diff --git a/0019-opensc-CVE-2023-5992.patch b/0019-opensc-CVE-2023-5992.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..229d6fa74238544db06dd5e776d8f8cda4fd5d52 --- /dev/null +++ b/0019-opensc-CVE-2023-5992.patch @@ -0,0 +1,824 @@ +diff --git a/src/common/Makefile.am b/src/common/Makefile.am +index 5153428dce..9ecbffe8fd 100644 +--- a/src/common/Makefile.am ++++ b/src/common/Makefile.am +@@ -8,7 +8,8 @@ dist_noinst_DATA = \ + LICENSE.compat_getopt compat_getopt.txt \ + compat_getopt_main.c \ + README.compat_strlcpy compat_strlcpy.3 +-noinst_HEADERS = compat_strlcat.h compat_strlcpy.h compat_strnlen.h compat_getpass.h compat_getopt.h simclist.h libpkcs11.h libscdl.h ++noinst_HEADERS = compat_strlcat.h compat_strlcpy.h compat_strnlen.h compat_getpass.h \ ++ compat_getopt.h simclist.h libpkcs11.h libscdl.h constant-time.h + + AM_CPPFLAGS = -I$(top_srcdir)/src + +@@ -43,7 +44,8 @@ TIDY_FILES = \ + compat_report_rangecheckfailure.c \ + compat___iob_func.c \ + simclist.c simclist.h \ +- libpkcs11.c libscdl.c ++ libpkcs11.c libscdl.c \ ++ constant-time.h + + check-local: + if [ -x "$(CLANGTIDY)" ]; then clang-tidy -config='' --checks='$(TIDY_CHECKS)' -header-filter=.* $(addprefix $(srcdir)/,$(TIDY_FILES)) -- $(TIDY_FLAGS); fi +diff --git a/src/common/constant-time.h b/src/common/constant-time.h +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..40c3e500c2 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/src/common/constant-time.h +@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@ ++/* Original source: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/9890cc42daff5e2d0cad01ac4bf78c391f599a6e/include/internal/constant_time.h */ ++ ++#ifndef CONSTANT_TIME_H ++#define CONSTANT_TIME_H ++ ++#include ++#include ++ ++#if !defined(inline) ++#if defined(__STDC_VERSION__) && __STDC_VERSION__ >= 199901L ++#define constant_inline inline ++#elif defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__ >= 2 ++#elif defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__ >= 2 ++#elif defined(_MSC_VER) ++#define constant_inline __inline ++#else ++#define constant_inline ++#endif ++#else /* use what caller wants as inline may be from config.h */ ++#define constant_inline inline /* inline */ ++#endif ++ ++/*- ++ * The boolean methods return a bitmask of all ones (0xff...f) for true ++ * and 0 for false. For example, ++ * if (a < b) { ++ * c = a; ++ * } else { ++ * c = b; ++ * } ++ * can be written as ++ * unsigned int lt = constant_time_lt(a, b); ++ * c = constant_time_select(lt, a, b); ++ */ ++ ++static constant_inline unsigned int ++value_barrier(unsigned int a) ++{ ++ volatile unsigned int r = a; ++ return r; ++} ++ ++static constant_inline size_t ++value_barrier_s(size_t a) ++{ ++ volatile size_t r = a; ++ return r; ++} ++ ++/* MSB */ ++static constant_inline size_t ++constant_time_msb_s(size_t a) ++{ ++ return 0 - (a >> (sizeof(a) * 8 - 1)); ++} ++ ++static constant_inline unsigned int ++constant_time_msb(unsigned int a) ++{ ++ return 0 - (a >> (sizeof(a) * 8 - 1)); ++} ++ ++/* Select */ ++static constant_inline unsigned int ++constant_time_select(unsigned int mask, unsigned int a, unsigned int b) ++{ ++ return (value_barrier(mask) & a) | (value_barrier(~mask) & b); ++} ++ ++static constant_inline unsigned char ++constant_time_select_8(unsigned char mask, unsigned char a, unsigned char b) ++{ ++ return (unsigned char)constant_time_select(mask, a, b); ++} ++ ++static constant_inline size_t ++constant_time_select_s(size_t mask, size_t a, size_t b) ++{ ++ return (value_barrier_s(mask) & a) | (value_barrier_s(~mask) & b); ++} ++ ++/* Zero */ ++static constant_inline unsigned int ++constant_time_is_zero(unsigned int a) ++{ ++ return constant_time_msb(~a & (a - 1)); ++} ++ ++static constant_inline size_t ++constant_time_is_zero_s(size_t a) ++{ ++ return constant_time_msb_s(~a & (a - 1)); ++} ++ ++/* Comparison*/ ++static constant_inline size_t ++constant_time_lt_s(size_t a, size_t