +2166,9 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) sizeof(rx->key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue])); BUILD_BUG_ON(IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN != IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN); + } else if (rx->key && ieee80211_has_protected(fc)) { + entry->is_protected = true; + entry->key_color = rx->key->color; } return RX_QUEUED; } @@ -2211,6 +2215,14 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) if (memcmp(pn, rpn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN)) return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; memcpy(entry->last_pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); + } else if (entry->is_protected && + (!rx->key || !ieee80211_has_protected(fc) || + rx->key->color != entry->key_color)) { + /* Drop this as a mixed key or fragment cache attack, even + * if for TKIP Michael MIC should protect us, and WEP is a + * lost cause anyway. + */ + return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; } skb_pull(rx->skb, ieee80211_hdrlen(fc)); diff --git a/net/mac80211/sta_info.h b/net/mac80211/sta_info.h index b6e37af56146..c33bc5fc0f2d 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/sta_info.h +++ b/net/mac80211/sta_info.h @@ -429,7 +429,8 @@ struct ieee80211_fragment_entry { u16 extra_len; u16 last_frag; u8 rx_queue; - bool check_sequential_pn; /* needed for CCMP/GCMP */ + u8 check_sequential_pn:1, /* needed for CCMP/GCMP */ + is_protected:1; u8 last_pn[6]; /* PN of the last fragment if CCMP was used */ unsigned int key_color; }; -- Gitee From e28b9af81fe5034ae73228fcf91b6361234b8aee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wen Gong Date: Mon, 7 Jun 2021 22:39:02 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 4/9] mac80211: extend protection against mixed key and fragment cache attacks Signed-off-by: Kong zhiquan ---------------------------------------------------- commit 3edc6b0d6c061a70d8ca3c3c72eb1f58ce29bfb1 upstream. For some chips/drivers, e.g., QCA6174 with ath10k, the decryption is done by the hardware, and the Protected bit in the Frame Control field is cleared in the lower level driver before the frame is passed to mac80211. In such cases, the condition for ieee80211_has_protected() is not met in ieee80211_rx_h_defragment() of mac80211 and the new security validation steps are not executed. Extend mac80211 to cover the case where the Protected bit has been cleared, but the frame is indicated as having been decrypted by the hardware. This extends protection against mixed key and fragment cache attack for additional drivers/chips. This fixes CVE-2020-24586 and CVE-2020-24587 for such cases. Tested-on: QCA6174 hw3.2 PCI WLAN.RM.4.4.1-00110-QCARMSWP-1 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Wen Gong Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.037aa5ca0390.I7bb888e2965a0db02a67075fcb5deb50eb7408aa@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang --- net/mac80211/rx.c | 13 +++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/mac80211/rx.c b/net/mac80211/rx.c index 5adc884b411c..2052c7c7c475 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/rx.c +++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c @@ -2103,6 +2103,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) unsigned int frag, seq; struct ieee80211_fragment_entry *entry; struct sk_buff *skb; + struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(rx->skb); hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data; fc = hdr->frame_control; @@ -2166,7 +2167,9 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) sizeof(rx->key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue])); BUILD_BUG_ON(IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN != IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN); - } else if (rx->key && ieee80211_has_protected(fc)) { + } else if (rx->key && + (ieee80211_has_protected(fc) || + (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED))) { entry->is_protected = true; entry->key_color = rx->key->color; } @@ -2216,13 +2219,19 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; memcpy(entry->last_pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); } else if (entry->is_protected && - (!rx->key || !ieee80211_has_protected(fc) || + (!rx->key || + (!ieee80211_has_protected(fc) && + !