From 286c0eafe4a805bb9d20a06591e15ece7256600b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Funda Wang Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2025 16:25:34 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] fix CVE-2024-12085, CVE-2024-12086, CVE-2024-12087, CVE-2024-12088, CVE-2024-12747 --- backport-CVE-2024-12085.patch | 27 +++ backport-CVE-2024-12086-part1.patch | 37 ++++ backport-CVE-2024-12086-part2.patch | 103 ++++++++++ backport-CVE-2024-12086-part3.patch | 103 ++++++++++ backport-CVE-2024-12086-part4.patch | 37 ++++ backport-CVE-2024-12087-part1.patch | 45 +++++ backport-CVE-2024-12087-part2.patch | 27 +++ backport-CVE-2024-12088.patch | 136 +++++++++++++ backport-CVE-2024-12747.patch | 187 ++++++++++++++++++ ...R_FLIST-collission-with-FLAG_HLINKED.patch | 40 ++++ ...port-Fix_use-after-free_in_generator.patch | 31 +++ rsync.spec | 19 +- 12 files changed, 790 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 backport-CVE-2024-12085.patch create mode 100644 backport-CVE-2024-12086-part1.patch create mode 100644 backport-CVE-2024-12086-part2.patch create mode 100644 backport-CVE-2024-12086-part3.patch create mode 100644 backport-CVE-2024-12086-part4.patch create mode 100644 backport-CVE-2024-12087-part1.patch create mode 100644 backport-CVE-2024-12087-part2.patch create mode 100644 backport-CVE-2024-12088.patch create mode 100644 backport-CVE-2024-12747.patch create mode 100644 backport-Fix-FLAG_GOT_DIR_FLIST-collission-with-FLAG_HLINKED.patch create mode 100644 backport-Fix_use-after-free_in_generator.patch diff --git a/backport-CVE-2024-12085.patch b/backport-CVE-2024-12085.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7356fb6 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-CVE-2024-12085.patch @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +From cf620065502f065d4ea44f5df4f81295a738aa21 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Andrew Tridgell +Date: Thu, 14 Nov 2024 09:57:08 +1100 +Subject: [PATCH] prevent information leak off the stack + +prevent leak of uninitialised stack data in hash_search +--- + match.c | 3 +++ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/match.c b/match.c +index 36e78ed2..dfd6af2c 100644 +--- a/match.c ++++ b/match.c +@@ -147,6 +147,9 @@ static void hash_search(int f,struct sum_struct *s, + int more; + schar *map; + ++ // prevent possible memory leaks ++ memset(sum2, 0, sizeof sum2); ++ + /* want_i is used to encourage adjacent matches, allowing the RLL + * coding of the output to work more efficiently. */ + want_i = 0; +-- +2.34.1 + diff --git a/backport-CVE-2024-12086-part1.patch b/backport-CVE-2024-12086-part1.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..45505a6 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-CVE-2024-12086-part1.patch @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +From 3feb8669d875d03c9ceb82e208ef40ddda8eb908 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Andrew Tridgell +Date: Sat, 23 Nov 2024 11:08:03 +1100 +Subject: [PATCH 1/4] refuse fuzzy options when fuzzy not selected + +this prevents a malicious server providing a file to compare to when +the user has not given the fuzzy option +--- + receiver.c | 5 +++++ + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/receiver.c b/receiver.c +index 6b4b369e..2d7f6033 100644 +--- a/receiver.c ++++ b/receiver.c +@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ + extern struct file_list *cur_flist, *first_flist, *dir_flist; + extern filter_rule_list daemon_filter_list; + extern OFF_T preallocated_len; ++extern int fuzzy_basis; + + static struct bitbag *delayed_bits = NULL; + static int phase = 0, redoing = 0; +@@ -716,6 +717,10 @@ + fnamecmp = get_backup_name(fname); + break; + case FNAMECMP_FUZZY: ++ if (fuzzy_basis == 0) { ++ rprintf(FERROR_XFER, "rsync: refusing malicious fuzzy operation for %s\n", xname); ++ exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL); ++ } + if (file->dirname) { + pathjoin(fnamecmpbuf, sizeof fnamecmpbuf, file->dirname, xname); + fnamecmp = fnamecmpbuf; +-- +2.34.1 + diff --git a/backport-CVE-2024-12086-part2.patch b/backport-CVE-2024-12086-part2.