From 7e73b3b7e3aa67a6e61b1ab7a16b93e315d51851 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Borkmann Date: Tue, 4 Jan 2022 14:16:03 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 1/7] bpf: Fix out of bounds access from invalid *_or_null type verification stable inclusion from stable-5.10.92 commit 35ab8c9085b0af847df7fac9571ccd26d9f0f513 category: bugfix issue: #I4SHEN CVE: CVE-2022-23222 Signed-off-by: Yu Changchun --------------------------------------- [ no upstream commit given implicitly fixed through the larger refactoring in c25b2ae136039ffa820c26138ed4a5e5f3ab3841 ] While auditing some other code, I noticed missing checks inside the pointer arithmetic simulation, more specifically, adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(). Several *_OR_NULL types are not rejected whereas they are _required_ to be rejected given the expectation is that they get promoted into a 'real' pointer type for the success case, that is, after an explicit != NULL check. One case which stands out and is accessible from unprivileged (iff enabled given disabled by default) is BPF ring buffer. From crafting a PoC, the NULL check can be bypassed through an offset, and its id marking will then lead to promotion of mem_or_null to a mem type. bpf_ringbuf_reserve() helper can trigger this case through passing of reserved flags, for example. func#0 @0 0: R1=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: R1=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0 fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm 1: (18) r1 = 0x0 3: R1_w=map_ptr(id=0,off=0,ks=0,vs=0,imm=0) R10=fp0 fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm 3: (b7) r2 = 8 4: R1_w=map_ptr(id=0,off=0,ks=0,vs=0,imm=0) R2_w=invP8 R10=fp0 fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm 4: (b7) r3 = 0 5: R1_w=map_ptr(id=0,off=0,ks=0,vs=0,imm=0) R2_w=invP8 R3_w=invP0 R10=fp0 fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm 5: (85) call bpf_ringbuf_reserve#131 6: R0_w=mem_or_null(id=2,ref_obj_id=2,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0 fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm refs=2 6: (bf) r6 = r0 7: R0_w=mem_or_null(id=2,ref_obj_id=2,off=0,imm=0) R6_w=mem_or_null(id=2,ref_obj_id=2,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0 fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm refs=2 7: (07) r0 += 1 8: R0_w=mem_or_null(id=2,ref_obj_id=2,off=1,imm=0) R6_w=mem_or_null(id=2,ref_obj_id=2,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0 fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm refs=2 8: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+4 R0_w=mem(id=0,ref_obj_id=0,off=0,imm=0) R6_w=mem(id=0,ref_obj_id=2,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0 fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm refs=2 9: R0_w=mem(id=0,ref_obj_id=0,off=0,imm=0) R6_w=mem(id=0,ref_obj_id=2,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0 fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm refs=2 9: (62) *(u32 *)(r6 +0) = 0 R0_w=mem(id=0,ref_obj_id=0,off=0,imm=0) R6_w=mem(id=0,ref_obj_id=2,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0 fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm refs=2 10: R0_w=mem(id=0,ref_obj_id=0,off=0,imm=0) R6_w=mem(id=0,ref_obj_id=2,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0 fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm refs=2 10: (bf) r1 = r6 11: R0_w=mem(id=0,ref_obj_id=0,off=0,imm=0) R1_w=mem(id=0,ref_obj_id=2,off=0,imm=0) R6_w=mem(id=0,ref_obj_id=2,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0 fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm refs=2 11: (b7) r2 = 0 12: R0_w=mem(id=0,ref_obj_id=0,off=0,imm=0) R1_w=mem(id=0,ref_obj_id=2,off=0,imm=0) R2_w=invP0 R6_w=mem(id=0,ref_obj_id=2,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0 fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm refs=2 12: (85) call bpf_ringbuf_submit#132 13: R6=invP(id=0) R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm 13: (b7) r0 = 0 14: R0_w=invP0 R6=invP(id=0) R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm 14: (95) exit from 8 to 13: safe processed 15 insns (limit 1000000) max_states_per_insn 0 total_states 1 peak_states 1 mark_read 0 OK All three commits, that is b121b341e598 ("bpf: Add PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL support"), 457f44363a88 ("bpf: Implement BPF ring buffer and verifier support for it"), and