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) || rx->key->color != entry->key_color)) { /* Drop this as a mixed key or fragment cache attack, even * if for TKIP Michael MIC should protect us, and WEP is a * lost cause anyway. */ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; + } else if (entry->is_protected && rx->key && + entry->key_color != rx->key->color && + (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) { + return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; } skb_pull(rx->skb, ieee80211_hdrlen(fc)); -- Gitee From cdaa1da3634a7a491519a663e9c7fa7ee8efd762 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mathy Vanhoef Date: Mon, 7 Jun 2021 22:38:56 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 5/9] cfg80211: mitigate A-MSDU aggregation attacks Signed-off-by: Kong Zhiquan ---------------------------------------------------- commit 2b8a1fee3488c602aca8bea004a087e60806a5cf upstream. Mitigate A-MSDU injection attacks (CVE-2020-24588) by detecting if the destination address of a subframe equals an RFC1042 (i.e., LLC/SNAP) header, and if so dropping the complete A-MSDU frame. This mitigates known attacks, although new (unknown) aggregation-based attacks may remain possible. This defense works because in A-MSDU aggregation injection attacks, a normal encrypted Wi-Fi frame is turned into an A-MSDU frame. This means the first 6 bytes of the first A-MSDU subframe correspond to an RFC1042 header. In other words, the destination MAC address of the first A-MSDU subframe contains the start of an RFC1042 header during an aggregation attack. We can detect this and thereby prevent this specific attack. For details, see Section 7.2 of "Fragment and Forge: Breaking Wi-Fi Through Frame Aggregation and Fragmentation". Note that for kernel 4.9 and above this patch depends on "mac80211: properly handle A-MSDUs that start with a rfc1042 header". Otherwise this patch has no impact and attacks will remain possible. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.25d93176ddaf.I9e265b597f2cd23eb44573f35b625947b386a9de@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang --- net/wireless/util.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/wireless/util.c b/net/wireless/util.c index 1a878b84cbd0..1b3e2d37cd57 100644 --- a/net/wireless/util.c +++ b/net/wireless/util.c @@ -652,6 +652,9 @@ void ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sk_buff_head *list, remaining = skb->len - offset; if (subframe_len > remaining) goto purge; + /* mitigate A-MSDU aggregation injection attacks */ + if (ether_addr_equal(eth.h_dest, rfc1042_header)) + goto purge; offset += sizeof(struct ethhdr); last = remaining <= subframe_len + padding; -- Gitee From 861c4ff849e77dd00ec0be03ece89e802f058743 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johannes Berg Date: Mon, 7 Jun 2021 22:38:57 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 6/9] mac80211: drop A-MSDUs on old ciphers Signed-off-by:KOng zhiquan --------------------------------------------------- commit 270032a2a9c4535799736142e1e7c413ca7b836e upstream. With old ciphers (WEP and TKIP) we shouldn't be using A-MSDUs since A-MSDUs are only supported if we know that they are, and the only practical way for that is HT support which doesn't support old ciphers. However, we would normally accept them anyway. Since we check the MMIC before deaggregating A-MSDUs, and the A-MSDU bit in the QoS header is not protected in TKIP (or WEP), this enables attacks similar to CVE-2020-24588. To prevent that, drop A-MSDUs completely with old ciphers. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.076543300172.I548e6e71f1ee9cad4b9a37bf212ae7db723587aa@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang --- net/mac80211/rx.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/mac80211/rx.c b/net/mac80211/rx.c index 2052c7c7c475..4b17273eb6b4 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/rx.c +++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ * Copyright 2007-2010 Johannes Berg * Copyright 2013-2014 Intel Mobile Communications GmbH * Copyright(c) 2015 - 2017 Intel Deutschland GmbH - * Copyright (C) 2018 Intel Corporation + * Copyright (C) 2018-2021 Intel Corporation * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as @@ -2653,6 +2653,23 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_amsdu(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) if (is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1)) return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; + if (rx->key) { + /* + * We should not receive A-MSDUs on pre-HT connections, + * and HT connections cannot use old ciphers. Thus drop + * them, as in those cases we couldn't even have SPP + * A-MSDUs or such. + */ + switch (rx->key->conf.cipher) { + case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40: + case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104: + case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP: + return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; + default: + break; + } + } + return __ieee80211_rx_h_amsdu(rx, 0); } -- Gitee From e19c06d833ff1c5409fa0dfdb054c0a3c3a039be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wen Gong Date: Fri, 15 Oct 2021 12:03:49 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 7/9] ath10k: add struct for high latency PN replay protection Signed-off-by:Kong zhiquan ----------------------------------------------------- mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.3-rc1 commit e1bddde9737ac4687ca6e2fe6c95f67a9bec353b category: bugfix bugzilla: 181870 CVE: CVE-2020-26145 ------------------------------------------------- Add the struct for PN replay protection and fragment packet handler. Also fix the bitmask of HTT_RX_DESC_HL_INFO_MCAST_BCAST to match what's currently used by SDIO firmware. The defines are not used yet so it's safe to modify them. Remove the conflicting HTT_RX_DESC_HL_INFO_FRAGMENT as it's not either used in ath10k. Tested on QCA6174 SDIO with firmware WLAN.RMH.4.4.1-00007-QCARMSWP-1. Signed-off-by: Wen Gong Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo conflict: drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt.h Signed-off-by: Wang Hai Reviewed-by: Yue Haibing Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang --- drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/core.h | 8 ++++++ drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt.h | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 48 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/core.h b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/core.h index 5c9fc4070fd2..3cd49d29ac23 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/core.h +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/core.h @@ -414,6 +414,14 @@ struct ath10k_peer { /* protected by ar->data_lock */ struct ieee80211_key_conf *keys[WMI_MAX_KEY_INDEX + 1]; + union htt_rx_pn_t tids_last_pn[ATH10K_TXRX_NUM_EXT_TIDS]; + bool tids_last_pn_valid[ATH10K_TXRX_NUM_EXT_TIDS]; + union htt_rx_pn_t frag_tids_last_pn[ATH10K_TXRX_NUM_EXT_TIDS]; + u32 frag_tids_seq[ATH10K_TXRX_NUM_EXT_TIDS]; + struct { + enum htt_security_types sec_type; + int pn_len; + } rx_pn[ATH10K_HTT_TXRX_PEER_SECURITY_MAX]; }; struct ath10k_txq { diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt.h b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt.h index 5d3ff80f3a1f..c1ff938d5341 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt.h +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt.h @@ -719,6 +719,20 @@ struct htt_rx_indication { struct htt_rx_indication_mpdu_range mpdu_ranges[0]; } __packed; +struct htt_hl_rx_desc { + __le32 info; + __le32 pn_31_0; + union { + struct { + __le16 pn_47_32; + __le16 pn_63_48; + } pn16; + __le32 pn_63_32; + } u0; + __le32 pn_95_64; + __le32 pn_127_96; +} __packed; + static inline struct htt_rx_indication_mpdu_range * htt_rx_ind_get_mpdu_ranges(struct htt_rx_indication *rx_ind) { @@ -764,6 +778,21 @@ struct htt_rx_peer_unmap { __le16 peer_id; } __packed; +enum htt_txrx_sec_cast_type { + HTT_TXRX_SEC_MCAST = 0, + HTT_TXRX_SEC_UCAST +}; + +enum htt_rx_pn_check_type { + HTT_RX_NON_PN_CHECK = 0, + HTT_RX_PN_CHECK +}; + +enum htt_rx_tkip_demic_type { + HTT_RX_NON_TKIP_MIC = 0, + HTT_RX_TKIP_MIC +}; + enum htt_security_types { HTT_SECURITY_NONE, HTT_SECURITY_WEP128, @@ -777,6 +806,9 @@ enum htt_security_types { HTT_NUM_SECURITY_TYPES /* keep this last! */ }; +#define ATH10K_HTT_TXRX_PEER_SECURITY_MAX 2 +#define ATH10K_TXRX_NUM_EXT_TIDS 19 + enum htt_security_flags { #define HTT_SECURITY_TYPE_MASK 0x7F #define HTT_SECURITY_TYPE_LSB 0 @@ -887,6 +919,11 @@ struct htt_rx_fragment_indication { u8 fw_msdu_rx_desc[0]; } __packed; +#define ATH10K_IEEE80211_EXTIV BIT(5) +#define ATH10K_IEEE80211_TKIP_MICLEN 8 /* trailing MIC */ + +#define HTT_RX_FRAG_IND_INFO0_HEADER_LEN 16 + #define HTT_RX_FRAG_IND_INFO0_EXT_TID_MASK 0x1F #define HTT_RX_FRAG_IND_INFO0_EXT_TID_LSB 0 #define HTT_RX_FRAG_IND_INFO0_FLUSH_VALID_MASK 0x20 @@ -1994,6 +2031,9 @@ struct htt_rx_desc { u8 msdu_payload[0]; }; +#define HTT_RX_DESC_HL_INFO_MCAST_BCAST_MASK 0x00010000 +#define HTT_RX_DESC_HL_INFO_MCAST_BCAST_LSB 16 + #define HTT_RX_DESC_ALIGN 8 #define HTT_MAC_ADDR_LEN 6 -- Gitee From bd2b640611ea8128f747c21e7eca3ea1e62e4554 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wen Gong Date: Fri, 15 Oct 2021 