diff --git a/apps/enc.c b/apps/enc.c
index b3bf4cc2592d01dfa1c998911bcab79f66a4c3fa..5375fd8eb3503ffe77e56b2a50cf0b544dd5a067 100644
--- a/apps/enc.c
+++ b/apps/enc.c
@@ -234,6 +234,8 @@ int enc_main(int argc, char **argv)
                 goto opthelp;
             if (k)
                 n *= 1024;
+            if (n > INT_MAX)
+                goto opthelp;
             bsize = (int)n;
             break;
         case OPT_K:
diff --git a/apps/ocsp.c b/apps/ocsp.c
index 821e224c6ce45da6940a949035704945034e3563..fe759c08ed5a2a3a4a7d62a7ccb32c34db5d2b54 100644
--- a/apps/ocsp.c
+++ b/apps/ocsp.c
@@ -666,7 +666,8 @@ redo_accept:
                 resp =
                     OCSP_response_create(OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_MALFORMEDREQUEST,
                                          NULL);
-                send_ocsp_response(cbio, resp);
+                if (resp != NULL)
+                    send_ocsp_response(cbio, resp);
             }
             goto done_resp;
         }
@@ -764,16 +765,18 @@ redo_accept:
         BIO_free(derbio);
     }
 
-    i = OCSP_response_status(resp);
-    if (i != OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL) {
-        BIO_printf(out, "Responder Error: %s (%d)\n",
-                   OCSP_response_status_str(i), i);
-        if (!ignore_err)
+    if (resp != NULL) {
+        i = OCSP_response_status(resp);
+        if (i != OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL) {
+            BIO_printf(out, "Responder Error: %s (%d)\n",
+                       OCSP_response_status_str(i), i);
+            if (!ignore_err)
                 goto end;
-    }
+        }
 
-    if (resp_text)
-        OCSP_RESPONSE_print(out, resp, 0);
+        if (resp_text)
+            OCSP_RESPONSE_print(out, resp, 0);
+    }
 
     /* If running as responder don't verify our own response */
     if (cbio != NULL) {
diff --git a/crypto/rand/randfile.c b/crypto/rand/randfile.c
index 86c322473ca54783cc531bf770a202f8c73ff5ff..01f3b611d9d0fac167eeb487759993a8419edcf0 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/randfile.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/randfile.c
@@ -167,6 +167,10 @@ int RAND_load_file(const char *file, long bytes)
         /* If given a bytecount, and we did it, break. */
         if (bytes > 0 && (bytes -= i) <= 0)
             break;
+
+        /* We can hit a signed integer overflow on the next iteration */
+        if (ret > INT_MAX - RAND_LOAD_BUF_SIZE)
+            break;
     }
 
     OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, sizeof(buf));
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c
index b4f4c45998befe513ad0097aa219b71cbf414749..fa87bdd028c2ec656bb2b101873cc3bf683b7b6a 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c
@@ -608,6 +608,11 @@ const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0(int id)
 {
     int num = OSSL_NELEM(default_table);
 
+    if (id < 0) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
     if (id < num)
         return default_table + id;
     return sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_value(param_table, id - num);
diff --git a/doc/man1/openssl-enc.pod.in b/doc/man1/openssl-enc.pod.in
index e6d5103bd91a2592897d0ea83ae192e96b9a580b..35405ed3819f0afe42dc22881156f12b45f80ccd 100644
--- a/doc/man1/openssl-enc.pod.in
+++ b/doc/man1/openssl-enc.pod.in
@@ -177,6 +177,7 @@ or decryption.
 =item B<-bufsize> I<number>
 
 Set the buffer size for I/O.
+The maximum size that can be specified is B<2^31-1> (2147483647) bytes.
 
 =item B<-nopad>
 
diff --git a/doc/man3/RAND_load_file.pod b/doc/man3/RAND_load_file.pod
index baca54cb3c890e001c43e52e098267062c2e0115..fd00bf883d401c131cffaa8c7667b2b7a131fcec 100644
--- a/doc/man3/RAND_load_file.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/RAND_load_file.pod
@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ RAND_load_file() reads a number of bytes from file B<filename> and
 adds them to the PRNG. If B<max_bytes> is nonnegative,
 up to B<max_bytes> are read;
 if B<max_bytes> is -1, the complete file is read.
+RAND_load_file() can read less than the complete file or the requested number
+of bytes if it doesn't fit in the return value type.
 Do not load the same file multiple times unless its contents have
 been updated by RAND_write_file() between reads.
 Also, note that B<filename> should be adequately protected so that an