the afbf21dce668 ("bpf: Support readonly/readwrite buffers in verifier") suffer the same cause and their *_OR_NULL type pendants must be rejected in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(). Make the test more robust by reusing reg_type_may_be_null() helper such that we catch all *_OR_NULL types we have today and in future. Note that pointer arithmetic on PTR_TO_BTF_ID, PTR_TO_RDONLY_BUF, and PTR_TO_RDWR_BUF is generally allowed. Fixes: b121b341e598 ("bpf: Add PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL support") Fixes: 457f44363a88 ("bpf: Implement BPF ring buffer and verifier support for it") Fixes: afbf21dce668 ("bpf: Support readonly/readwrite buffers in verifier") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Yu Changchun Signed-off-by: kong_zhiquan --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index ce1e9193365f..01af63e9f135 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -6012,16 +6012,16 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, fallthrough; case PTR_TO_PACKET_END: case PTR_TO_SOCKET: - case PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL: case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: - case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL: case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: - case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL: case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: +reject: verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on %s prohibited\n", dst, reg_type_str[ptr_reg->type]); return -EACCES; default: + if (reg_type_may_be_null(ptr_reg->type)) + goto reject; break; } -- Gitee From c91c62e9b565e762e732f5a9d5c5c301c94d2ac1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Eric W. Biederman" Date: Thu, 20 Jan 2022 11:04:01 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 2/7] cgroup-v1: Require capabilities to set release_agent stable inclusion from stable-5.10.97 commit 1fc3444cda9a78c65b769e3fa93455e09ff7a0d3 category: bugfix issue: #I4TM31 CVE: CVE-2022-0492 Signed-off-by: Yu Changchun --------------------------------------- commit 24f6008564183aa120d07c03d9289519c2fe02af upstream. The cgroup release_agent is called with call_usermodehelper. The function call_usermodehelper starts the release_agent with a full set fo capabilities. Therefore require capabilities when setting the release_agaent. Reported-by: Tabitha Sable Tested-by: Tabitha Sable Fixes: 81a6a5cdd2c5 ("Task Control Groups: automatic userspace notification of idle cgroups") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.24+ Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Yu Changchun Signed-off-by: kong_zhiquan --- kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c index 812dd4ed0129..134723ce778a 100644 --- a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c +++ b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c @@ -545,6 +545,14 @@ static ssize_t cgroup_release_agent_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of, BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(cgrp->root->release_agent_path) < PATH_MAX); + /* + * Release agent gets called with all capabilities, + * require capabilities to set release agent. + */ + if ((of->file->f_cred->user_ns != &init_user_ns) || + !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + cgrp = cgroup_kn_lock_live(of->kn, false); if (!cgrp) return -ENODEV; @@ -962,6 +970,12 @@ int cgroup1_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param) /* Specifying two release agents is forbidden */ if (ctx->release_agent) return invalfc(fc, "release_agent respecified"); + /* + * Release agent gets called with all capabilities, + * require capabilities to set release agent. + */ + if ((fc->user_ns != &init_user_ns) || !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return invalfc(fc, "Setting release_agent not allowed"); ctx->release_agent = param->string; param->string = NULL; break; -- Gitee From 79116549a60ebf729058d33810a18ed7c5742eeb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mathias Krause Date: Thu, 27 Jan 2022 18:34:19 +1000 Subject: [PATCH 3/7] drm/vmwgfx: Fix stale file descriptors on failed usercopy stable inclusion from stable-5.10.95 commit ae2b20f27732fe92055d9e7b350abc5cdf3e2414 category: bugfix issue: #I4SHEN CVE: CVE-2022-22942 Signed-off-by: Yu Changchun --------------------------------------- commit a0f90c8815706981c483a652a6aefca51a5e191c upstream. A