diff --git a/backport-CVE-2021-28861.patch b/backport-CVE-2021-28861.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..13854e359523ad5f58eb12863c9fbdd5e4a08a6d --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-CVE-2021-28861.patch @@ -0,0 +1,129 @@ +From defaa2b19a9a01c79c1d5641a8aa179bb10ead3f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Miss Islington (bot)" + <31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com> +Date: Wed, 22 Jun 2022 01:42:02 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH] gh-87389: Fix an open redirection vulnerability in + http.server. (GH-93879) (GH-94093) + +Fix an open redirection vulnerability in the `http.server` module when +an URI path starts with `//` that could produce a 301 Location header +with a misleading target. Vulnerability discovered, and logic fix +proposed, by Hamza Avvan (@hamzaavvan). + +Test and comments authored by Gregory P. Smith [Google]. +(cherry picked from commit 4abab6b603dd38bec1168e9a37c40a48ec89508e) +--- + Lib/http/server.py | 7 +++ + Lib/test/test_httpservers.py | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++- + .../2022-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst | 3 ++ + 3 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst + +diff --git a/Lib/http/server.py b/Lib/http/server.py +index d7cce20..c609372 100644 +--- a/Lib/http/server.py ++++ b/Lib/http/server.py +@@ -332,6 +332,13 @@ class BaseHTTPRequestHandler(socketserver.StreamRequestHandler): + return False + self.command, self.path = command, path + ++ # gh-87389: The purpose of replacing '//' with '/' is to protect ++ # against open redirect attacks possibly triggered if the path starts ++ # with '//' because http clients treat //path as an absolute URI ++ # without scheme (similar to http://path) rather than a path. ++ if self.path.startswith('//'): ++ self.path = '/' + self.path.lstrip('/') # Reduce to a single / ++ + # Examine the headers and look for a Connection directive. + try: + self.headers = http.client.parse_headers(self.rfile, +diff --git a/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py b/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py +index c1494d2..4acf7a6 100644 +--- a/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py ++++ b/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py +@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ class SimpleHTTPServerTestCase(BaseTestCase): + pass + + def setUp(self): +- BaseTestCase.setUp(self) ++ super().setUp() + self.cwd = os.getcwd() + basetempdir = tempfile.gettempdir() + os.chdir(basetempdir) +@@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ class SimpleHTTPServerTestCase(BaseTestCase): + except: + pass + finally: +- BaseTestCase.tearDown(self) ++ super().tearDown() + + def check_status_and_reason(self, response, status, data=None): + def close_conn(): +@@ -415,6 +415,55 @@ class SimpleHTTPServerTestCase(BaseTestCase): + self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.OK, + data=support.TESTFN_UNDECODABLE) + ++ def test_get_dir_redirect_location_domain_injection_bug(self): ++ """Ensure //evil.co/..%2f../../X does not put //evil.co/ in Location. ++ ++ //netloc/ in a Location header is a redirect to a new host. ++ https://github.com/python/cpython/issues/87389 ++ ++ This checks that a path resolving to a directory on our server cannot ++ resolve into a redirect to another server. ++ """ ++ os.mkdir(os.path.join(self.tempdir, 'existing_directory')) ++ url = f'/python.org/..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f../%0a%0d/../{self.tempdir_name}/existing_directory' ++ expected_location = f'{url}/' # /python.org.../ single slash single prefix, trailing slash ++ # Canonicalizes to /tmp/tempdir_name/existing_directory which does ++ # exist and is a dir, triggering the 301 redirect logic. ++ response = self.request(url) ++ self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY) ++ location = response.getheader('Location') ++ self.assertEqual(location, expected_location, msg='non-attack failed!') ++ ++ # //python.org... multi-slash prefix, no trailing slash ++ attack_url = f'/{url}' ++ response = self.request(attack_url) ++ self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY) ++ location = response.getheader('Location') ++ self.assertFalse(location.startswith('//'), msg=location) ++ self.assertEqual(location, expected_location, ++ msg='Expected Location header to start with a single / and ' ++ 'end with a / as this is a directory redirect.') ++ ++ # ///python.org... triple-slash prefix, no trailing slash ++ attack3_url = f'//{url}' ++ response = self.request(attack3_url) ++ self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY) ++ self.assertEqual(response.getheader('Location'), expected_location) ++ ++ # If the second word in the http request (Request-URI for the http ++ # method) is a full URI, we don't worry about it, as that'll be parsed ++ # and reassembled as a full URI within BaseHTTPRequestHandler.send_head ++ # so no errant scheme-less //netloc//evil.co/ domain mixup can happen. ++ attack_scheme_netloc_2slash_url = f'https://pypi.org/{url}' ++ expected_scheme_netloc_location = f'{attack_scheme_netloc_2slash_url}/' ++ response = self.request(attack_scheme_netloc_2slash_url) ++ self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY) ++ location = response.getheader('Location') ++ # We're just ensuring that the scheme and domain make it through, if ++ # there are or aren't multiple slashes at the start of the path that ++ # follows that isn't important in this Location: header. ++ self.assertTrue(location.startswith('https://pypi.org/'), msg=location) ++ + def test_get(self): + #constructs the path relative to the root directory of the HTTPServer + response = self.request(self.base_url + '/test') +diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..029d437 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst +@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ ++:mod:`http.server`: Fix an open redirection vulnerability in the HTTP server ++when an URI path starts with ``//``. Vulnerability discovered, and initial ++fix proposed, by Hamza Avvan. +-- +1.8.3.1 + diff --git a/python3.spec b/python3.spec index 1e70655655b5b94ebe1148b10f92ff03ad03e3c0..813ffbc40c4cb4150ab5d48409d47069eb4a110b 100644 --- a/python3.spec +++ b/python3.spec @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ Summary: Interpreter of the Python3 programming language URL: https://www.python.org/ Version: 3.9.9 -Release: 12 +Release: 13 License: Python-2.0 %global branchversion 3.9 @@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ Patch6000: backport-Add--with-wheel-pkg-dir-configure-option.patch Patch6001: backport-bpo-46811-Make-test-suite-support-Expat-2.4.5.patch Patch6002: backport-bpo-20369-concurrent.futures.wait-now-deduplicates-f.patch Patch6003: Make-mailcap-refuse-to-match-unsafe-filenam.patch +Patch6004: backport-CVE-2021-28861.patch Patch9000: add-the-sm3-method-for-obtaining-the-salt-value.patch @@ -181,6 +182,7 @@ rm -r Modules/expat %patch6001 -p1 %patch6002 -p1 %patch6003 -p1 +%patch6004 -p1 %patch9000 -p1 @@ -797,6 +799,12 @@ export BEP_GTDLIST="$BEP_GTDLIST_TMP" %{_mandir}/*/* %changelog +* Thu Aug 25 2022 shixuantong - 3.9.9-13 +- Type:CVE +- CVE:CVE-2021-28861 +- SUG:NA +- DESC:fix CVE-2021-28861 + * Wed Aug 03 2022 shixuantong - 3.9.9-12 - Type:bugfix - CVE:NA