diff --git a/CVE-2024-3596.patch b/CVE-2024-3596.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d3b4edd5bab8527fe910f28349dfe201adb7fed5 --- /dev/null +++ b/CVE-2024-3596.patch @@ -0,0 +1,765 @@ +Refer: +https://build.opensuse.org/projects/SUSE:SLE-15-SP4:Update/packages/freeradius-server/files/CVE-2024-3596.patch?expand=1 +https://github.com/FreeRADIUS/freeradius-server/commit/7d095e85531d4941b43c0ad6d5c880291625a585 + +diff -Nur freeradius-server-3.2.3_bak/man/man1/radclient.1 freeradius-server-3.2.3/man/man1/radclient.1 +--- freeradius-server-3.2.3_bak/man/man1/radclient.1 2024-07-16 16:46:31.231616649 +0800 ++++ freeradius-server-3.2.3/man/man1/radclient.1 2024-07-16 16:46:48.236642156 +0800 +@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ + .B radclient + .RB [ \-4 ] + .RB [ \-6 ] ++.RB [ \-b ] + .RB [ \-c + .IR count ] + .RB [ \-d +@@ -52,6 +53,13 @@ + Use IPv4 (default) + .IP \-6 + Use IPv6 ++.IP \-b ++Enforce the Blast RADIUS checks. All replies to an Access-Request packet ++must contain a Message-Authenticator as the first attribute. ++ ++For compatibility with old servers, this flag is not set by default. ++However, radclient still checks for the Blast RADIUS signature, and ++discards packets which match the attack. + .IP \-c\ \fIcount\fP + Send each packet \fIcount\fP times. + .IP \-d\ \fIraddb_directory\fP +diff -Nur freeradius-server-3.2.3_bak/raddb/clients.conf freeradius-server-3.2.3/raddb/clients.conf +--- freeradius-server-3.2.3_bak/raddb/clients.conf 2024-07-16 16:46:31.233616652 +0800 ++++ freeradius-server-3.2.3/raddb/clients.conf 2024-07-16 16:46:48.236642156 +0800 +@@ -100,15 +100,30 @@ + secret = testing123 + + # +- # Old-style clients do not send a Message-Authenticator +- # in an Access-Request. RFC 5080 suggests that all clients +- # SHOULD include it in an Access-Request. The configuration +- # item below allows the server to require it. If a client +- # is required to include a Message-Authenticator and it does +- # not, then the packet will be silently discarded. ++ # The global configuration "security.require_message_authenticator" ++ # flag sets the default for all clients. That default can be ++ # over-ridden here, by setting it to "no". ++ # ++ # This flag exists solely for legacy clients which do not send ++ # Message-Authenticator in all Access-Request packets. We do not ++ # recommend setting it to "no". ++ # ++ # allowed values: yes, no ++ # ++# require_message_authenticator = yes ++ ++ # ++ # The global configuration "security.limit_proxy_state" ++ # flag sets the default for all clients. That default can be ++ # over-ridden here, by setting it to "no". ++ # ++ # This flag exists solely for legacy clients which do not send ++ # Message-Authenticator in all Access-Request packets. We do not ++ # recommend setting it to "no". + # + # allowed values: yes, no +- require_message_authenticator = no ++ # ++# limit_proxy_state = yes + + # + # The short name is used as an alias for the fully qualified +diff -Nur freeradius-server-3.2.3_bak/raddb/proxy.conf freeradius-server-3.2.3/raddb/proxy.conf +--- freeradius-server-3.2.3_bak/raddb/proxy.conf 2024-07-16 16:46:31.242616665 +0800 ++++ freeradius-server-3.2.3/raddb/proxy.conf 2024-07-16 16:46:48.237642158 +0800 +@@ -252,6 +252,20 @@ + # + secret = testing123 + ++ # The global configuration "security.require_message_authenticator" ++ # flag sets the default for all home servers. That default can be ++ # over-ridden here, by setting it to "no". ++ # ++ # This flag exists solely for legacy home servers which do ++ # not send Message-Authenticator in all Access-Accept, ++ # Access-Reject, or Access-Challenge packets. We do not ++ # recommend setting it to "no". ++ # ++ # allowed values: yes, no ++ # ++ #require_message_authenticator = no ++ ++ + ############################################################ + # + # The rest of the configuration items listed here are