failing usercopy of the fence_rep object will lead to a stale entry in the file descriptor table as put_unused_fd() won't release it. This enables userland to refer to a dangling 'file' object through that still valid file descriptor, leading to all kinds of use-after-free exploitation scenarios. Fix this by deferring the call to fd_install() until after the usercopy has succeeded. Fixes: c906965dee22 ("drm/vmwgfx: Add export fence to file descriptor support") Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause Signed-off-by: Zack Rusin Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Yu Changchun Signed-off-by: kong_zhiquan --- drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_drv.h | 5 ++-- drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c | 33 +++++++++++++------------ drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_fence.c | 2 +- drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_kms.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_drv.h b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_drv.h index 1523b51a7284..ad208a5f4ebe 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_drv.h +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_drv.h @@ -1088,15 +1088,14 @@ extern int vmw_execbuf_fence_commands(struct drm_file *file_priv, struct vmw_private *dev_priv, struct vmw_fence_obj **p_fence, uint32_t *p_handle); -extern void vmw_execbuf_copy_fence_user(struct vmw_private *dev_priv, +extern int vmw_execbuf_copy_fence_user(struct vmw_private *dev_priv, struct vmw_fpriv *vmw_fp, int ret, struct drm_vmw_fence_rep __user *user_fence_rep, struct vmw_fence_obj *fence, uint32_t fence_handle, - int32_t out_fence_fd, - struct sync_file *sync_file); + int32_t out_fence_fd); bool vmw_cmd_describe(const void *buf, u32 *size, char const **cmd); /** diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c index 83e1b54eb864..739cbc77d886 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c @@ -3816,17 +3816,17 @@ int vmw_execbuf_fence_commands(struct drm_file *file_priv, * Also if copying fails, user-space will be unable to signal the fence object * so we wait for it immediately, and then unreference the user-space reference. */ -void +int vmw_execbuf_copy_fence_user(struct vmw_private *dev_priv, struct vmw_fpriv *vmw_fp, int ret, struct drm_vmw_fence_rep __user *user_fence_rep, struct vmw_fence_obj *fence, uint32_t fence_handle, - int32_t out_fence_fd, struct sync_file *sync_file) + int32_t out_fence_fd) { struct drm_vmw_fence_rep fence_rep; if (user_fence_rep == NULL) - return; + return 0; memset(&fence_rep, 0, sizeof(fence_rep)); @@ -3854,20 +3854,14 @@ vmw_execbuf_copy_fence_user(struct vmw_private *dev_priv, * handle. */ if (unlikely(ret != 0) && (fence_rep.error == 0)) { - if (sync_file) - fput(sync_file->file); - - if (fence_rep.fd != -1) { - put_unused_fd(fence_rep.fd); - fence_rep.fd = -1; - } - ttm_ref_object_base_unref(vmw_fp->tfile, fence_handle, TTM_REF_USAGE); VMW_DEBUG_USER("Fence copy error. Syncing.\n"); (void) vmw_fence_obj_wait(fence, false, false, VMW_FENCE_WAIT_TIMEOUT); } + + return ret ? -EFAULT : 0; } /** @@ -4209,16 +4203,23 @@ int vmw_execbuf_process(struct drm_file *file_priv, (void) vmw_fence_obj_wait(fence, false, false, VMW_FENCE_WAIT_TIMEOUT); + } + } + + ret = vmw_execbuf_copy_fence_user(dev_priv, vmw_fpriv(file_priv), ret, + user_fence_rep, fence, handle, out_fence_fd); + + if (sync_file) { + if (ret) { + /* usercopy of fence failed, put the file object */ + fput(sync_file->file); + put_unused_fd(out_fence_fd); } else { /* Link the fence with the FD created earlier */ fd_install(out_fence_fd, sync_file->file); } } - vmw_execbuf_copy_fence_user(dev_priv, vmw_fpriv(file_priv), ret, - user_fence_rep, fence, handle, out_fence_fd, - sync_file); - /* Don't unreference when handing fence out */ if (unlikely(out_fence != NULL)) { *out_fence = fence; @@ -4236,7 +4237,7 @@ int vmw_execbuf_process(struct drm_file *file_priv, */ vmw_validation_unref_lists(&val_ctx); - return 0; + return ret; out_unlock_binding: mutex_unlock(&dev_priv->binding_mutex); diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_fence.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_fence.c index 0f8d29397157..8bc41ec97d71 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_fence.