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..719c6f1 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-CVE-2024-12086-part2.patch @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +From 33385aefe4773e7a3982d41995681eb079c92d12 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Andrew Tridgell +Date: Sat, 23 Nov 2024 12:26:10 +1100 +Subject: [PATCH 2/4] added secure_relative_open() + +this is an open that enforces no symlink following for all path +components in a relative path +--- + syscall.c | 74 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 74 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/syscall.c b/syscall.c +index d92074aa..a4b7f542 100644 +--- a/syscall.c ++++ b/syscall.c +@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ + #include + #endif + ++#include "ifuncs.h" ++ + extern int dry_run; + extern int am_root; + extern int am_sender; +@@ -712,3 +714,75 @@ int do_open_nofollow(const char *pathname, int flags) + + return fd; + } ++ ++/* ++ open a file relative to a base directory. The basedir can be NULL, ++ in which case the current working directory is used. The relpath ++ must be a relative path, and the relpath must not contain any ++ elements in the path which follow symlinks (ie. like O_NOFOLLOW, but ++ applies to all path components, not just the last component) ++*/ ++int secure_relative_open(const char *basedir, const char *relpath, int flags, mode_t mode) ++{ ++ if (!relpath || relpath[0] == '/') { ++ // must be a relative path ++ errno = EINVAL; ++ return -1; ++ } ++ ++#if !defined(O_NOFOLLOW) || !defined(O_DIRECTORY) ++ // really old system, all we can do is live with the risks ++ if (!basedir) { ++ return open(relpath, flags, mode); ++ } ++ char fullpath[MAXPATHLEN]; ++ pathjoin(fullpath, sizeof fullpath, basedir, relpath); ++ return open(fullpath, flags, mode); ++#else ++ int dirfd = AT_FDCWD; ++ if (basedir != NULL) { ++ dirfd = openat(AT_FDCWD, basedir, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY); ++ if (dirfd == -1) { ++ return -1; ++ } ++ } ++ int retfd = -1; ++ ++ char *path_copy = my_strdup(relpath, __FILE__, __LINE__); ++ if (!path_copy) { ++ return -1; ++ } ++ ++ for (const char *part = strtok(path_copy, "/"); ++ part != NULL; ++ part = strtok(NULL, "/")) ++ { ++ int next_fd = openat(dirfd, part, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW); ++ if (next_fd == -1 && errno == ENOTDIR) { ++ if (strtok(NULL, "/") != NULL) { ++ // this is not the last component of the path ++ errno = ELOOP; ++ goto cleanup; ++ } ++ // this could be the last component of the path, try as a file ++ retfd = openat(dirfd, part, flags | O_NOFOLLOW, mode); ++ goto cleanup; ++ } ++ if (next_fd == -1) { ++ goto cleanup; ++ } ++ if (dirfd != AT_FDCWD) close(dirfd); ++ dirfd = next_fd; ++ } ++ ++ // the path must be a directory ++ errno = EINVAL; ++ ++cleanup: ++ free(path_copy); ++ if (dirfd != AT_FDCWD) { ++ close(dirfd); ++ } ++ return retfd; ++#endif // O_NOFOLLOW, O_DIRECTORY ++} +-- +2.34.1 + diff --git a/backport-CVE-2024-12086-part3.patch b/backport-CVE-2024-12086-part3.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4be6391 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-CVE-2024-12086-part3.patch @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +From e59ef9939d3f0ccc8f9bab51442989a81be0c914 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Andrew Tridgell +Date: Sat, 23 Nov 2024 12:28:13 +1100 +Subject: [PATCH 3/4] receiver: use secure_relative_open() for basis file + +this prevents attacks where the basis file is manipulated by a +malicious sender to gain information about files outside the +destination tree +--- + receiver.