optional, +diff -Nur freeradius-server-3.2.3_bak/raddb/radiusd.conf.in freeradius-server-3.2.3/raddb/radiusd.conf.in +--- freeradius-server-3.2.3_bak/raddb/radiusd.conf.in 2024-07-16 16:46:31.242616665 +0800 ++++ freeradius-server-3.2.3/raddb/radiusd.conf.in 2024-07-16 16:46:48.237642158 +0800 +@@ -572,6 +572,64 @@ + # + status_server = yes + ++ # ++ # Global configuration for requiring Message-Authenticator ++ # in all Access-* packets sent over UDP or TCP. This flag ++ # is ignored for TLS. ++ ++ # ++ # This flag sets the global default for all clients and home ++ # servers. It can be over-ridden in an individual client or ++ # home server definition by adding a flag to that section: ++ # ++ # require_message_authenticator = no ++ # ++ # If the server produces error message which says "Packet ++ # does not contain required Message-Authenticator attribute", ++ # then this configuration item has to be updated. ++ # ++ # WARNING: This item should always be left as "yes", ++ # otherwise it is possible for MITM attackers to create fake ++ # Access-Accept packets to the NAS! ++ # ++ require_message_authenticator = yes ++ ++ # ++ # Global configuration for requiring Message-Authenticator ++ # Access-Request packets from a NAS, but only if those ++ # packets also contain Proxy-State. This flag only applies ++ # to packets sent over UDP or TCP. This flag is ignored for ++ # TLS. ++ # ++ # This flag sets the global default for all clients. It can ++ # be over-ridden in an individual client definition by adding ++ # a flag to that section: ++ # ++ # limit_proxy_state = no ++ # ++ # If "require_message_authenticator" is set to "yes", this ++ # configuration item is ignored. ++ # ++ # If "require_message_authenticator" is set to "no", this ++ # configuration item is checked. ++ # ++ # This configuration item should ALWAYS be set to "yes". ++ # ++ # The only reason to set it to "no" is when the client is a ++ # proxy, AND the proxy does not send Message-Authenticator in ++ # Access-Request packets. Even then, the best approach to ++ # fix the issue is to (1) update the proxy to send ++ # Message-Authenticator, and if that can't be done, then (2) ++ # set this flag to "no", but ONLY on a per-client basis. ++ # ++ # WARNING: Setting both this flag and the ++ # "require_message_authenticator" flag to "no" will allow ++ # MITM attackers to create fake Access-Accept packets to the ++ # NAS! At least one of them MUST be set to "yes" for the ++ # system to have any protection against the attack. ++ # ++ limit_proxy_state = yes ++ + @openssl_version_check_config@ + } + +diff -Nur freeradius-server-3.2.3_bak/src/include/clients.h freeradius-server-3.2.3/src/include/clients.h +--- freeradius-server-3.2.3_bak/src/include/clients.h 2024-07-16 16:46:31.259616690 +0800 ++++ freeradius-server-3.2.3/src/include/clients.h 2024-07-16 16:46:48.237642158 +0800 +@@ -43,7 +43,9 @@ + + char const *secret; //!< Secret PSK. + +- bool message_authenticator; //!< Require RADIUS message authenticator in requests. ++ bool require_ma; //!< Require RADIUS message authenticator in requests. ++ ++ bool limit_proxy_state; //!< Limit Proxy-State in requests + + char const *nas_type; //!< Type of client (arbitrary). + +diff -Nur freeradius-server-3.2.3_bak/src/include/conffile.h freeradius-server-3.2.3/src/include/conffile.h +--- freeradius-server-3.2.3_bak/src/include/conffile.h 2024-07-16 16:46:31.259616690 +0800 ++++ freeradius-server-3.2.3/src/include/conffile.h 2024-07-16 16:46:48.238642159 +0800 +@@ -140,6 +140,7 @@ + #define PW_TYPE_MULTI (1 << 18) //!< CONF_PAIR can have multiple copies. + #define PW_TYPE_NOT_EMPTY (1 << 19) //!< CONF_PAIR is required to have a non zero length value. + #define PW_TYPE_FILE_EXISTS ((1 << 20) | PW_TYPE_STRING) //!< File matching value must exist ++#define PW_TYPE_IGNORE_DEFAULT (1 << 21) //!