b) ++{ ++ return constant_time_msb_s(a ^ ((a ^ b) | ((a - b) ^ b))); ++} ++ ++static constant_inline unsigned int ++constant_time_lt(unsigned int a, unsigned int b) ++{ ++ return constant_time_msb(a ^ ((a ^ b) | ((a - b) ^ b))); ++} ++ ++static constant_inline unsigned int ++constant_time_ge(unsigned int a, unsigned int b) ++{ ++ return ~constant_time_lt(a, b); ++} ++ ++/* Equality*/ ++ ++static constant_inline unsigned int ++constant_time_eq(unsigned int a, unsigned int b) ++{ ++ return constant_time_is_zero(a ^ b); ++} ++ ++static constant_inline size_t ++constant_time_eq_s(size_t a, size_t b) ++{ ++ return constant_time_is_zero_s(a ^ b); ++} ++ ++static constant_inline unsigned int ++constant_time_eq_i(int a, int b) ++{ ++ return constant_time_eq((unsigned int)a, (unsigned int)b); ++} ++ ++#endif /* CONSTANT_TIME_H */ +diff --git a/src/libopensc/internal.h b/src/libopensc/internal.h +index 7531260c14..2a98f0e966 100644 +--- a/src/libopensc/internal.h ++++ b/src/libopensc/internal.h +@@ -175,8 +175,8 @@ int _sc_card_add_xeddsa_alg(struct sc_card *card, size_t key_length, + + int sc_pkcs1_strip_01_padding(struct sc_context *ctx, const u8 *in_dat, size_t in_len, + u8 *out_dat, size_t *out_len); +-int sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding(struct sc_context *ctx, const u8 *data, size_t len, +- u8 *out_dat, size_t *out_len); ++int sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(sc_context_t *ctx, unsigned int n, const u8 *data, ++ unsigned int data_len, u8 *out, unsigned int *out_len); + int sc_pkcs1_strip_digest_info_prefix(unsigned int *algorithm, + const u8 *in_dat, size_t in_len, u8 *out_dat, size_t *out_len); + #ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL +diff --git a/src/libopensc/padding.c b/src/libopensc/padding.c +index ca47733a4e..ddb3061134 100644 +--- a/src/libopensc/padding.c ++++ b/src/libopensc/padding.c +@@ -32,10 +32,13 @@ + #include + #include + ++#include "common/constant-time.h" + #include "internal.h" + #include "pkcs11/pkcs11.h" + /* TODO doxygen comments */ + ++#define SC_PKCS1_PADDING_MIN_SIZE 11 ++ + /* + * Prefixes for pkcs-v1 signatures + */ +@@ -144,44 +147,82 @@ sc_pkcs1_strip_01_padding(struct sc_cont + } + + +-/* remove pkcs1 BT02 padding (adding BT02 padding is currently not +- * needed/implemented) */ ++/* Remove pkcs1 BT02 padding (adding BT02 padding is currently not ++ * needed/implemented) in constant-time. ++ * Original source: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/9890cc42daff5e2d0cad01ac4bf78c391f599a6e/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c#L171 */ + int +-sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding(sc_context_t *ctx, const u8 *data, size_t len, u8 *out, size_t *out_len) ++sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(sc_context_t *ctx, unsigned int n, const u8 *data, unsigned int data_len, u8 *out, unsigned int *out_len) + { +- unsigned int n = 0; +- ++ unsigned int i = 0; ++ u8 *msg, *msg_orig = NULL; ++ unsigned int good, found_zero_byte, mask; ++ unsigned int zero_index = 0, msg_index, mlen = -1, len = 0; + LOG_FUNC_CALLED(ctx); +- if (data == NULL || len < 3) ++ ++ if (data == NULL || data_len <= 0 || data_len > n || n < SC_PKCS1_PADDING_MIN_SIZE) + LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_ERROR_INTERNAL); + +- /* skip leading zero byte */ +- if (*data == 0) { +- data++; +- len--; ++ msg = msg_orig = calloc(n, sizeof(u8)); ++ if (msg == NULL) ++ LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_ERROR_INTERNAL); ++ ++ /* ++ * We can not check length of input data straight away and still we need to read ++ * from input even when the input is not as long as needed to keep the time constant. ++ * If data has wrong size, it is padded by zeroes from left and the following checks ++ * do not pass. ++ */ ++ len = data_len; ++ for (data += len, msg += n, i = 0; i < n; i++) { ++ mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(len); ++ len -= 1 & mask; ++ data -= 1 & mask; ++ *--msg = *data & mask; ++ } ++ // check first byte to be 0x00 ++ good = constant_time_is_zero(msg[0]); ++ // check second byte to be 0x02 ++ good &= constant_time_eq(msg[1], 2); ++ ++ // find zero byte after random data in padding ++ found_zero_byte = 0; ++ for (i = 2; i < n; i++) { ++ unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(msg[i]); ++ zero_index = constant_time_select(~found_zero_byte & equals0, i, zero_index); ++ found_zero_byte |= equals0; + } +- if (data[0] != 0x02) +- LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING); +- /* skip over padding bytes */ +- for (n = 1; n < len && data[n]; n++) +- ; +- /* Must be at least 8 pad bytes */ +- if (n >= len || n < 9) +- LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING); +- n++; +- if (out == NULL) +- /* just check the padding */ +- LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_SUCCESS); + +- /* Now move decrypted contents to head of buffer */ +- if (*out_len < len - n) +- LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_ERROR_INTERNAL); +- *out_len = len - n; +- memmove(out, data + n, *out_len); ++ // zero_index stands for index of last found zero ++ good &= constant_time_ge(zero_index, 2 + 8); ++ ++ // start of the actual message in data ++ msg_index = zero_index + 1; ++ ++ // length of message ++ mlen = data_len - msg_index; ++ ++ // check that message fits into out buffer ++ good &= constant_time_ge(*out_len, mlen); ++ ++ // move the result in-place by |num|-SC_PKCS1_PADDING_MIN_SIZE-|mlen| bytes to the left. ++ *out_len = constant_time_select(constant_time_lt(n - SC_PKCS1_PADDING_MIN_SIZE, *out_len), ++ n - SC_PKCS1_PADDING_MIN_SIZE, *out_len); ++ for (msg_index = 1; msg_index < n - SC_PKCS1_PADDING_MIN_SIZE; msg_index <<= 1) { ++ mask = ~constant_time_eq(msg_index & (n - SC_PKCS1_PADDING_MIN_SIZE - mlen), 0); ++ for (i = SC_PKCS1_PADDING_MIN_SIZE; i < n - msg_index; i++) ++ msg[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, msg[i + msg_index], msg[i]); ++ } ++ // move message into out buffer, if good ++ for (i = 0; i < *out_len; i++) { ++ unsigned int msg_index; ++ // when out is longer than message in data, use some bogus index in msg ++ mask = good & constant_time_lt(i, mlen); ++ msg_index = constant_time_select(mask, i + SC_PKCS1_PADDING_MIN_SIZE, 0); // to now overflow msg buffer ++ out[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, msg[msg_index], out[i]); ++ } + +- sc_log(ctx, "stripped output(%"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u): %s", len - n, +- sc_dump_hex(out, len - n)); +- LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, len - n); ++ free(msg_orig); ++ return constant_time_select(good, mlen, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING); + } + + #ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL +diff --git a/src/minidriver/minidriver.c b/src/minidriver/minidriver.c +index 3391994abe..5248d9758a 100644 +--- a/src/minidriver/minidriver.c ++++ b/src/minidriver/minidriver.c +@@ -4653,9 +4653,9 @@ DWORD WINAPI CardRSADecrypt(__in PCARD_DATA pCardData, + "sc_pkcs15_decipher: DECRYPT-INFO dwVersion=%lu\n", + (unsigned long)pInfo->dwVersion); + if (pInfo->dwPaddingType == CARD_PADDING_PKCS1) { +- size_t temp = pInfo->cbData; ++ unsigned int temp = pInfo->cbData; + logprintf(pCardData, 2, "sc_pkcs15_decipher: stripping PKCS1 padding\n"); +- r = sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding(vs->ctx, pbuf2, pInfo->cbData, pbuf2, &temp); ++ r = sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(vs->ctx, prkey_info->modulus_length / 8, pbuf2, pInfo->cbData, pbuf2, &temp); + pInfo->cbData = (DWORD) temp; + if (r < 0) { + logprintf(pCardData, 2, "Cannot strip PKCS1 padding: %i\n", r); + +diff --git a/src/tests/unittests/Makefile.am b/src/tests/unittests/Makefile.am +index 7019ca7ba8..4c73911e48 100644 +--- a/src/tests/unittests/Makefile.am ++++ b/src/tests/unittests/Makefile.am +@@ -6,8 +6,10 @@ include $(top_srcdir)/aminclude_static.a + clean-local: code-coverage-clean + distclean-local: code-coverage-dist-clean + +-noinst_PROGRAMS = asn1 simpletlv cachedir pkcs15filter openpgp-tool hextobin decode_ecdsa_signature +-TESTS = asn1 simpletlv cachedir pkcs15filter openpgp-tool hextobin decode_ecdsa_signature ++noinst_PROGRAMS = asn1 simpletlv cachedir pkcs15filter openpgp-tool hextobin \ ++ decode_ecdsa_signature strip_pkcs1_2_padding ++TESTS = asn1 simpletlv cachedir pkcs15filter openpgp-tool hextobin \ ++ decode_ecdsa_signature strip_pkcs1_2_padding + + noinst_HEADERS = torture.h + +@@ -28,6 +30,7 @@ pkcs15filter_SOURCES = pkcs15-emulator-f + openpgp_tool_SOURCES = openpgp-tool.c $(top_builddir)/src/tools/openpgp-tool-helpers.c + hextobin_SOURCES = hextobin.c + decode_ecdsa_signature_SOURCES = decode_ecdsa_signature.c ++strip_pkcs1_2_paddingSOURCES = strip_pkcs1_2_padding.c + + if ENABLE_ZLIB + noinst_PROGRAMS += compression +diff --git a/src/tests/unittests/Makefile.mak b/src/tests/unittests/Makefile.mak +index 2607546f57..6284b51af9 100644 +--- a/src/tests/unittests/Makefile.mak ++++ b/src/tests/unittests/Makefile.mak +@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@ + TOPDIR = ..\..\.. + +-TARGETS = asn1 compression pkcs15filter ++TARGETS = asn1 compression pkcs15filter strip_pkcs1_2_padding + + OBJECTS = asn1.obj \ + compression.obj \ +- pkcs15-emulator-filter.obj ++ pkcs15-emulator-filter.obj \ ++ strip_pkcs1_2_padding.obj \ + $(TOPDIR)\win32\versioninfo.res + + all: $(TARGETS) +diff --git a/src/tests/unittests/strip_pkcs1_2_padding.c b/src/tests/unittests/strip_pkcs1_2_padding.c +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..f9561b936d +--- /dev/null ++++ b/src/tests/unittests/strip_pkcs1_2_padding.c +@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@ ++#include "common/compat_strlcpy.c" ++#include "libopensc/log.c" ++#include "libopensc/padding.c" ++#include "torture.h" ++#include ++ ++static void ++torture_long_output_buffer(void **state) ++{ ++ unsigned int n = 14; ++ unsigned int in_len = 14; ++ unsigned char in[] = {0x00, 0x02, ++ 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, ++ 0x00, ++ 'm', 's', 'g'}; ++ unsigned int out_len = 3; ++ unsigned char *out = calloc(out_len, sizeof(unsigned char)); ++ unsigned char result_msg[] = {'m', 's', 'g'}; ++ int r = sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(NULL, n, in, in_len, out, &out_len); ++ assert_int_equal(r, 3); ++ assert_memory_equal(out, result_msg, r); ++ free(out); ++} ++ ++static void ++torture_short_output_buffer(void **state) ++{ ++ unsigned int n = 14; ++ unsigned int in_len = 14; ++ unsigned char in[] = {0x00, 0x02, ++ 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, ++ 0x00, ++ 'm', 's', 'g'}; ++ unsigned int out_len = 1; ++ unsigned char *out = calloc(out_len, sizeof(unsigned char)); ++ int r = sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(NULL, n, in, in_len, out, &out_len); ++ assert_int_equal(r, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING); ++ free(out); ++} ++ ++static void ++torture_short_message_correct_padding(void **state) ++{ ++ unsigned int n = 14; ++ unsigned int in_len = 14; ++ unsigned char in[] = {0x00, 0x02, ++ 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, ++ 0x00, ++ 'm', 's', 'g'}; ++ unsigned int out_len = 3; ++ unsigned char *out = calloc(out_len, sizeof(unsigned char)); ++ unsigned char result_msg[] = {'m', 's', 'g'}; ++ int r = sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(NULL, n, in, in_len, out, &out_len); ++ assert_int_equal(r, 3); ++ assert_memory_equal(out, result_msg, r); ++ free(out); ++} ++ ++static void ++torture_missing_first_zero(void **state) ++{ ++ unsigned int n = 13; ++ unsigned int in_len = 13; ++ unsigned char in[] = {0x02, ++ 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, ++ 0x00, ++ 'm', 's', 'g'}; ++ unsigned int out_len = 10; ++ unsigned