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- + 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/receiver.c b/receiver.c +index 2d7f6033..8031b8f4 100644 +--- a/receiver.c ++++ b/receiver.c +@@ -552,6 +552,8 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name) + progress_init(); + + while (1) { ++ const char *basedir = NULL; ++ + cleanup_disable(); + + /* This call also sets cur_flist. */ +@@ -722,27 +724,29 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name) + exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL); + } + if (file->dirname) { +- pathjoin(fnamecmpbuf, sizeof fnamecmpbuf, file->dirname, xname); +- fnamecmp = fnamecmpbuf; +- } else +- fnamecmp = xname; ++ basedir = file->dirname; ++ } ++ fnamecmp = xname; + break; + default: + if (fnamecmp_type > FNAMECMP_FUZZY && fnamecmp_type-FNAMECMP_FUZZY <= basis_dir_cnt) { + fnamecmp_type -= FNAMECMP_FUZZY + 1; + if (file->dirname) { +- stringjoin(fnamecmpbuf, sizeof fnamecmpbuf, +- basis_dir[fnamecmp_type], "/", file->dirname, "/", xname, NULL); +- } else +- pathjoin(fnamecmpbuf, sizeof fnamecmpbuf, basis_dir[fnamecmp_type], xname); ++ pathjoin(fnamecmpbuf, sizeof fnamecmpbuf, basis_dir[fnamecmp_type], file->dirname); ++ basedir = fnamecmpbuf; ++ } else { ++ basedir = basis_dir[fnamecmp_type]; ++ } ++ fnamecmp = xname; + } else if (fnamecmp_type >= basis_dir_cnt) { + rprintf(FERROR, + "invalid basis_dir index: %d.\n", + fnamecmp_type); + exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL); +- } else +- pathjoin(fnamecmpbuf, sizeof fnamecmpbuf, basis_dir[fnamecmp_type], fname); +- fnamecmp = fnamecmpbuf; ++ } else { ++ basedir = basis_dir[fnamecmp_type]; ++ fnamecmp = fname; ++ } + break; + } + if (!fnamecmp || (daemon_filter_list.head +@@ -765,7 +769,7 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name) + } + + /* open the file */ +- fd1 = do_open(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0); ++ fd1 = secure_relative_open(basedir, fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0); + + if (fd1 == -1 && protocol_version < 29) { + if (fnamecmp != fname) { +@@ -776,14 +780,20 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name) + + if (fd1 == -1 && basis_dir[0]) { + /* pre-29 allowed only one alternate basis */ +- pathjoin(fnamecmpbuf, sizeof fnamecmpbuf, +- basis_dir[0], fname); +- fnamecmp = fnamecmpbuf; ++ basedir = basis_dir[0]; ++ fnamecmp = fname; + fnamecmp_type = FNAMECMP_BASIS_DIR_LOW; +- fd1 = do_open(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0); ++ fd1 = secure_relative_open(basedir, fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0); + } + } + ++ if (basedir) { ++ // for the following code we need the full ++ // path name as a single string ++ pathjoin(fnamecmpbuf, sizeof fnamecmpbuf, basedir, fnamecmp); ++ fnamecmp = fnamecmpbuf; ++ } ++ + one_inplace = inplace_partial && fnamecmp_type == FNAMECMP_PARTIAL_DIR; + updating_basis_or_equiv = one_inplace + || (inplace && (fnamecmp == fname || fnamecmp_type == FNAMECMP_BACKUP)); +-- +2.34.1 + diff --git a/backport-CVE-2024-12086-part4.patch b/backport-CVE-2024-12086-part4.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..74a16e7 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-CVE-2024-12086-part4.patch @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +From c78e53edb802d04f7e4e070fe8314f2544749e7a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Andrew Tridgell +Date: Tue, 26 Nov 2024 09:16:31 +1100 +Subject: [PATCH 4/4] disallow ../ elements in relpath for secure_relative_open + +--- + syscall.c | 7 +++++++ + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/syscall.c b/syscall.c +index a4b7f542..47c5ea57 100644 +--- a/syscall.c ++++ b/syscall.c +@@ -721,6 +721,8 @@ int do_open_nofollow(const char *pathname, int flags) + must be a relative path, and the relpath must not contain any + elements in the path which follow symlinks (ie. like O_NOFOLLOW, but + applies to all path components, not just the last component) ++ ++ The relpath must also not contain any ../ elements in the path + */ + int secure_relative_open(const char *basedir, const char *relpath, int flags, mode_t mode) + { +@@ -729,6 +731,11 @@ int secure_relative_open(const char *basedir, const char *relpath, int flags, mo + errno = EINVAL; + return -1; + } ++ if (strncmp(relpath, "../", 3) == 0 || strstr(relpath, "/../")) { ++ // no ../ elements allowed in the relpath ++ errno = EINVAL; ++ return -1; ++ } + + #if !defined(O_NOFOLLOW) || !defined(O_DIRECTORY) + // really old system, all we can do is live with the risks +-- +2.34.1 + diff --git a/backport-CVE-2024-12087-part1.patch b/backport-CVE-2024-12087-part1.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..99ebc15 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-CVE-2024-12087-part1.patch @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +From 0ebc19ee486a8e928a68d8f98d07d40f176770aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Wayne Davison +Date: Thu, 14 Nov 2024 15:46:50 -0800 +Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Refuse a duplicate dirlist. + +--- + flist.c | 9 +++++++++ + rsync.h | 1 + + 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/flist.c b/flist.c +index 464d556e..847b1054 100644 +--- a/flist.c ++++ b/flist.c +@@ -2584,6 +2584,15 @@ struct file_list *recv_file_list(int f, int dir_ndx) + init_hard_links(); + #endif + ++ if (inc_recurse && dir_ndx >= 0) { ++ struct file_struct *file = dir_flist->files[dir_ndx]; ++ if (file->flags & FLAG_GOT_DIR_FLIST) { ++ rprintf(FERROR_XFER, "rsync: refusing malicious duplicate flist for dir %d\n", dir_ndx); ++ exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL); ++ } ++ file->flags |= FLAG_GOT_DIR_FLIST; ++ } ++ + flist = flist_new(0, "recv_file_list"); + flist_expand(flist, FLIST_START_LARGE); + +diff --git a/rsync.h b/rsync.h +index 0f9e277f..b9a7101a 100644 +--- a/rsync.h ++++ b/rsync.h +@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ + #define FLAG_DUPLICATE (1<<4) /* sender */ + #define FLAG_MISSING_DIR (1<<4) /* generator */ + #define FLAG_HLINKED (1<<5) /* receiver/generator (checked on all types) */ ++#define FLAG_GOT_DIR_FLIST (1<<5)/* sender/receiver/generator - dir_flist only */ + #define FLAG_HLINK_FIRST (1<<6) /* receiver/generator (w/FLAG_HLINKED) */ + #define FLAG_IMPLIED_DIR (1<<6) /* sender/receiver/generator (dirs only) */ + #define FLAG_HLINK_LAST (1<<7) /* receiver/generator */ +-- +2.34.1 + diff --git a/backport-CVE-2024-12087-part2.patch b/backport-CVE-2024-12087-part2.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b067809 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-CVE-2024-12087-part2.patch @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +From b3e16be18d582dac1513c0a932d146b36e867b1b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Andrew Tridgell +Date: Tue, 26 Nov 2024 16:12:45 +1100 +Subject: [PATCH 2/2] range check dir_ndx before use + +--- + flist.c | 4 ++++ + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/flist.c b/flist.c +index 847b1054..087f9da6 100644 +--- a/flist.c ++++ b/flist.c +@@ -2585,6 +2585,10 @@ struct file_list *recv_file_list(int f, int dir_ndx) + #endif + + if (inc_recurse && dir_ndx >= 0) { ++ if (dir_ndx >= dir_flist->used) { ++ rprintf(FERROR_XFER, "rsync: refusing invalid dir_ndx %u >= %u\n", dir_ndx, dir_flist->used); ++ exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL); ++ } + struct file_struct *file = dir_flist->files[dir_ndx]; + if (file->flags & FLAG_GOT_DIR_FLIST) { + rprintf(FERROR_XFER, "rsync: refusing malicious duplicate flist for dir %d\n", dir_ndx); +-- +2.34.1 + diff --git a/backport-CVE-2024-12088.patch b/backport-CVE-2024-12088.