< don't set from .dflt if the CONF_PAIR is missing + /* @} **/ + + #define FR_INTEGER_COND_CHECK(_name, _var, _cond, _new)\ +diff -Nur freeradius-server-3.2.3_bak/src/include/libradius.h freeradius-server-3.2.3/src/include/libradius.h +--- freeradius-server-3.2.3_bak/src/include/libradius.h 2024-07-16 16:46:31.259616690 +0800 ++++ freeradius-server-3.2.3/src/include/libradius.h 2024-07-16 16:46:48.238642159 +0800 +@@ -410,6 +410,7 @@ + #ifdef WITH_RADIUSV11 + bool radiusv11; + #endif ++ bool tls; //!< uses secure transport + } RADIUS_PACKET; + + typedef enum { +@@ -527,6 +528,11 @@ + /* radius.c */ + int rad_send(RADIUS_PACKET *, RADIUS_PACKET const *, char const *secret); + bool rad_packet_ok(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, int flags, decode_fail_t *reason); ++/* ++ * 1 == require_ma ++ * 2 == msg_peek ++ * 3 == limit_proxy_state ++ */ + RADIUS_PACKET *rad_recv(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, int fd, int flags); + ssize_t rad_recv_header(int sockfd, fr_ipaddr_t *src_ipaddr, uint16_t *src_port, int *code); + void rad_recv_discard(int sockfd); +diff -Nur freeradius-server-3.2.3_bak/src/include/radiusd.h freeradius-server-3.2.3/src/include/radiusd.h +--- freeradius-server-3.2.3_bak/src/include/radiusd.h 2024-07-16 16:46:31.260616692 +0800 ++++ freeradius-server-3.2.3/src/include/radiusd.h 2024-07-16 16:46:48.239642161 +0800 +@@ -174,6 +174,9 @@ + + bool exiting; //!< are we exiting? + ++ bool require_ma; //!< global configuration for all clients and home servers ++ ++ bool limit_proxy_state; //!< global configuration for all clients + + #ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL_VERSION_CHECK + char const *allow_vulnerable_openssl; //!< The CVE number of the last security issue acknowledged. +diff -Nur freeradius-server-3.2.3_bak/src/include/realms.h freeradius-server-3.2.3/src/include/realms.h +--- freeradius-server-3.2.3_bak/src/include/realms.h 2024-07-16 16:46:31.260616692 +0800 ++++ freeradius-server-3.2.3/src/include/realms.h 2024-07-16 16:46:48.239642161 +0800 +@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ + bool dual; //!< One of a pair of homeservers on consecutive ports. + bool dynamic; //!< is this a dynamically added home server? + bool nonblock; //!< Enable a socket non-blocking to the home server. ++ bool require_ma; //!< for all replies to Access-Request and Status-Server + #ifdef WITH_COA_TUNNEL + bool recv_coa; //!< receive CoA packets, too + #endif +diff -Nur freeradius-server-3.2.3_bak/src/lib/radius.c freeradius-server-3.2.3/src/lib/radius.c +--- freeradius-server-3.2.3_bak/src/lib/radius.c 2024-07-16 16:46:31.262616695 +0800 ++++ freeradius-server-3.2.3/src/lib/radius.c 2024-07-16 16:46:48.240642163 +0800 +@@ -1831,6 +1831,7 @@ + uint16_t total_length; + int len; + VALUE_PAIR const *reply; ++ bool seen_ma = false; + + /* + * A 4K packet, aligned on 64-bits. +@@ -1909,6 +1910,27 @@ + */ + + /* ++ * Always add Message-Authenticator for replies to ++ * Access-Request packets. ++ * ++ * It must be the FIRST attribute in the packet. ++ */ ++ if (!packet->tls && ++ ((original && (original->code == PW_CODE_ACCESS_REQUEST)) || ++ (packet->code == PW_CODE_ACCESS_REQUEST))) { ++ seen_ma = true; ++ ++ packet->offset = RADIUS_HDR_LEN; ++ ++ ptr[0] = PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR; ++ ptr[1] = 18; ++ memset(ptr + 2, 0, 16); ++ ++ ptr += 18; ++ total_length += 18; ++ } ++ ++ /* + * Loop over the reply attributes for the packet. + */ + reply = packet->vps; +@@ -1984,15 +2006,13 @@ + * length and initial value. + */ + if (!reply->da->vendor && (reply->da->attr == PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR)) { +-#ifdef WITH_RADIUSV11 + /* +- * RADIUSV11 does not encode or verify Message-Authenticator. ++ * We have already encoded the Message-Authenticator, don't do it again. + */ +- if (packet->radiusv11) { ++ if (seen_ma) { + reply = reply->next; + continue; + } +-#endif + + if (room < 18) break; + +@@ -2510,6 +2530,8 @@ + char