char *out = calloc(out_len, sizeof(unsigned char)); ++ int r = sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(NULL, n, in, in_len, out, &out_len); ++ assert_int_equal(r, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING); ++ free(out); ++} ++ ++static void ++torture_missing_two(void **state) ++{ ++ unsigned int n = 13; ++ unsigned int in_len = 13; ++ unsigned char in[] = {0x00, ++ 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, ++ 0x00, ++ 'm', 's', 'g'}; ++ unsigned int out_len = 10; ++ unsigned char *out = calloc(out_len, sizeof(unsigned char)); ++ int r = sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(NULL, n, in, in_len, out, &out_len); ++ assert_int_equal(r, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING); ++ free(out); ++} ++ ++static void ++torture_short_padding(void **state) ++{ ++ unsigned int n = 13; ++ unsigned int in_len = 13; ++ unsigned char in[] = {0x00, 0x02, ++ 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, ++ 0x00, ++ 'm', 's', 'g'}; ++ unsigned int out_len = 10; ++ unsigned char *out = calloc(out_len, sizeof(unsigned char)); ++ int r = sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(NULL, n, in, in_len, out, &out_len); ++ assert_int_equal(r, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING); ++ free(out); ++} ++ ++static void ++torture_missing_second_zero(void **state) ++{ ++ unsigned int n = 13; ++ unsigned int in_len = 13; ++ unsigned char in[] = {0x00, 0x02, ++ 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, ++ 'm', 's', 'g'}; ++ unsigned int out_len = 10; ++ unsigned char *out = calloc(out_len, sizeof(unsigned char)); ++ int r = sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(NULL, n, in, in_len, out, &out_len); ++ assert_int_equal(r, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING); ++ free(out); ++} ++ ++static void ++torture_missing_message(void **state) ++{ ++ unsigned int n = 20; ++ unsigned int in_len = 11; ++ unsigned char in[] = {0x00, 0x02, ++ 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, ++ 0x00}; ++ unsigned int out_len = 11; ++ unsigned char *out = calloc(out_len, sizeof(unsigned char)); ++ int r = sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(NULL, n, in, in_len, out, &out_len); ++ assert_int_equal(r, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING); ++ free(out); ++} ++ ++static void ++torture_one_byte_message(void **state) ++{ ++ unsigned int n = 12; ++ unsigned int in_len = 12; ++ unsigned char in[] = {0x00, 0x02, ++ 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, ++ 0x00, ++ 'm'}; ++ unsigned int out_len = 1; ++ unsigned char *out = calloc(out_len, sizeof(unsigned char)); ++ unsigned char result_msg[] = {'m'}; ++ int r = sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(NULL, n, in, in_len, out, &out_len); ++ assert_int_equal(r, 1); ++ assert_memory_equal(out, result_msg, r); ++ free(out); ++} ++ ++static void ++torture_longer_padding(void **state) ++{ ++ unsigned int n = 26; ++ unsigned int in_len = 26; ++ unsigned char in[] = {0x00, 0x02, ++ 0x0e, 0x38, 0x97, 0x18, 0x16, 0x57, 0x9e, 0x30, 0xb6, 0xa5, 0x78, 0x13, 0x20, 0xca, 0x11, ++ 0x00, ++ 0x9d, 0x98, 0x3d, 0xca, 0xa9, 0xa7, 0x11, 0x0a}; ++ unsigned int out_len = 8; ++ unsigned char *out = calloc(out_len, sizeof(unsigned char)); ++ unsigned char result_msg[] = {0x9d, 0x98, 0x3d, 0xca, 0xa9, 0xa7, 0x11, 0x0a}; ++ int r = sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(NULL, n, in, in_len, out, &out_len); ++ assert_int_equal(r, 8); ++ assert_memory_equal(out, result_msg, r); ++ free(out); ++} ++ ++static void ++torture_empty_message(void **state) ++{ ++ unsigned int n = 18; ++ unsigned int in_len = 18; ++ unsigned char in[] = {0x00, 0x02, ++ 0x0e, 0x38, 0x97, 0x18, 0x16, 0x57, 0x9e, 0x30, 0xb6, 0xa5, 0x78, 0x13, 0x20, 0xca, 0x11, ++ 0x00}; ++ unsigned int out_len = 8; ++ unsigned char *out = calloc(out_len, sizeof(unsigned char)); ++ int r = sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(NULL, n, in, in_len, out, &out_len); ++ assert_int_equal(r, 0); ++ free(out); ++} ++ ++int ++main(void) ++{ ++ const struct CMUnitTest tests[] = { ++ cmocka_unit_test(torture_long_output_buffer), ++ cmocka_unit_test(torture_short_output_buffer), ++ cmocka_unit_test(torture_short_message_correct_padding), ++ cmocka_unit_test(torture_missing_first_zero), ++ cmocka_unit_test(torture_missing_two), ++ cmocka_unit_test(torture_short_padding), ++ cmocka_unit_test(torture_missing_second_zero), ++ cmocka_unit_test(torture_missing_message), ++ cmocka_unit_test(torture_one_byte_message), ++ cmocka_unit_test(torture_longer_padding), ++ cmocka_unit_test(torture_empty_message)}; ++ return cmocka_run_group_tests(tests, NULL, NULL); ++} + +diff --git a/src/libopensc/pkcs15-sec.c b/src/libopensc/pkcs15-sec.c +index a019af460f..f7ee819d65 100644 +--- a/src/libopensc/pkcs15-sec.c ++++ b/src/libopensc/pkcs15-sec.c +@@ -308,9 +308,10 @@ int sc_pkcs15_decipher(struct sc_pkcs15_ + + /* Strip any padding */ + if (pad_flags & SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_PAD_PKCS1) { +- size_t s = r; +- r = sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding(ctx, out, s, out, &s); +- LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, r, "Invalid PKCS#1 padding"); ++ unsigned int s = r; ++ unsigned int key_size = (unsigned int)alg_info->key_length; ++ r = sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(ctx, key_size / 8, out, s, out, &s); ++ /* for keeping PKCS#1 v1.5 depadding constant-time, do not log error here */ + } + #ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL + if (pad_flags & SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_PAD_OAEP) +@@ -332,7 +333,8 @@ int sc_pkcs15_decipher(struct sc_pkcs15_ + LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, r, "Invalid OAEP padding"); + } + #endif +- LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, r); ++ /* do not log error code to prevent side channel attack */ ++ return r; + } + + /* derive one key from another. RSA can use decipher, so this is for only ECDH + +diff --git a/src/pkcs11/framework-pkcs15.c b/src/pkcs11/framework-pkcs15.c +index f75a3dbaec..632681df63 100644 +--- a/src/pkcs11/framework-pkcs15.c ++++ b/src/pkcs11/framework-pkcs15.c +@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ + * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + ++#include "common/constant-time.h" + #include "config.h" + #include + #include +@@ -4395,7 +4396,8 @@ pkcs15_prkey_decrypt(struct sc_pkcs11_se + struct pkcs15_fw_data *fw_data = NULL; + struct pkcs15_prkey_object *prkey; + unsigned char decrypted[512]; /* FIXME: Will not work for keys above 4096 bits */ +- int buff_too_small, rv, flags = 0, prkey_has_path = 0; ++ int rv, flags = 0, prkey_has_path = 0; ++ CK_ULONG mask, good, rv_pkcs11; + + if (pulDataLen == NULL) { + /* This is call from the C_DecyptInit function */ +@@ -4484,27 +4486,53 @@ pkcs15_prkey_decrypt(struct sc_pkcs11_se + rv = sc_pkcs15_decipher(fw_data->p15_card, prkey->prv_p15obj, flags, + pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen, decrypted, sizeof(decrypted), pMechanism); + +- if (rv < 0 && !sc_pkcs11_conf.lock_login && !prkey_has_path) ++ /* skip for PKCS#1 v1.5 padding prevent side channel attack */ ++ if (!(flags & SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_PAD_PKCS1) && ++ rv < 0 && !sc_pkcs11_conf.lock_login && !prkey_has_path) + if (reselect_app_df(fw_data->p15_card) == SC_SUCCESS) + rv = sc_pkcs15_decipher(fw_data->p15_card, prkey->prv_p15obj, flags, + pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen, decrypted, sizeof(decrypted), pMechanism); + + sc_unlock(p11card->card); + +- sc_log(context, "Decryption complete. Result %d.", rv); ++ sc_log(context, "Decryption complete."); + +- if (rv < 0) +- return sc_to_cryptoki_error(rv, "C_Decrypt"); ++ /* Handle following code in constant-time ++ * to prevent Marvin attack