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2ba5881 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-CVE-2024-12088.patch @@ -0,0 +1,136 @@ +From 535f8f816539ba681ef0f12015d2cb587ae61b6d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Andrew Tridgell +Date: Sat, 23 Nov 2024 15:15:53 +1100 +Subject: [PATCH] make --safe-links stricter + +when --safe-links is used also reject links where a '../' component is +included in the destination as other than the leading part of the +filename +--- + testsuite/safe-links.test | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + testsuite/unsafe-byname.test | 2 +- + util1.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++- + 3 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 testsuite/safe-links.test + +diff --git a/testsuite/safe-links.test b/testsuite/safe-links.test +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000..6e95a4b9 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/testsuite/safe-links.test +@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ ++#!/bin/sh ++ ++. "$suitedir/rsync.fns" ++ ++test_symlink() { ++ is_a_link "$1" || test_fail "File $1 is not a symlink" ++} ++ ++test_regular() { ++ if [ ! -f "$1" ]; then ++ test_fail "File $1 is not regular file or not exists" ++ fi ++} ++ ++test_notexist() { ++ if [ -e "$1" ]; then ++ test_fail "File $1 exists" ++ fi ++ if [ -h "$1" ]; then ++ test_fail "File $1 exists as a symlink" ++ fi ++} ++ ++cd "$tmpdir" ++ ++mkdir from ++ ++mkdir "from/safe" ++mkdir "from/unsafe" ++ ++mkdir "from/safe/files" ++mkdir "from/safe/links" ++ ++touch "from/safe/files/file1" ++touch "from/safe/files/file2" ++touch "from/unsafe/unsafefile" ++ ++ln -s ../files/file1 "from/safe/links/" ++ln -s ../files/file2 "from/safe/links/" ++ln -s ../../unsafe/unsafefile "from/safe/links/" ++ln -s a/a/a/../../../unsafe2 "from/safe/links/" ++ ++#echo "LISTING FROM" ++#ls -lR from ++ ++echo "rsync with relative path and just -a" ++$RSYNC -avv --safe-links from/safe/ to ++ ++#echo "LISTING TO" ++#ls -lR to ++ ++test_symlink to/links/file1 ++test_symlink to/links/file2 ++test_notexist to/links/unsafefile ++test_notexist to/links/unsafe2 +diff --git a/testsuite/unsafe-byname.test b/testsuite/unsafe-byname.test +index 75e72014..d2e318ef 100644 +--- a/testsuite/unsafe-byname.test ++++ b/testsuite/unsafe-byname.test +@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ test_unsafe ..//../dest from/dir unsafe + test_unsafe .. from/file safe + test_unsafe ../.. from/file unsafe + test_unsafe ..//.. from//file unsafe +-test_unsafe dir/.. from safe ++test_unsafe dir/.. from unsafe + test_unsafe dir/../.. from unsafe + test_unsafe dir/..//.. from unsafe + +diff --git a/util1.c b/util1.c +index da50ff1e..f260d398 100644 +--- a/util1.c ++++ b/util1.c +@@ -1318,7 +1318,14 @@ int handle_partial_dir(const char *fname, int create) + * + * "src" is the top source directory currently applicable at the level + * of the referenced symlink. This is usually the symlink's full path +- * (including its name), as referenced from the root of the transfer. */ ++ * (including its name), as referenced from the root of the transfer. ++ * ++ * NOTE: this also rejects dest names with a .. component in other ++ * than the first component of the name ie. it rejects names such as ++ * a/b/../x/y. This needs to be done as the leading subpaths 'a' or ++ * 'b' could later be replaced with symlinks such as a link to '.' ++ * resulting in the link being transferred now becoming unsafe ++ */ + int unsafe_symlink(const char *dest, const char *src) + { + const char *name, *slash; +@@ -1328,6 +1335,23 @@ int unsafe_symlink(const char *dest, const char *src) + if (!dest || !*dest || *dest == '/') + return 1; + ++ // reject destinations with /../ in the name other than at the start of the name ++ const char *dest2 = dest; ++ while (strncmp(dest2, "../", 3) == 0) { ++ dest2 += 3; ++ while (*dest2 == '/') { ++ // allow for ..//..