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_fence.c @@ -1171,7 +1171,7 @@ int vmw_fence_event_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data, } vmw_execbuf_copy_fence_user(dev_priv, vmw_fp, 0, user_fence_rep, fence, - handle, -1, NULL); + handle, -1); vmw_fence_obj_unreference(&fence); return 0; out_no_create: diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_kms.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_kms.c index 312ed0881a99..e58112997c88 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_kms.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_kms.c @@ -2479,7 +2479,7 @@ void vmw_kms_helper_validation_finish(struct vmw_private *dev_priv, if (file_priv) vmw_execbuf_copy_fence_user(dev_priv, vmw_fpriv(file_priv), ret, user_fence_rep, fence, - handle, -1, NULL); + handle, -1); if (out_fence) *out_fence = fence; else -- Gitee From d33a13b1d9fd4c46c36409b48f805db406506c2f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Janis Schoetterl-Glausch Date: Fri, 28 Jan 2022 15:06:43 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 4/7] KVM: s390: Return error on SIDA memop on normal guest stable inclusion from stable-5.10.100 commit b62267b8b06e9b8bb429ae8f962ee431e6535d60 category: bugfix issue: #I4SHEN CVE: CVE-2022-0516 Signed-off-by: Yu Changchun --------------------------------------- commit 2c212e1baedcd782b2535a3f86bc491977677c0e upstream. Refuse SIDA memops on guests which are not protected. For normal guests, the secure instruction data address designation, which determines the location we access, is not under control of KVM. Fixes: 19e122776886 (KVM: S390: protvirt: Introduce instruction data area bounce buffer) Signed-off-by: Janis Schoetterl-Glausch Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Yu Changchun Signed-off-by: kong_zhiquan --- arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c b/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c index f94b4f78d4da..957dda21055b 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c @@ -4648,6 +4648,8 @@ static long kvm_s390_guest_sida_op(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, return -EINVAL; if (mop->size + mop->sida_offset > sida_size(vcpu->arch.sie_block)) return -E2BIG; + if (!kvm_s390_pv_cpu_is_protected(vcpu)) + return -EINVAL; switch (mop->op) { case KVM_S390_MEMOP_SIDA_READ: -- Gitee From 17e11a17ea24ed990965eab9b66d070e8f8208f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Willem de Bruijn Date: Wed, 15 Dec 2021 09:39:37 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 5/7] net/packet: rx_owner_map depends on pg_vec stable inclusion from stable-5.10.88 commit 7da349f07e457cad135df0920a3f670e423fb5e9 category: bugfix issue: #I4SHEN CVE: CVE-2021-22600 Signed-off-by: Yu Changchun --------------------------------------- [ Upstream commit ec6af094ea28f0f2dda1a6a33b14cd57e36a9755 ] Packet sockets may switch ring versions. Avoid misinterpreting state between versions, whose fields share a union. rx_owner_map is only allocated with a packet ring (pg_vec) and both are swapped together. If pg_vec is NULL, meaning no packet ring was allocated, then neither was rx_owner_map. And the field may be old state from a tpacket_v3. Fixes: 61fad6816fc1 ("net/packet: tpacket_rcv: avoid a producer race condition") Reported-by: Syzbot Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211215143937.106178-1-willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Yu Changchun Signed-off-by: kong_zhiquan --- net/packet/af_packet.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c index 08144559eed5..f78097aa403a 100644 --- a/net/packet/af_packet.c +++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c @@ -4461,9 +4461,10 @@ static int packet_set_ring(struct sock *sk, union tpacket_req_u *req_u, } out_free_pg_vec: - bitmap_free(rx_owner_map); - if (pg_vec) + if (pg_vec) { + bitmap_free(rx_owner_map); free_pg_vec(pg_vec, order, req->tp_block_nr); + } out: return err; } -- Gitee From 78de2c994d9338d6a5098f8f0ec613cc4e14d0d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jon Maloy Date: Thu, 17 Feb 2022 14:59:04 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 6/7] tipc: improve size validations for received domain records mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.17-rc4 commit 9aa422ad326634b76309e8ff342c246800621216 category: bugfix issue: #I4U9Y8 CVE: CVE-2022-0435 Reference: https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/9aa422ad326634b76309e8ff342c246800621216 Signed-off-by: Yu Changchun -------------------------------- The function tipc_mon_rcv() allows a node to receive