for PKCS#1 v1.5 padding. */ + +- buff_too_small = (*pulDataLen < (CK_ULONG)rv); +- *pulDataLen = rv; +- if (pData == NULL_PTR) +- return CKR_OK; +- if (buff_too_small) +- return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; +- memcpy(pData, decrypted, *pulDataLen); ++ /* only padding error must be handled in constant-time way, ++ * other error can be returned straight away */ ++ if ((~constant_time_eq_i(rv, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING) & constant_time_lt_s(sizeof(decrypted), (size_t)rv))) ++ return sc_to_cryptoki_error(rv, "C_Decrypt"); + +- return CKR_OK; ++ /* check rv for padding error */ ++ good = ~constant_time_eq_i(rv, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING); ++ rv_pkcs11 = sc_to_cryptoki_error(SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING, "C_Decrypt"); ++ rv_pkcs11 = constant_time_select_s(good, CKR_OK, rv_pkcs11); ++ ++ if (pData == NULL_PTR) { ++ /* set length only if no error */ ++ *pulDataLen = constant_time_select_s(good, rv, *pulDataLen); ++ /* return error only if original rv < 0 */ ++ return rv_pkcs11; ++ } ++ ++ /* check whether *pulDataLen < rv and set return value for small output buffer */ ++ mask = good & constant_time_lt_s(*pulDataLen, rv); ++ rv_pkcs11 = constant_time_select_s(mask, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, rv_pkcs11); ++ good &= ~mask; ++ ++ /* move everything from decrypted into out buffer constant-time, if rv is ok */ ++ for (CK_ULONG i = 0; i < *pulDataLen; i++) { /* iterate over whole pData to not disclose real depadded length */ ++ CK_ULONG msg_index; ++ mask = good & constant_time_lt_s(i, sizeof(decrypted)); /* i should be in the bounds of decrypted */ ++ mask &= constant_time_lt_s(i, constant_time_select_s(good, rv, 0)); /* check that is in bounds of depadded message */ ++ msg_index = constant_time_select_s(mask, i, 0); ++ pData[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, decrypted[msg_index], pData[i]); ++ } ++ *pulDataLen = constant_time_select_s(good, rv, *pulDataLen); ++ /* do not log error code to prevent side channel attack */ ++ return rv_pkcs11; + } + + + +diff --git a/src/pkcs11/mechanism.c b/src/pkcs11/mechanism.c +index 03495265a4..d3f0434231 100644 +--- a/src/pkcs11/mechanism.c ++++ b/src/pkcs11/mechanism.c +@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ + #include + #include + ++#include "common/constant-time.h" + #include "sc-pkcs11.h" + + /* Also used for verification data */ +@@ -1089,7 +1090,9 @@ sc_pkcs11_decr(struct sc_pkcs11_session + rv = op->type->decrypt(op, pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen, + pData, pulDataLen); + +- if (rv != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && pData != NULL) ++ /* terminate session for any return value except CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, ++ * perform check in time side-channel free way to prevent Marvin attack */ ++ if (!constant_time_eq_s(rv, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) && pData != NULL) + session_stop_operation(session, SC_PKCS11_OPERATION_DECRYPT); + + return rv; +@@ -1110,10 +1113,12 @@ sc_pkcs11_decr_update(struct sc_pkcs11_s + rv = op->type->decrypt_update(op, pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen, + pData, pulDataLen); + +- /* terminate session for any error except CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL */ +- if (rv != CKR_OK && rv != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) ++ /* terminate session for any return value except CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, ++ * perform check in time side-channel free way to prevent Marvin attack */ ++ if (~constant_time_eq_s(rv, CKR_OK) & ~constant_time_eq_s(rv, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL)) + session_stop_operation(session, SC_PKCS11_OPERATION_DECRYPT); +- LOG_FUNC_RETURN(context, (int)rv); ++ /* do not log error code to prevent side channel attack */ ++ return rv; + } + + CK_RV +@@ -1530,6 +1535,10 @@ sc_pkcs11_decrypt(sc_pkcs11_operation_t + if (pulDataLen) + *pulDataLen = ulDataLen; + ++ /* Skip DecryptFinalize for PKCS#1 v1.5 padding to prevent time side-channel leakage */ ++ if (((CK_MECHANISM_PTR)&operation->mechanism)->mechanism == CKM_RSA_PKCS) ++ return rv; ++ + if (rv != CKR_OK) + return rv; + + + +diff --git a/src/pkcs11/pkcs11-object.c b/src/pkcs11/pkcs11-object.c +index f04c0b4c56..b023911213 100644 +--- a/src/pkcs11/pkcs11-object.c ++++ b/src/pkcs11/pkcs11-object.c +@@ -1034,7 +1034,8 @@ C_Decrypt(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + rv = reset_login_state(session->slot, rv); + } + +- SC_LOG_RV("C_Decrypt() = %s", rv); ++ /* do not log error code to prevent side channel attack */ ++ SC_LOG("C_Decrypt()"); + sc_pkcs11_unlock(); + return rv; + } +@@ -1058,7 +1059,8 @@ C_DecryptUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + rv = sc_pkcs11_decr_update(session, pEncryptedPart, ulEncryptedPartLen, + pPart, pulPartLen); + +- SC_LOG_RV("C_DecryptUpdate() = %s", rv); ++ /* do not log error code to prevent side channel attack */ ++ SC_LOG("C_DecryptUpdate()"); + sc_pkcs11_unlock(); + return rv; + } +@@ -1086,7 +1088,8 @@ C_DecryptFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + rv = reset_login_state(session->slot, rv); + } + +- SC_LOG_RV("C_DecryptFinal() = %s", rv); ++ /* do not log error code to prevent side channel attack */ ++ SC_LOG("C_DecryptFinal()"); + sc_pkcs11_unlock(); + return rv; + } +diff --git a/src/pkcs11/sc-pkcs11.h b/src/pkcs11/sc-pkcs11.h +index 66dfcdde67..510017ed2a 100644 +--- a/src/pkcs11/sc-pkcs11.h ++++ b/src/pkcs11/sc-pkcs11.h +@@ -246,6 +246,11 @@ do {\ + }\ + } while(0) + ++#define SC_LOG(fmt) \ ++ do { \ ++ sc_log(context, (fmt)); \ ++ } while (0) ++ + /* Debug virtual slots. S is slot to be highlighted or NULL + * C is a comment format string and args It will be preceded by "VSS " */ + #define DEBUG_VSS(S, ...) do { sc_log(context,"VSS " __VA_ARGS__); _debug_virtual_slots(S); } while (0) + + +diff --git a/src/pkcs11/misc.c b/src/pkcs11/misc.c +index 5ca1176b1d..1d893d6181 100644 +--- a/src/pkcs11/misc.c ++++ b/src/pkcs11/misc.c +@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ + #include + #include + ++#include "common/constant-time.h" + #include "sc-pkcs11.h" + + #define DUMP_TEMPLATE_MAX 32 +@@ -174,7 +175,7 @@ CK_RV reset_login_state(struct sc_pkcs11_slot *slot, CK_RV rv) + slot->p11card->framework->logout(slot); + } + +- if (rv == CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN) { ++ if (constant_time_eq_s(rv, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN)) { + slot->login_user = -1; + pop_all_login_states(slot); + } diff --git a/opensc.spec b/opensc.spec index a0cae07bca521a442d29e95b0d8b3b17b76cc0e0..61d4e4ee42d0c80e0e54717da685fc14262ec682 100644 --- a/opensc.spec +++ b/opensc.spec @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ Name: opensc Version: 0.23.0 -Release: 4 +Release: 5 License: LGPL-2.1-or-later Summary: Smart card library and applications URL: https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/wiki @@ -29,6 +29,10 @@ Patch14: 0015-opensc-CVE-2023-40661-9of12.patch Patch15: 0016-opensc-CVE-2023-40661-10of12.patch Patch16: 0017-opensc-CVE-2023-40661-11of12.patch Patch17: 0018-opensc-CVE-2023-40661-12of12.patch +#CVE-2023-5992 constant-time-pkcs1.5.patch +# https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/pull/2948 +# https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/pull/3016 +Patch18: 0019-opensc-CVE-2023-5992.patch BuildRequires: openssl-devel pcsc-lite-devel bash-completion docbook-style-xsl readline-devel BuildRequires: desktop-file-utils /usr/bin/xsltproc autoconf automake libtool gcc @@ -159,6 +163,9 @@ make check %{_datadir}/opensc/ %changelog +* Fri Jun 28 2024 dillon chen - 0.23.0-5 +- fix CVE-2023-5992 + * Fri Oct 20 2023 dillon chen - 0.23.0-4 - fix CVE-2023-40660 CVE-2023-4535 CVE-2023-40661