12:03:50 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 8/9] ath10k: add CCMP PN replay protection for fragmented frames for PCIe Signed-off-by: Kong Zhiquan --------------------------------------------------- mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.13-rc4 commit a1166b2653db2f3de7338b9fb8a0f6e924b904ee category: bugfix bugzilla: 181870 CVE: CVE-2020-26145 ------------------------------------------------- PN replay check for not fragmented frames is finished in the firmware, but this was not done for fragmented frames when ath10k is used with QCA6174/QCA6377 PCIe. mac80211 has the function ieee80211_rx_h_defragment() for PN replay check for fragmented frames, but this does not get checked with QCA6174 due to the ieee80211_has_protected() condition not matching the cleared Protected bit case. Validate the PN of received fragmented frames within ath10k when CCMP is used and drop the fragment if the PN is not correct (incremented by exactly one from the previous fragment). This applies only for QCA6174/QCA6377 PCIe. Tested-on: QCA6174 hw3.2 PCI WLAN.RM.4.4.1-00110-QCARMSWP-1 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Wen Gong Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.9ba2664866a4.I756e47b67e210dba69966d989c4711ffc02dc6bc@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Wang Hai Reviewed-by: Yue Haibing Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang --- drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt.h | 1 + drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c | 99 +++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt.h b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt.h index c1ff938d5341..95ca591abec7 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt.h +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt.h @@ -808,6 +808,7 @@ enum htt_security_types { #define ATH10K_HTT_TXRX_PEER_SECURITY_MAX 2 #define ATH10K_TXRX_NUM_EXT_TIDS 19 +#define ATH10K_TXRX_NON_QOS_TID 16 enum htt_security_flags { #define HTT_SECURITY_TYPE_MASK 0x7F diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c index 68cda1564c77..3101fb00e262 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c @@ -1524,16 +1524,87 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_csum_offload(struct sk_buff *msdu) msdu->ip_summed = ath10k_htt_rx_get_csum_state(msdu); } +static u64 ath10k_htt_rx_h_get_pn(struct ath10k *ar, struct sk_buff *skb, + u16 offset, + enum htt_rx_mpdu_encrypt_type enctype) +{ + struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr; + u64 pn = 0; + u8 *ehdr; + + hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)(skb->data + offset); + ehdr = skb->data + offset + ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); + + if (enctype == HTT_RX_MPDU_ENCRYPT_AES_CCM_WPA2) { + pn = ehdr[0]; + pn |= (u64)ehdr[1] << 8; + pn |= (u64)ehdr[4] << 16; + pn |= (u64)ehdr[5] << 24; + pn |= (u64)ehdr[6] << 32; + pn |= (u64)ehdr[7] << 40; + } + return pn; +} + +static bool ath10k_htt_rx_h_frag_pn_check(struct ath10k *ar, + struct sk_buff *skb, + u16 peer_id, + u16 offset, + enum htt_rx_mpdu_encrypt_type enctype) +{ + struct ath10k_peer *peer; + union htt_rx_pn_t *last_pn, new_pn = {0}; + struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr; + bool more_frags; + u8 tid, frag_number; + u32 seq; + + peer = ath10k_peer_find_by_id(ar, peer_id); + if (!peer) { + ath10k_dbg(ar, ATH10K_DBG_HTT, "invalid peer for frag pn check\n"); + return false; + } + + hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)(skb->data + offset); + if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control)) + tid = ieee80211_get_tid(hdr); + else + tid = ATH10K_TXRX_NON_QOS_TID; + + last_pn = &peer->frag_tids_last_pn[tid]; + new_pn.pn48 = ath10k_htt_rx_h_get_pn(ar, skb, offset, enctype); + more_frags = ieee80211_has_morefrags(hdr->frame_control); + frag_number = le16_to_cpu(hdr->seq_ctrl) & IEEE80211_SCTL_FRAG; + seq = (__le16_to_cpu(hdr->seq_ctrl) & IEEE80211_SCTL_SEQ) >> 4; + + if (frag_number == 0) { + last_pn->pn48 = new_pn.pn48; + peer->frag_tids_seq[tid] = seq; + } else { + if (seq != peer->frag_tids_seq[tid]) + return false; + + if (new_pn.pn48 != last_pn->pn48 + 1) + return false; + + last_pn->pn48 = new_pn.pn48; + } + + return true; +} + static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(struct ath10k *ar, struct sk_buff_head *amsdu, struct ieee80211_rx_status *status, bool fill_crypt_header, u8 *rx_hdr, - enum ath10k_pkt_rx_err *err) + enum ath10k_pkt_rx_err *err, + u16 peer_id, + bool frag) { struct sk_buff *first; struct sk_buff *last; - struct sk_buff *msdu; + struct sk_buff *msdu, *temp; struct htt_rx_desc *rxd; struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr; enum htt_rx_mpdu_encrypt_type enctype; @@ -1546,6 +1617,7 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(struct ath10k *ar, bool is_decrypted; bool is_mgmt; u32 attention; + bool frag_pn_check = true; if (skb_queue_empty(amsdu)) return; @@ -1644,6 +1716,24 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(struct ath10k *ar, } skb_queue_walk(amsdu, msdu) { + if (frag && !fill_crypt_header && is_decrypted && + enctype == HTT_RX_MPDU_ENCRYPT_AES_CCM_WPA2) + frag_pn_check = ath10k_htt_rx_h_frag_pn_check(ar, + msdu, + peer_id, + 0, + enctype); + + if (!frag_pn_check) { + /* Discard the fragment with invalid PN */ + temp = msdu->prev; + __skb_unlink(msdu, amsdu); + dev_kfree_skb_any(msdu); + msdu = temp; + frag_pn_check = true; + continue; + } + ath10k_htt_rx_h_csum_offload(msdu); ath10k_htt_rx_h_undecap(ar, msdu, status, first_hdr, enctype, is_decrypted); @@ -1849,7 +1939,8 @@ static int ath10k_htt_rx_handle_amsdu(struct ath10k_htt *htt) ath10k_htt_rx_h_unchain(ar, &amsdu, &drop_cnt, &unchain_cnt); ath10k_htt_rx_h_filter(ar, &amsdu, rx_status, &drop_cnt_filter); - ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(ar, &amsdu, rx_status, true, first_hdr, &err); + ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(ar, &amsdu, rx_status, true, first_hdr, &err, 0, + false); msdus_to_queue = skb_queue_len(&amsdu); ath10k_htt_rx_h_enqueue(ar, &amsdu, rx_status); @@ -2200,7 +2291,7 @@ static int ath10k_htt_rx_in_ord_ind(struct ath10k *ar, struct sk_buff *skb) ath10k_htt_rx_h_ppdu(ar, &amsdu, status, vdev_id); ath10k_htt_rx_h_filter(ar, &amsdu, status, NULL); ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(ar, &amsdu, status, false, NULL, - NULL); + NULL, peer_id, frag); ath10k_htt_rx_h_enqueue(ar, &amsdu, status); break; case -EAGAIN: -- Gitee From fea05648f54f7876b428950cd170ed68cd314240 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wen Gong Date: Fri, 15 Oct 2021 12:03:51 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 9/9] =?UTF-8?q?ath10k:=20drop=20fragments=20with=20multica?= =?UTF-8?q?st=20DA=20for=20PCIe=20Signed-off-by=EF=BC=9AKong=20Zhiquan=20=20-------------------------------------?= =?UTF-8?q?----------------=20mainline=20inclusion=20from=20mainline-v5.13?= =?UTF-8?q?-rc4=20commit=2065c415a144ad8132b6a6d97d4a1919ffc728e2d1=20cate?= =?UTF-8?q?gory:=20bugfix=20bugzilla:=20181870=20CVE:=20CVE-2020-26145?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit ------------------------------------------------- Fragmentation is not used with multicast frames. Discard unexpected fragments with multicast DA. This fixes CVE-2020-26145. Tested-on: QCA6174 hw3.2 PCI WLAN.RM.4.4.1-00110-QCARMSWP-1 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Wen Gong Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.5a0bd289bda8.Idd6ebea20038fb1cfee6de924aa595e5647c9eae@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Wang Hai Reviewed-by: Yue Haibing Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang --- drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c index 3101fb00e262..435b9aacbfc3 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c @@ -1546,6 +1546,16 @@ static u64 ath10k_htt_rx_h_get_pn(struct ath10k *ar, struct sk_buff *skb, return pn; } +static bool ath10k_htt_rx_h_frag_multicast_check(struct ath10k *ar, + struct sk_buff *skb, + u16 offset) +{ + struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr; + + hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)(skb->data + offset); + return !is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1); +} + static bool ath10k_htt_rx_h_frag_pn_check(struct ath10k *ar, struct sk_buff *skb, u16 peer_id, @@ -1617,7 +1627,7 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(struct ath10k *ar, bool is_decrypted; bool is_mgmt; u32 attention; - bool frag_pn_check = true; + bool frag_pn_check = true, multicast_check = true; if (skb_queue_empty(amsdu)) return; @@ -1724,13 +1734,20 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(struct ath10k *ar, 0, enctype); - if (!frag_pn_check) { - /* Discard the fragment with invalid PN */ + if (frag) + multicast_check = ath10k_htt_rx_h_frag_multicast_check(ar, + msdu, + 0); + + if (!frag_pn_check || !multicast_check) { + /* Discard the fragment with invalid PN or multicast DA + */ temp = msdu->prev; __skb_unlink(msdu, amsdu); dev_kfree_skb_any(msdu); msdu = temp; frag_pn_check = true; + multicast_check = true; continue; } -- Gitee