and process domain_record structs from peer nodes to track their views of the network topology. This patch verifies that the number of members in a received domain record does not exceed the limit defined by MAX_MON_DOMAIN, something that may otherwise lead to a stack overflow. tipc_mon_rcv() is called from the function tipc_link_proto_rcv(), where we are reading a 32 bit message data length field into a uint16. To avert any risk of bit overflow, we add an extra sanity check for this in that function. We cannot see that happen with the current code, but future designers being unaware of this risk, may introduce it by allowing delivery of very large (> 64k) sk buffers from the bearer layer. This potential problem was identified by Eric Dumazet. This fixes CVE-2022-0435 Reported-by: Samuel Page Reported-by: Eric Dumazet Fixes: 35c55c9877f8 ("tipc: add neighbor monitoring framework") Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy Reviewed-by: Xin Long Reviewed-by: Samuel Page Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao Reviewed-by: Yongjun Wei Reviewed-by: Yue Haibing Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai Signed-off-by: Yu Changchun Signed-off-by: kong_zhiquan --- net/tipc/link.c | 9 +++++++-- net/tipc/monitor.c | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/tipc/link.c b/net/tipc/link.c index c92e6984933c..ca73873ff4a5 100644 --- a/net/tipc/link.c +++ b/net/tipc/link.c @@ -2156,7 +2156,7 @@ static int tipc_link_proto_rcv(struct tipc_link *l, struct sk_buff *skb, struct tipc_msg *hdr = buf_msg(skb); struct tipc_gap_ack_blks *ga = NULL; bool reply = msg_probe(hdr), retransmitted = false; - u16 dlen = msg_data_sz(hdr), glen = 0; + u32 dlen = msg_data_sz(hdr), glen = 0; u16 peers_snd_nxt = msg_next_sent(hdr); u16 peers_tol = msg_link_tolerance(hdr); u16 peers_prio = msg_linkprio(hdr); @@ -2170,6 +2170,10 @@ static int tipc_link_proto_rcv(struct tipc_link *l, struct sk_buff *skb, void *data; trace_tipc_proto_rcv(skb, false, l->name); + + if (dlen > U16_MAX) + goto exit; + if (tipc_link_is_blocked(l) || !xmitq) goto exit; @@ -2265,7 +2269,8 @@ static int tipc_link_proto_rcv(struct tipc_link *l, struct sk_buff *skb, /* Receive Gap ACK blocks from peer if any */ glen = tipc_get_gap_ack_blks(&ga, l, hdr, true); - + if(glen > dlen) + break; tipc_mon_rcv(l->net, data + glen, dlen - glen, l->addr, &l->mon_state, l->bearer_id); diff --git a/net/tipc/monitor.c b/net/tipc/monitor.c index 6dce2abf436e..a37190da5a50 100644 --- a/net/tipc/monitor.c +++ b/net/tipc/monitor.c @@ -465,6 +465,8 @@ void tipc_mon_rcv(struct net *net, void *data, u16 dlen, u32 addr, state->probing = false; /* Sanity check received domain record */ + if (new_member_cnt > MAX_MON_DOMAIN) + return; if (dlen < dom_rec_len(arrv_dom, 0)) return; if (dlen != dom_rec_len(arrv_dom, new_member_cnt)) -- Gitee From 9fa4a7a15f0066591a8031d90b8a859277a7f521 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jamie Hill-Daniel Date: Tue, 18 Jan 2022 08:06:04 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 7/7] vfs: fs_context: fix up param length parsing in legacy_parse_param stable inclusion from stable-5.10.93 commit eadde287a62e66b2f9e62d007c59a8f50d4b8413 category: bugfix issue: #I4SHEN CVE: CVE-2022-0185 Signed-off-by: Yu Changchun --------------------------------------- commit 722d94847de29310e8aa03fcbdb41fc92c521756 upstream. The "PAGE_SIZE - 2 - size" calculation in legacy_parse_param() is an unsigned type so a large value of "size" results in a high positive value instead of a negative value as expected. Fix this by getting rid of the subtraction. Signed-off-by: Jamie Hill-Daniel Signed-off-by: William Liu Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso Tested-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo Acked-by: Dan Carpenter Acked-by: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Yu Changchun Signed-off-by: kong_zhiquan --- fs/fs_context.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/fs_context.c b/fs/fs_context.c index 2834d1afa6e8..b11677802ee1 100644 --- a/fs/fs_context.c +++ b/fs/fs_context.c @@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ static int legacy_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param) param->key); } - if (len > PAGE_SIZE - 2 - size) + if (size + len + 2 > PAGE_SIZE) return invalf(fc, "VFS: Legacy: Cumulative options too large"); if (strchr(param->key, ',') || (param->type == fs_value_is_string && -- Gitee