///../foo ++ dest2++; ++ } ++ } ++ if (strstr(dest2, "/../")) ++ return 1; ++ ++ // reject if the destination ends in /.. ++ const size_t dlen = strlen(dest); ++ if (dlen > 3 && strcmp(&dest[dlen-3], "/..") == 0) ++ return 1; ++ + /* find out what our safety margin is */ + for (name = src; (slash = strchr(name, '/')) != 0; name = slash+1) { + /* ".." segment starts the count over. "." segment is ignored. */ +-- +2.34.1 + diff --git a/backport-CVE-2024-12747.patch b/backport-CVE-2024-12747.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..61ecbe7 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-CVE-2024-12747.patch @@ -0,0 +1,187 @@ +From f45f48055e548851bc7230f454dfeba139be6c04 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Andrew Tridgell +Date: Wed, 18 Dec 2024 08:59:42 +1100 +Subject: [PATCH] fixed symlink race condition in sender + +when we open a file that we don't expect to be a symlink use +O_NOFOLLOW to prevent a race condition where an attacker could change +a file between being a normal file and a symlink +--- + checksum.c | 2 +- + flist.c | 2 +- + generator.c | 4 ++-- + receiver.c | 2 +- + sender.c | 2 +- + syscall.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ + t_unsafe.c | 3 +++ + tls.c | 3 +++ + trimslash.c | 2 ++ + util1.c | 2 +- + 10 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/checksum.c b/checksum.c +index cb21882c..66e80896 100644 +--- a/checksum.c ++++ b/checksum.c +@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ void file_checksum(const char *fname, const STRUCT_STAT *st_p, char *sum) + + memset(sum, 0, MAX_DIGEST_LEN); + +- fd = do_open(fname, O_RDONLY, 0); ++ fd = do_open_checklinks(fname); + if (fd == -1) + return; + +diff --git a/flist.c b/flist.c +index 087f9da6..17832533 100644 +--- a/flist.c ++++ b/flist.c +@@ -1390,7 +1390,7 @@ struct file_struct *make_file(const char *fname, struct file_list *flist, + + if (copy_devices && am_sender && IS_DEVICE(st.st_mode)) { + if (st.st_size == 0) { +- int fd = do_open(fname, O_RDONLY, 0); ++ int fd = do_open_checklinks(fname); + if (fd >= 0) { + st.st_size = get_device_size(fd, fname); + close(fd); +diff --git a/generator.c b/generator.c +index 110db28f..3f13bb95 100644 +--- a/generator.c ++++ b/generator.c +@@ -1798,7 +1798,7 @@ static void recv_generator(char *fname, struct file_struct *file, int ndx, + + if (write_devices && IS_DEVICE(sx.st.st_mode) && sx.st.st_size == 0) { + /* This early open into fd skips the regular open below. */ +- if ((fd = do_open(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0)) >= 0) ++ if ((fd = do_open_nofollow(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY)) >= 0) + real_sx.st.st_size = sx.st.st_size = get_device_size(fd, fnamecmp); + } + +@@ -1867,7 +1867,7 @@ static void recv_generator(char *fname, struct file_struct *file, int ndx, + } + + /* open the file */ +- if (fd < 0 && (fd = do_open(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0)) < 0) { ++ if (fd < 0 && (fd = do_open_checklinks(fnamecmp)) < 0) { + rsyserr(FERROR, errno, "failed to open %s, continuing", + full_fname(fnamecmp)); + pretend_missing: +diff --git a/receiver.c b/receiver.c +index 8031b8f4..edfbb210 100644 +--- a/receiver.c ++++ b/receiver.c +@@ -775,7 +775,7 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name) + if (fnamecmp != fname) { + fnamecmp = fname; + fnamecmp_type = FNAMECMP_FNAME; +- fd1 = do_open(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0); ++ fd1 = do_open_nofollow(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY); + } + + if (fd1 == -1 && basis_dir[0]) { +diff --git a/sender.c b/sender.c +index 2bbff2fa..a4d46c39 100644 +--- a/sender.c ++++ b/sender.c +@@ -350,7 +350,7 @@ void send_files(int f_in, int f_out) + exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL); + } + +- fd = do_open(fname, O_RDONLY, 0); ++ fd = do_open_checklinks(fname); + if (fd == -1) { + if (errno == ENOENT) { + enum logcode c = am_daemon && protocol_version < 28 ? FERROR : FWARNING; +diff --git a/syscall.c b/syscall.c +index 081357bb..8cea2900 100644 +--- a/syscall.c ++++ b/syscall.c +@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ extern int preallocate_files; + extern int preserve_perms; + extern int preserve_executability; + extern int open_noatime; ++extern int copy_links; ++extern int copy_unsafe_links; + + #ifndef S_BLKSIZE + # if defined hpux || defined __hpux__ || defined __hpux +@@ -788,3 +790,21 @@ cleanup: + return retfd; + #endif // O_NOFOLLOW, O_DIRECTORY + } ++ ++/* ++ varient of do_open/do_open_nofollow which does do_open() if the ++ copy_links or copy_unsafe_links options are set and does ++ do_open_nofollow() otherwise ++ ++ This is used to prevent a race condition where an attacker could be ++ switching a file between being a symlink and being a normal file ++ ++ The open is always done with O_RDONLY flags ++ */ ++int do_open_checklinks(const char *pathname) ++{ ++ if (copy_links || copy_unsafe_links) { ++ return do_open(pathname, O_RDONLY, 0); ++ } ++ return do_open_nofollow(pathname, O_RDONLY); ++} +diff --git a/t_unsafe.c b/t_unsafe.c +index 010cac50..e10619a2 100644 +--- a/t_unsafe.c ++++ b/t_unsafe.c +@@ -28,6 +28,9 @@ int am_root = 0; + int am_sender = 1; + int read_only = 0; + int list_only = 0; ++int copy_links = 0; ++int copy_unsafe_links = 0; ++ + short info_levels[COUNT_INFO], debug_levels[COUNT_DEBUG]; + + int +diff --git a/tls.c b/tls.c +index e6b0708a..858f8f10 100644 +--- a/tls.c ++++ b/tls.c +@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ int list_only = 0; + int link_times = 0; + int link_owner = 0; + int nsec_times = 0; ++int safe_symlinks = 0; ++int copy_links = 0; ++int copy_unsafe_links = 0; + + #ifdef SUPPORT_XATTRS + +diff --git a/trimslash.c b/trimslash.c +index 1ec928ca..f2774cd7 100644 +--- a/trimslash.c ++++ b/trimslash.c +@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ int am_root = 0; + int am_sender = 1; + int read_only = 1; + int list_only = 0; ++int copy_links = 0; ++int copy_unsafe_links = 0; + + int + main(int argc, char **argv) +diff --git a/util1.c b/util1.c +index f260d398..d84bc414 100644 +--- a/util1.c ++++ b/util1.c +@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ int copy_file(const char *source, const char *dest, int tmpfilefd, mode_t mode) + int len; /* Number of bytes read into `buf'. */ + OFF_T prealloc_len = 0, offset = 0; + +- if ((ifd = do_open(source, O_RDONLY, 0)) < 0) { ++ if ((ifd = do_open_nofollow(source, O_RDONLY)) < 0) { + int save_errno = errno; + rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno, "open %s", full_fname(source)); + errno = save_errno; +-- +2.34.1 + diff --git a/backport-Fix-FLAG_GOT_DIR_FLIST-collission-with-FLAG_HLINKED.patch b/backport-Fix-FLAG_GOT_DIR_FLIST-collission-with-FLAG_HLINKED.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bf39d9b --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-Fix-FLAG_GOT_DIR_FLIST-collission-with-FLAG_HLINKED.patch @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +From: Natanael Copa +Date: Wed, 15 Jan 2025 15:10:24 +0100 +Subject: Fix FLAG_GOT_DIR_FLIST collission with FLAG_HLINKED +Origin: https://github.com/ncopa/rsync/commit/efb85fd8db9e8f74eb3ab91ebf44f6ed35e3da5b +Bug: https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/issues/697 +Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/1093089 +Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/1093052 +Bug: https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/issues/702 + +fixes commit 688f5c379a43 (Refuse a duplicate dirlist.) + +Fixes: https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/issues/702 +Fixes: https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/issues/697 +--- + rsync.h | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/rsync.h b/rsync.h +index 9be1297bdd29..479ac4848991 100644 +--- a/rsync.h ++++ b/rsync.h +@@ -84,7 +84,6 @@ + #define FLAG_DUPLICATE (1<<4) /* sender */ + #define FLAG_MISSING_DIR (1<<4) /* generator */ + #define FLAG_HLINKED (1<<5) /* receiver/generator (checked on all types) */ +-#define FLAG_GOT_DIR_FLIST (1<<5)/* sender/receiver/generator - dir_flist only */ + #define FLAG_HLINK_FIRST (1<<6) /* receiver/generator (w/FLAG_HLINKED) */ + #define FLAG_IMPLIED_DIR (1<<6) /* sender/receiver/generator (dirs only) */ + #define FLAG_HLINK_LAST (1<<7) /* receiver/generator */ +@@ -93,6 +92,7 @@ + #define FLAG_SKIP_GROUP (1<<10) /* receiver/generator */ + #define FLAG_TIME_FAILED (1<<11)/* generator */ + #define FLAG_MOD_NSEC (1<<12) /* sender/receiver/generator */ ++#define FLAG_GOT_DIR_FLIST (1<<13)/* sender/receiver/generator - dir_flist only */ + + /* These flags are passed to functions but not stored. */ + +-- +2.47.1 + diff --git a/backport-Fix_use-after-free_in_generator.patch b/backport-Fix_use-after-free_in_generator.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5d3ccb2 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-Fix_use-after-free_in_generator.patch @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +From f923b19fd85039a2b0e908391074872334646d51 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Natanael Copa +Date: Wed, 15 Jan 2025 15:48:04 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix use-after-free in generator + +full_fname() will free the return value in the next call so we need to +duplicate it before passing it to rsyserr. + +Fixes: https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/issues/704 +--- + generator.c | 6 +++++- + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/generator.c b/generator.c +index 3f13bb95..b56fa569 100644 +--- a/generator.c ++++ b/generator.c +@@ -2041,8 +2041,12 @@ int atomic_create(struct file_struct *file, char *fname, const char *slnk, const + + if (!skip_atomic) { + if (do_rename(tmpname, fname) < 0) { ++ char *full_tmpname = strdup(full_fname(tmpname)); ++ if (full_tmpname == NULL) ++ out_of_memory("atomic_create"); + rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno, "rename %s -> \"%s\" failed", +- full_fname(tmpname), full_fname(fname)); ++ full_tmpname, full_fname(fname)); ++ free(full_tmpname); + do_unlink(tmpname); + return 0; + } diff --git a/rsync.spec b/rsync.spec index 8216ce8..d512e87 100644 --- a/rsync.spec +++ b/rsync.spec @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ Name: rsync Version: 3.2.5 -Release: 3 +Release: 4 Summary: Fast incremental file transfer utility License: GPLv3+ URL: http://rsync.samba.org/ @@ -11,7 +11,18 @@ Source3: rsyncd.conf Source4: rsyncd.sysconfig Source5: rsyncd@.service -patch6000: backport-Duplicate-argv-data-before-poptFreeContext.patch +Patch6000: backport-Duplicate-argv-data-before-poptFreeContext.patch +Patch6001: backport-CVE-2024-12085.patch +Patch6002: backport-CVE-2024-12086-part1.patch +Patch6003: backport-CVE-2024-12086-part2.patch +Patch6004: backport-CVE-2024-12086-part3.patch +Patch6005: backport-CVE-2024-12086-part4.patch +Patch6006: backport-CVE-2024-12087-part1.patch +Patch6007: backport-CVE-2024-12087-part2.patch +Patch6008: backport-CVE-2024-12088.patch +Patch6009: backport-CVE-2024-12747.patch +Patch6010: backport-Fix-FLAG_GOT_DIR_FLIST-collission-with-FLAG_HLINKED.patch +Patch6011: backport-Fix_use-after-free_in_generator.patch BuildRequires: git gcc systemd libacl-devel libattr-devel autoconf popt-devel BuildRequires: lz4-devel openssl-devel libzstd-devel @@ -75,6 +86,10 @@ install -D -m644 %{SOURCE5} %{buildroot}/%{_unitdir}/rsyncd@.service %{_mandir}/man5/rsyncd.conf.5* %changelog +* Wed Jan 15 2025 Funda Wang - 3.2.5-4 +- fix CVE-2024-12085, CVE-2024-12086, CVE-2024-12087, CVE-2024-12088, + CVE-2024-12747 + * Wed Oct 9 zhoupengcheng - 3.2.5-3 - backport patch from upstream -- Gitee