host_ipaddr[128]; + #ifndef WITH_RADIUSV11_ONLY + bool require_ma = false; ++ bool limit_proxy_state = false; ++ bool seen_proxy_state = false; + bool seen_ma = false; + bool eap = false; + bool non_eap = false; +@@ -2561,13 +2583,14 @@ + /* + * Message-Authenticator is required in Status-Server + * packets, otherwise they can be trivially forged. +- */ +- if (hdr->code == PW_CODE_STATUS_SERVER) require_ma = true; +- +- /* ++ * + * It's also required if the caller asks for it. ++ * ++ * We only limit Proxy-State if we're not requiring ++ * Message-Authenticator. + */ +- if (flags) require_ma = true; ++ require_ma = ((flags & 0x01) != 0) || (hdr->code == PW_CODE_STATUS_SERVER); ++ limit_proxy_state = ((flags & 0x04) != 0) & !require_ma; + + /* + * Repeat the length checks. This time, instead of +@@ -2731,6 +2754,10 @@ + non_eap = true; + break; + ++ case PW_PROXY_STATE: ++ seen_proxy_state = true; ++ break; ++ + case PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR: + #ifdef WITH_RADIUSV11 + /* +@@ -2817,6 +2844,18 @@ + inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af, + &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr, + host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr))); ++ failure = DECODE_FAIL_MA_MISSING; ++ goto finish; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * The client is a NAS which shouldn't send Proxy-State, but it did! ++ */ ++ if (limit_proxy_state && seen_proxy_state && !seen_ma) { ++ FR_DEBUG_STRERROR_PRINTF("Insecure packet from host %s: Packet does not contain required Message-Authenticator attribute, but still has one or more Proxy-State attributes", ++ inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af, ++ &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr, ++ host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr))); + failure = DECODE_FAIL_MA_MISSING; + goto finish; + } +diff -Nur freeradius-server-3.2.3_bak/src/main/client.c freeradius-server-3.2.3/src/main/client.c +--- freeradius-server-3.2.3_bak/src/main/client.c 2024-07-16 16:46:31.263616696 +0800 ++++ freeradius-server-3.2.3/src/main/client.c 2024-07-16 16:46:48.241642164 +0800 +@@ -328,7 +328,8 @@ + (old->coa_home_server == client->coa_home_server) && + (old->coa_home_pool == client->coa_home_pool) && + #endif +- (old->message_authenticator == client->message_authenticator)) { ++ (old->require_ma == client->require_ma) && ++ (old->limit_proxy_state == client->limit_proxy_state)) { + WARN("Ignoring duplicate client %s", client->longname); + client_free(client); + return true; +@@ -512,7 +513,8 @@ + + { "src_ipaddr", FR_CONF_POINTER(PW_TYPE_STRING, &cl_srcipaddr), NULL }, + +- { "require_message_authenticator", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, RADCLIENT, message_authenticator), "no" }, ++ { "require_message_authenticator", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN | PW_TYPE_IGNORE_DEFAULT, RADCLIENT, require_ma), NULL }, ++ { "limit_proxy_state", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN | PW_TYPE_IGNORE_DEFAULT, RADCLIENT, limit_proxy_state), NULL }, + + { "secret", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING | PW_TYPE_SECRET, RADCLIENT, secret), NULL }, + { "shortname", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, RADCLIENT, shortname), NULL }, +@@ -724,7 +726,7 @@ + { "FreeRADIUS-Client-Src-IP-Address", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_IPV4_ADDR, RADCLIENT, src_ipaddr), NULL }, + { "FreeRADIUS-Client-Src-IPv6-Address", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_IPV6_ADDR, RADCLIENT, src_ipaddr), NULL }, + +- { "FreeRADIUS-Client-Require-MA", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, RADCLIENT, message_authenticator), NULL }, ++ { "FreeRADIUS-Client-Require-MA", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, RADCLIENT, require_ma), NULL }, + + { "FreeRADIUS-Client-Secret", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, RADCLIENT, secret), "" }, + { "FreeRADIUS-Client-Shortname", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, RADCLIENT, shortname), "" }, +@@ -906,6 +908,15 @@ + c = talloc_zero(ctx, RADCLIENT); + c->cs = cs; + ++ /* ++ * Set the "require message authenticator" and "limit ++ * proxy state" flags from the global default. If the ++ * configuration item exists, AND is set, it will ++ * over-ride the flag. ++ */ ++ c->require_ma = main_config.require_ma; ++ c->limit_proxy_state = main_config.limit_proxy_state; ++ + memset(&cl_ipaddr, 0, sizeof(cl_ipaddr)); + cl_netmask = 255; + +@@ -1233,7 +1244,7 @@ + if (shortname) c->shortname = talloc_typed_strdup(c, shortname); + if (type) c->nas_type = talloc_typed_strdup(c, type); + if (server) c->server = talloc_typed_strdup(c, server); +- c->message_authenticator = require_ma; ++ c->require_ma = require_ma; + + return c; + } +diff -Nur freeradius-server-3.2.3_bak/src/main/conffile.c freeradius-server-3.2.3/src/main/conffile.c +--- freeradius-server-3.2.3_bak/src/main/conffile.c 2024-07-16 16:46:31.263616696 +0800 ++++ freeradius-server-3.2.3/src/main/conffile.c 2024-07-16 16:46:48.242642166 +0800 +@@ -1424,6 +1424,7 @@ + { + int rcode; + bool deprecated, required, attribute, secret, file_input, cant_be_empty, tmpl, multi, file_exists; ++ bool ignore_dflt; + char **q; + char const *value; + CONF_PAIR *cp = NULL; +@@ -1447,6 +1448,7 @@ + cant_be_empty = (type & PW_TYPE_NOT_EMPTY); + tmpl = (type & PW_TYPE_TMPL); + multi = (type & PW_TYPE_MULTI); ++ ignore_dflt = (type & PW_TYPE_IGNORE_DEFAULT); + + if (attribute) required = true; + if (required) cant_be_empty = true; /* May want to review this in the future... */ +@@ -1470,7 +1472,7 @@ + * section, use the default value. + */ + if (!cp) { +- if (deprecated) return 0; /* Don't set the default value */ ++ if (deprecated || ignore_dflt) return 0; /* Don't set the default value */ + + rcode = 1; + value = dflt; +diff -Nur freeradius-server-3.2.3_bak/src/main/listen.c freeradius-server-3.2.3/src/main/listen.c +--- freeradius-server-3.2.3_bak/src/main/listen.c 2024-07-16 16:46:31.263616696 +0800 ++++ freeradius-server-3.2.3/src/main/listen.c 2024-07-16 16:46:48.243642167 +0800 +@@ -1947,7 +1947,7 @@ + * Now that we've sanity checked everything, receive the + * packet. + */ +- packet = rad_recv(ctx, listener->fd, client->message_authenticator); ++ packet = rad_recv(ctx, listener->fd, client->require_ma | (((int) client->limit_proxy_state) << 2)); + if (!packet) { + FR_STATS_INC(auth, total_malformed_requests); + if (DEBUG_ENABLED) ERROR("Receive - %s", fr_strerror()); +@@ -2343,7 +2343,7 @@ + * Now that we've sanity checked everything, receive the + * packet. + */ +- packet = rad_recv(ctx, listener->fd, client->message_authenticator); ++ packet = rad_recv(ctx, listener->fd, client->require_ma); + if (!packet) { + FR_STATS_INC(coa, total_malformed_requests); + if (DEBUG_ENABLED) ERROR("Receive - %s", fr_strerror()); +diff -Nur freeradius-server-3.2.3_bak/src/main/mainconfig.c freeradius-server-3.2.3/src/main/mainconfig.c +--- freeradius-server-3.2.3_bak/src/main/mainconfig.c 2024-07-16 16:46:31.264616698 +0800 ++++ freeradius-server-3.2.3/src/main/mainconfig.c 2024-07-16 16:46:48.243642167 +0800 +@@ -160,6 +160,8 @@ + { "max_attributes", FR_CONF_POINTER(PW_TYPE_INTEGER, &fr_max_attributes), STRINGIFY(0) }, + { "reject_delay", FR_CONF_POINTER(PW_TYPE_TIMEVAL, &main_config.reject_delay), STRINGIFY(0) }, + { "status_server", FR_CONF_POINTER(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, &main_config.status_server), "no"}, ++ { "require_message_authenticator", FR_CONF_POINTER(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, &main_config.require_ma), "yes"}, ++ { "limit_proxy_state", FR_CONF_POINTER(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, &main_config.limit_proxy_state), "yes"}, + #ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL_VERSION_CHECK + { "allow_vulnerable_openssl", FR_CONF_POINTER(PW_TYPE_STRING, &main_config.allow_vulnerable_openssl), "no"}, + #endif +diff -Nur freeradius-server-3.2.3_bak/src/main/process.c freeradius-server-3.2.3/src/main/process.c +--- freeradius-server-3.2.3_bak/src/main/process.c 2024-07-16 16:46:31.264616698 +0800 ++++ freeradius-server-3.2.3/src/main/process.c 2024-07-16 16:46:48.244642169 +0800 +@@ -2790,11 +2790,25 @@ + * server core, but I guess we can fix that later. + */ + if (!request->proxy_reply) { ++ decode_fail_t reason; ++ ++ /* ++ * If the home server configuration requires a Message-Authenticator, then set the flag, ++ * but only if the proxied packet is Access-Request or Status-Sercer. ++ * ++ * The realms.c file already clears require_ma for TLS connections. ++ */ ++ bool require_ma = request->home_server->require_ma && (request->proxy->code == PW_CODE_ACCESS_REQUEST); + if (!request->home_server) { + proxy_reply_too_late(request); + return 0; + } + ++ if (!rad_packet_ok(packet, require_ma, &reason)) { ++ DEBUG("Ignoring invalid packet - %s", fr_strerror()); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ + if (rad_verify(packet, request->proxy, + request->home_server->secret) != 0) { + DEBUG("Ignoring spoofed proxy reply. Signature is invalid"); +diff -Nur freeradius-server-3.2.3_bak/src/main/radclient.c freeradius-server-3.2.3/src/main/radclient.c +--- freeradius-server-3.2.3_bak/src/main/radclient.c 2024-07-16 16:46:31.264616698 +0800 ++++ freeradius-server-3.2.3/src/main/radclient.c 2024-07-16 16:46:48.245642170 +0800 +@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ + static int resend_count = 1; + static bool done = true; + static bool print_filename = false; ++static bool blast_radius = false; + + static fr_ipaddr_t client_ipaddr; + static uint16_t client_port = 0; +@@ -95,6 +96,7 @@ + fprintf(stderr, " One of auth, acct, status, coa, disconnect or auto.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -4 Use IPv4 address of server\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -6 Use IPv6 address of server.\n"); ++ fprintf(stderr, " -b Mandate checks for Blast RADIUS issue (this is not set by default).\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -c Send each packet 'count' times.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -d Set user dictionary directory (defaults to " RADDBDIR ").\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -D Set main dictionary directory (defaults to " DICTDIR ").\n"); +@@ -1060,6 +1062,131 @@ + } + + /* ++ * Do Blast RADIUS checks. ++ * ++ * The request is an Access-Request, and does NOT contain Proxy-State. ++ * ++ * The reply is a raw packet, and is NOT yet decoded. ++ */ ++static int blast_radius_check(rc_request_t *request, RADIUS_PACKET *reply) ++{ ++ uint8_t *attr, *end; ++ VALUE_PAIR *vp; ++ bool have_message_authenticator = false; ++ ++ /* ++ * We've received a raw packet. Nothing has (as of yet) checked ++ * anything in it other than the length, and that it's a ++ * well-formed RADIUS packet. ++ */ ++ switch (reply->data[0]) { ++ case PW_CODE_ACCESS_ACCEPT: ++ case PW_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT: ++ case PW_CODE_ACCESS_CHALLENGE: ++ if (reply->data[1] != request->packet->id) { ++ ERROR("Invalid reply ID %d to Access-Request ID %d", reply->data[1], request->packet->id); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ break; ++ ++ default: ++ ERROR("Invalid reply code %d to Access-Request", reply->data[0]); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * If the reply has a Message-Authenticator, then it MIGHT be fine. ++ */ ++ attr = reply->data + 20; ++ end = reply->data + reply->data_len; ++ ++ /* ++ * It should be the first attribute, so we warn if it isn't there. ++ * ++ * But it's not a fatal error. ++ */ ++ if (blast_radius && (attr[0] != PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR)) { ++ RDEBUG("WARNING The %s reply packet does not have Message-Authenticator as the first attribute. The packet may be vulnerable to Blast RADIUS attacks.", ++ fr_packet_codes[reply->data[0]]); ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * Set up for Proxy-State checks. ++ * ++ * If we see a Proxy-State in the reply which we didn't send, then it's a Blast RADIUS attack. ++ */ ++ vp = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->packet->vps, PW_PROXY_STATE, 0, TAG_ANY); ++ ++ while (attr < end) { ++ /* ++ * Blast RADIUS work-arounds require that ++ * Message-Authenticator is the first attribute in the ++ * reply. Note that we don't check for it being the ++ * first attribute, but simply that it exists. ++ * ++ * That check is a balance between securing the reply ++ * packet from attacks, and not violating the RFCs which ++ * say that there is no order to attributes in the ++ * packet. ++ * ++ * However, no matter the status of the '-b' flag we ++ * still can check for the signature of the attack, and ++ * discard packets which are suspicious. This behavior ++ * protects radclient from the attack, without mandating ++ * new behavior on the server side. ++ * ++ * Note that we don't set the '-b' flag by default. ++ * radclient is intended for testing / debugging, and is ++ * not intended to be used as part of a secure login / ++ * user checking system. ++ */ ++ if (attr[0] == PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR) { ++ have_message_authenticator = true; ++ goto next; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * If there are Proxy-State attributes in the reply, they must ++ * match EXACTLY the Proxy-State attributes in the request. ++ * ++ * Note that we don't care if there are more Proxy-States ++ * in the request than in the reply. The Blast RADIUS ++ * issue requires _adding_ Proxy-State attributes, and ++ * cannot work when the server _deletes_ Proxy-State ++ * attributes. ++ */ ++ if (attr[0] == PW_PROXY_STATE) { ++ if (!vp || (vp->length != (size_t) (attr[1] - 2)) || (memcmp(vp->vp_octets, attr + 2, vp->length) != 0)) { ++ ERROR("Invalid reply to Access-Request ID %d - Discarding packet due to Blast RADIUS attack being detected.", request->packet->id); ++ ERROR("We received a Proxy-State in the reply which we did not send, or which is different from what we sent."); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ ++ vp = fr_pair_find_by_num(vp->next, PW_PROXY_STATE, 0, TAG_ANY); ++ } ++ ++ next: ++ attr += attr[1]; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * If "-b" is set, then we require Message-Authenticator in the reply. ++ */ ++ if (blast_radius && !have_message_authenticator) { ++ ERROR("The %s reply packet does not contain Message-Authenticator - discarding packet due to Blast RADIUS checks.", ++ fr_packet_codes[reply->data[0]]); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * The packet doesn't look like it's a Blast RADIUS attack. The ++ * caller will now verify the packet signature. ++ */ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++ ++/* + * Receive one packet, maybe. + */ + static int recv_one_packet(int wait_time) +@@ -1111,6 +1238,20 @@ + request = fr_packet2myptr(rc_request_t, packet, packet_p); + + /* ++ * We want radclient to be able to send any packet, including ++ * imperfect ones. However, we do NOT want to be vulnerable to ++ * the "Blast RADIUS" issue. Instead of adding command-line ++ * flags to enable/disable similar flags to what the server ++ * sends, we just do a few more smart checks to double-check ++ * things. ++ */ ++ if ((request->packet->code == PW_CODE_ACCESS_REQUEST) && ++ blast_radius_check(request, reply) < 0) { ++ rad_free(&reply); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ ++ /* + * Fails the signature validation: not a real reply. + * FIXME: Silently drop it and listen for another packet. + */ +@@ -1243,7 +1384,7 @@ + exit(1); + } + +- while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "46c:d:D:f:Fhn:p:qr:sS:t:vx" ++ while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "46bc:d:D:f:Fhn:p:qr:sS:t:vx" + #ifdef WITH_TCP + "P:" + #endif +@@ -1256,6 +1397,10 @@ + force_af = AF_INET6; + break; + ++ case 'b': ++ blast_radius = true; ++ break; ++ + case 'c': + if (!isdigit((uint8_t) *optarg)) usage(); + +diff -Nur freeradius-server-3.2.3_bak/src/main/realms.c freeradius-server-3.2.3/src/main/realms.c +--- freeradius-server-3.2.3_bak/src/main/realms.c 2024-07-16 16:46:31.265616699 +0800 ++++ freeradius-server-3.2.3/src/main/realms.c 2024-07-16 16:46:48.246642172 +0800 +@@ -477,6 +477,7 @@ + + static CONF_PARSER home_server_config[] = { + { "nonblock", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, home_server_t, nonblock), "no" }, ++ { "require_message_authenticator", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN | PW_TYPE_IGNORE_DEFAULT, home_server_t, require_ma), NULL }, + { "ipaddr", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_COMBO_IP_ADDR, home_server_t, ipaddr), NULL }, + { "ipv4addr", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_IPV4_ADDR, home_server_t, ipaddr), NULL }, + { "ipv6addr", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_IPV6_ADDR, home_server_t, ipaddr), NULL }, +@@ -780,6 +781,7 @@ + home->cs = cs; + home->state = HOME_STATE_UNKNOWN; + home->proto = IPPROTO_UDP; ++ home->require_ma = main_config.require_ma; + + /* + * Parse the configuration into the home server +@@ -1116,6 +1118,11 @@ + if (tls) { + int rcode; + ++ /* ++ * We don't require this for TLS connections. ++ */ ++ home->require_ma = false; ++ + home->tls = tls_client_conf_parse(tls); + if (!home->tls) { + goto error; +diff -Nur freeradius-server-3.2.3_bak/src/main/tls_listen.c freeradius-server-3.2.3/src/main/tls_listen.c +--- freeradius-server-3.2.3_bak/src/main/tls_listen.c 2024-07-16 16:46:31.265616699 +0800 ++++ freeradius-server-3.2.3/src/main/tls_listen.c 2024-07-16 16:49:00.185840125 +0800 +@@ -674,6 +674,8 @@ + packet->radiusv11 = sock->radiusv11; + #endif + ++ packet->tls = true; ++ + if (!rad_packet_ok(packet, 0, NULL)) { + if (DEBUG_ENABLED) ERROR("Receive - %s", fr_strerror()); + DEBUG("(TLS) Closing TLS socket from client"); +@@ -1286,6 +1288,7 @@ + } + + #endif ++ packet->tls = true; + + /* + * FIXME: Client MIB updates? +@@ -1322,7 +1325,6 @@ + break; + #endif + #endif +- + default: + #ifdef WITH_COA_TUNNEL + bad_packet: +@@ -1373,6 +1375,7 @@ + * if there's no packet, encode it here. + */ + if (!request->proxy->data) { ++ request->reply->tls = true; + request->proxy_listener->proxy_encode(request->proxy_listener, + request); + } +@@ -1508,6 +1511,8 @@ + if ((listener->status != RAD_LISTEN_STATUS_INIT && + (listener->status != RAD_LISTEN_STATUS_KNOWN))) return 0; + ++ request->reply->tls = true; ++ + /* + * Pack the VPs + */ diff --git a/freeradius.spec b/freeradius.spec index 88c02a92dac632601b482936f304aec3d2db1762..4513878f0e6120ed70fede1b5b2ed020285c5420 100644 --- a/freeradius.spec +++ b/freeradius.spec @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ Name: freeradius Version: 3.2.3 -Release: 1 +Release: 2 Summary: Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service License: GPLv2+ and LGPLv2+ @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ Source1: radiusd.service Source2: freeradius-logrotate Source3: freeradius-pam-conf Source4: freeradius-tmpfiles.conf +Patch0: CVE-2024-3596.patch BuildRequires: autoconf gdbm-devel openssl openssl-devel pam-devel zlib-devel net-snmp-devel BuildRequires: net-snmp-utils readline-devel libpcap-devel systemd-units libtalloc-devel @@ -496,6 +497,9 @@ exit 0 %attr(640,root,radiusd) %config(noreplace) /etc/raddb/mods-available/ldap %changelog +* Tue Jul 16 2024 wangkai <13474090681@163.com> - 3.2.3-2 +- Fix CVE-2024-3596 + * Thu Sep 28 2023 xu_ping <707078654@qq.com> - 3.2.3-1 - Update to 3.2.3