diff --git a/backport-CVE-2022-42898-third_party-heimdal-PAC-parse-integer.patch b/backport-CVE-2022-42898-third_party-heimdal-PAC-parse-integer.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f2f2a5c2298a7f9a47920f8c8e4b9bc48b654fae --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-CVE-2022-42898-third_party-heimdal-PAC-parse-integer.patch @@ -0,0 +1,1002 @@ +From 434f461e9e5a914d4e5a9141324f1705e5e50cf9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Joseph Sutton +Date: Fri, 14 Oct 2022 16:45:37 +1300 +Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2022-42898 third_party/heimdal: PAC parse integer + overflows + +Catch overflows that result from adding PAC_INFO_BUFFER_SIZE. + +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15203 + +Heavily edited by committer Nico Williams , original by +Joseph Sutton . + +Signed-off-by: Nico Williams + +[jsutton@samba.org Zero-initialised header_size in krb5_pac_parse() to + avoid a maybe-uninitialized error; added a missing check for ret == 0] + +Autobuild-User(master): Jule Anger +Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Nov 15 17:02:52 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184 +--- + third_party/heimdal/lib/krb5/pac.c | 614 +++++++++++++++--------- + third_party/heimdal/lib/krb5/test_pac.c | 48 +- + 2 files changed, 444 insertions(+), 218 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/third_party/heimdal/lib/krb5/pac.c b/third_party/heimdal/lib/krb5/pac.c +index b923981908d..e6dfe2aef3d 100644 +--- a/third_party/heimdal/lib/krb5/pac.c ++++ b/third_party/heimdal/lib/krb5/pac.c +@@ -37,19 +37,34 @@ + #include + #include + ++/* ++ * https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-pac/3341cfa2-6ef5-42e0-b7bc-4544884bf399 ++ */ + struct PAC_INFO_BUFFER { +- uint32_t type; +- uint32_t buffersize; +- uint32_t offset_hi; +- uint32_t offset_lo; ++ uint32_t type; /* ULONG ulType in the original */ ++ uint32_t buffersize; /* ULONG cbBufferSize in the original */ ++ uint64_t offset; /* ULONG64 Offset in the original ++ * this being the offset from the beginning of the ++ * struct PACTYPE to the beginning of the buffer ++ * containing data of type ulType ++ */ + }; + ++/* ++ * https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-pac/6655b92f-ab06-490b-845d-037e6987275f ++ */ + struct PACTYPE { +- uint32_t numbuffers; +- uint32_t version; +- struct PAC_INFO_BUFFER buffers[1]; ++ uint32_t numbuffers; /* named cBuffers of type ULONG in the original */ ++ uint32_t version; /* Named Version of type ULONG in the original */ ++ struct PAC_INFO_BUFFER buffers[1]; /* an ellipsis (...) in the original */ + }; + ++/* ++ * A PAC starts with a PACTYPE header structure that is followed by an array of ++ * numbuffers PAC_INFO_BUFFER structures, each of which points to a buffer ++ * beyond the last PAC_INFO_BUFFER structures. ++ */ ++ + struct krb5_pac_data { + struct PACTYPE *pac; + krb5_data data; +@@ -133,6 +148,60 @@ struct heim_type_data pac_object = { + NULL + }; + ++/* ++ * Returns the size of the PACTYPE header + the PAC_INFO_BUFFER array. This is ++ * also the end of the whole thing, and any offsets to buffers from ++ * thePAC_INFO_BUFFER[] entries have to be beyond it. ++ */ ++static krb5_error_code ++pac_header_size(krb5_context context, uint32_t num_buffers, uint32_t *result) ++{ ++ krb5_error_code ret; ++ uint32_t header_size; ++ ++ /* Guard against integer overflow */ ++ if (num_buffers > UINT32_MAX / PAC_INFO_BUFFER_SIZE) { ++ ret = EOVERFLOW; ++ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "PAC has too many buffers"); ++ return ret; ++ } ++ header_size = PAC_INFO_BUFFER_SIZE * num_buffers; ++ ++ /* Guard against integer overflow */ ++ if (header_size > UINT32_MAX - PACTYPE_SIZE) { ++ ret = EOVERFLOW; ++ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "PAC has too many buffers"); ++ return ret; ++ } ++ header_size += PACTYPE_SIZE; ++ ++ *result = header_size; ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++/* Output `size' + `addend' + padding for alignment if it doesn't overflow */ ++static krb5_error_code ++pac_aligned_size(krb5_context context, ++ uint32_t size, ++ uint32_t addend, ++ uint32_t *aligned_size) ++{ ++ krb5_error_code ret; ++ ++ if (size > UINT32_MAX - addend || ++ (size + addend) > UINT32_MAX - (PAC_ALIGNMENT - 1)) { ++ ret = EOVERFLOW; ++ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "integer overrun"); ++ return ret; ++ } ++ size += addend; ++ size += PAC_ALIGNMENT - 1; ++ size &= ~(PAC_ALIGNMENT - 1); ++ *aligned_size = size; ++ return 0; ++} ++ + /* + * HMAC-MD5 checksum over any key (needed for the PAC routines) + */ +@@ -184,165 +253,164 @@ KRB5_LIB_FUNCTION krb5_error_code KRB5_LIB_CALL + krb5_pac_parse(krb5_context context, const void *ptr, size_t len, + krb5_pac *pac) + { +- krb5_error_code ret; ++ krb5_error_code ret = 0; + krb5_pac p; + krb5_storage *sp = NULL; +- uint32_t i, tmp, tmp2, header_end; ++ uint32_t i, num_buffers, version, header_size = 0; ++ uint32_t prev_start = 0; ++ uint32_t prev_end = 0; + ++ *pac = NULL; + p = _heim_alloc_object(&pac_object, sizeof(*p)); +- if (p == NULL) { +- ret = krb5_enomem(context); +- goto out; +- } +- +- sp = krb5_storage_from_readonly_mem(ptr, len); +- if (sp == NULL) { ++ if (p) ++ sp = krb5_storage_from_readonly_mem(ptr, len); ++ if (sp == NULL) + ret = krb5_enomem(context); +- goto out; +- } +- krb5_storage_set_flags(sp, KRB5_STORAGE_BYTEORDER_LE); +- +- CHECK(ret, krb5_ret_uint32(sp, &tmp), out); +- CHECK(ret, krb5_ret_uint32(sp, &tmp2), out); +- if (tmp < 1) { +- ret = EINVAL; /* Too few buffers */ +- krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, N_("PAC has too few buffers", "")); +- goto out; ++ if (ret == 0) { ++ krb5_storage_set_flags(sp, KRB5_STORAGE_BYTEORDER_LE); ++ ret = krb5_ret_uint32(sp, &num_buffers); + } +- if (tmp2 != 0) { +- ret = EINVAL; /* Wrong version */ +- krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, ++ if (ret == 0) ++ ret = krb5_ret_uint32(sp, &version); ++ if (ret == 0 && num_buffers < 1) ++ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret = EINVAL, ++ N_("PAC has too few buffers", "")); ++ if (ret == 0 && num_buffers > 1000) ++ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret = EINVAL, ++ N_("PAC has too many buffers", "")); ++ if (ret == 0 && version != 0) ++ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret = EINVAL, + N_("PAC has wrong version %d", ""), +- (int)tmp2); +- goto out; +- } +- +- p->pac = calloc(1, +- sizeof(*p->pac) + (sizeof(p->pac->buffers[0]) * (tmp - 1))); +- if (p->pac == NULL) { ++ (int)version); ++ if (ret == 0) ++ ret = pac_header_size(context, num_buffers, &header_size); ++ if (ret == 0 && header_size > len) ++ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret = EOVERFLOW, ++ N_("PAC encoding invalid, would overflow buffers", "")); ++ if (ret == 0) ++ p->pac = calloc(1, header_size); ++ if (ret == 0 && p->pac == NULL) + ret = krb5_enomem(context); +- goto out; +- } +- +- p->pac->numbuffers = tmp; +- p->pac->version = tmp2; + +- header_end = PACTYPE_SIZE + (PAC_INFO_BUFFER_SIZE * p->pac->numbuffers); +- if (header_end > len) { +- ret = EINVAL; +- goto out; ++ if (ret == 0) { ++ p->pac->numbuffers = num_buffers; ++ p->pac->version = version; + } + +- for (i = 0; i < p->pac->numbuffers; i++) { +- CHECK(ret, krb5_ret_uint32(sp, &p->pac->buffers[i].type), out); +- CHECK(ret, krb5_ret_uint32(sp, &p->pac->buffers[i].buffersize), out); +- CHECK(ret, krb5_ret_uint32(sp, &p->pac->buffers[i].offset_lo), out); +- CHECK(ret, krb5_ret_uint32(sp, &p->pac->buffers[i].offset_hi), out); ++ for (i = 0; ret == 0 && i < p->pac->numbuffers; i++) { ++ ret = krb5_ret_uint32(sp, &p->pac->buffers[i].type); ++ if (ret == 0) ++ ret = krb5_ret_uint32(sp, &p->pac->buffers[i].buffersize); ++ if (ret == 0) ++ ret = krb5_ret_uint64(sp, &p->pac->buffers[i].offset); ++ if (ret) ++ break; + +- /* consistency checks */ +- if (p->pac->buffers[i].offset_lo & (PAC_ALIGNMENT - 1)) { +- ret = EINVAL; +- krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, ++ /* Consistency checks (we don't check for wasted space) */ ++ if (p->pac->buffers[i].offset & (PAC_ALIGNMENT - 1)) { ++ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret = EINVAL, + N_("PAC out of alignment", "")); +- goto out; ++ break; + } +- if (p->pac->buffers[i].offset_hi) { +- ret = EINVAL; +- krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, +- N_("PAC high offset set", "")); +- goto out; ++ if (p->pac->buffers[i].offset > len || ++ p->pac->buffers[i].buffersize > len || ++ len - p->pac->buffers[i].offset < p->pac->buffers[i].buffersize) { ++ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret = EOVERFLOW, ++ N_("PAC buffer overflow", "")); ++ break; + } +- if (p->pac->buffers[i].offset_lo > len) { +- ret = EINVAL; +- krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, +- N_("PAC offset overflow", "")); +- goto out; +- } +- if (p->pac->buffers[i].offset_lo < header_end) { +- ret = EINVAL; +- krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, ++ if (p->pac->buffers[i].offset < header_size) { ++ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret = EINVAL, + N_("PAC offset inside header: %lu %lu", ""), +- (unsigned long)p->pac->buffers[i].offset_lo, +- (unsigned long)header_end); +- goto out; +- } +- if (p->pac->buffers[i].buffersize > len - p->pac->buffers[i].offset_lo){ +- ret = EINVAL; +- krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, N_("PAC length overflow", "")); +- goto out; ++ (unsigned long)p->pac->buffers[i].offset, ++ (unsigned long)header_size); ++ break; + } + +- /* let save pointer to data we need later */ +- if (p->pac->buffers[i].type == PAC_SERVER_CHECKSUM) { +- if (p->server_checksum) { +- ret = EINVAL; +- krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, ++ /* ++ * We'd like to check for non-overlapping of buffers, but the buffers ++ * need not be in the same order as the PAC_INFO_BUFFER[] entries ++ * pointing to them! To fully check for overlap we'd have to have an ++ * O(N^2) loop after we parse all the PAC_INFO_BUFFER[]. ++ * ++ * But we can check that each buffer does not overlap the previous ++ * buffer. ++ */ ++ if (prev_start) { ++ if (p->pac->buffers[i].offset >= prev_start && ++ p->pac->buffers[i].offset < prev_end) { ++ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret = EINVAL, ++ N_("PAC overlap", "")); ++ break; ++ } ++ if (p->pac->buffers[i].offset < prev_start && ++ p->pac->buffers[i].offset + ++ p->pac->buffers[i].buffersize > prev_start) { ++ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret = EINVAL, ++ N_("PAC overlap", "")); ++ break; ++ } ++ } ++ prev_start = p->pac->buffers[i].offset; ++ prev_end = p->pac->buffers[i].offset + p->pac->buffers[i].buffersize; ++ ++ /* Let's save pointers to buffers we'll need later */ ++ switch (p->pac->buffers[i].type) { ++ case PAC_SERVER_CHECKSUM: ++ if (p->server_checksum) ++ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret = EINVAL, + N_("PAC has multiple server checksums", "")); +- goto out; +- } +- p->server_checksum = &p->pac->buffers[i]; +- } else if (p->pac->buffers[i].type == PAC_PRIVSVR_CHECKSUM) { +- if (p->privsvr_checksum) { +- ret = EINVAL; +- krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, +- N_("PAC has multiple KDC checksums", "")); +- goto out; +- } +- p->privsvr_checksum = &p->pac->buffers[i]; +- } else if (p->pac->buffers[i].type == PAC_LOGON_NAME) { +- if (p->logon_name) { +- ret = EINVAL; +- krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, +- N_("PAC has multiple logon names", "")); +- goto out; +- } +- p->logon_name = &p->pac->buffers[i]; +- } else if (p->pac->buffers[i].type == PAC_UPN_DNS_INFO) { +- if (p->upn_dns_info) { +- ret = EINVAL; +- krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, ++ else ++ p->server_checksum = &p->pac->buffers[i]; ++ break; ++ case PAC_PRIVSVR_CHECKSUM: ++ if (p->privsvr_checksum) ++ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret = EINVAL, ++ N_("PAC has multiple KDC checksums", "")); ++ else ++ p->privsvr_checksum = &p->pac->buffers[i]; ++ break; ++ case PAC_LOGON_NAME: ++ if (p->logon_name) ++ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret = EINVAL, ++ N_("PAC has multiple logon names", "")); ++ else ++ p->logon_name = &p->pac->buffers[i]; ++ break; ++ case PAC_UPN_DNS_INFO: ++ if (p->upn_dns_info) ++ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret = EINVAL, + N_("PAC has multiple UPN DNS info buffers", "")); +- goto out; +- } +- p->upn_dns_info = &p->pac->buffers[i]; +- } else if (p->pac->buffers[i].type == PAC_TICKET_CHECKSUM) { +- if (p->ticket_checksum) { +- ret = EINVAL; +- krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, ++ else ++ p->upn_dns_info = &p->pac->buffers[i]; ++ break; ++ case PAC_TICKET_CHECKSUM: ++ if (p->ticket_checksum) ++ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret = EINVAL, + N_("PAC has multiple ticket checksums", "")); +- goto out; +- } +- p->ticket_checksum = &p->pac->buffers[i]; +- } else if (p->pac->buffers[i].type == PAC_ATTRIBUTES_INFO) { +- if (p->attributes_info) { +- ret = EINVAL; +- krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, ++ else ++ p->ticket_checksum = &p->pac->buffers[i]; ++ break; ++ case PAC_ATTRIBUTES_INFO: ++ if (p->attributes_info) ++ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret = EINVAL, + N_("PAC has multiple attributes info buffers", "")); +- goto out; +- } +- p->attributes_info = &p->pac->buffers[i]; +- } ++ else ++ p->attributes_info = &p->pac->buffers[i]; ++ break; ++ default: break; ++ } + } + +- ret = krb5_data_copy(&p->data, ptr, len); +- if (ret) +- goto out; +- +- krb5_storage_free(sp); +- +- *pac = p; +- return 0; +- +-out: +- if (sp) +- krb5_storage_free(sp); +- if (p) { +- if (p->pac) +- free(p->pac); +- krb5_pac_free(context, p); ++ if (ret == 0) ++ ret = krb5_data_copy(&p->data, ptr, len); ++ if (ret == 0) { ++ *pac = p; ++ p = NULL; + } +- *pac = NULL; +- ++ if (sp) ++ krb5_storage_free(sp); ++ krb5_pac_free(context, p); + return ret; + } + +@@ -369,77 +437,111 @@ krb5_pac_init(krb5_context context, krb5_pac *pac) + krb5_pac_free(context, p); + return krb5_enomem(context); + } ++ memset(p->data.data, 0, p->data.length); + + *pac = p; + return 0; + } + ++/** ++ * Add a PAC buffer `nd' of type `type' to the pac `p'. ++ * ++ * @param context ++ * @param p ++ * @param type ++ * @param nd ++ * ++ * @return 0 on success or a Kerberos or system error. ++ */ + KRB5_LIB_FUNCTION krb5_error_code KRB5_LIB_CALL + krb5_pac_add_buffer(krb5_context context, krb5_pac p, +- uint32_t type, const krb5_data *data) ++ uint32_t type, const krb5_data *nd) + { + krb5_error_code ret; + void *ptr; +- size_t len, offset, header_end, old_end; ++ size_t old_len = p->data.length; ++ uint32_t len, offset, header_size; + uint32_t i; ++ uint32_t num_buffers; + +- assert(data->data != NULL); ++ assert(nd->data != NULL); + +- len = p->pac->numbuffers; ++ num_buffers = p->pac->numbuffers; ++ ret = pac_header_size(context, num_buffers + 1, &header_size); ++ if (ret) ++ return ret; + +- ptr = realloc(p->pac, +- sizeof(*p->pac) + (sizeof(p->pac->buffers[0]) * len)); ++ ptr = realloc(p->pac, header_size); + if (ptr == NULL) + return krb5_enomem(context); + + p->pac = ptr; ++ p->pac->buffers[num_buffers].type = 0; ++ p->pac->buffers[num_buffers].buffersize = 0; ++ p->pac->buffers[num_buffers].offset = 0; + +- for (i = 0; i < len; i++) +- p->pac->buffers[i].offset_lo += PAC_INFO_BUFFER_SIZE; +- +- offset = p->data.length + PAC_INFO_BUFFER_SIZE; +- +- p->pac->buffers[len].type = type; +- p->pac->buffers[len].buffersize = data->length; +- p->pac->buffers[len].offset_lo = offset; +- p->pac->buffers[len].offset_hi = 0; +- +- old_end = p->data.length; +- len = p->data.length + data->length + PAC_INFO_BUFFER_SIZE; +- if (len < p->data.length) { +- krb5_set_error_message(context, EINVAL, "integer overrun"); +- return EINVAL; ++ /* ++ * Check that we can adjust all the buffer offsets in the existing ++ * PAC_INFO_BUFFERs, since changing the size of PAC_INFO_BUFFER[] means ++ * changing the offsets of buffers following that array. ++ * ++ * We don't adjust them until we can't fail. ++ */ ++ for (i = 0; i < num_buffers; i++) { ++ if (p->pac->buffers[i].offset > UINT32_MAX - PAC_INFO_BUFFER_SIZE) { ++ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret = EOVERFLOW, ++ "too many / too large PAC buffers"); ++ return ret; ++ } + } + +- /* align to PAC_ALIGNMENT */ +- len = ((len + PAC_ALIGNMENT - 1) / PAC_ALIGNMENT) * PAC_ALIGNMENT; ++ /* ++ * The new buffer's offset must be past the end of the buffers we have ++ * (p->data), which is the sum of the header and p->data.length. ++ */ + ++ /* Set offset = p->data.length + PAC_INFO_BUFFER_SIZE + alignment */ ++ ret = pac_aligned_size(context, p->data.length, PAC_INFO_BUFFER_SIZE, &offset); ++ if (ret == 0) ++ /* Set the new length = offset + nd->length + alignment */ ++ ret = pac_aligned_size(context, offset, nd->length, &len); ++ if (ret) { ++ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "PAC buffer too large"); ++ return ret; ++ } + ret = krb5_data_realloc(&p->data, len); + if (ret) { + krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, N_("malloc: out of memory", "")); + return ret; + } + ++ /* Zero out the new allocation to zero out any padding */ ++ memset((char *)p->data.data + old_len, 0, len - old_len); ++ ++ p->pac->buffers[num_buffers].type = type; ++ p->pac->buffers[num_buffers].buffersize = nd->length; ++ p->pac->buffers[num_buffers].offset = offset; ++ ++ /* Adjust all the buffer offsets in the existing PAC_INFO_BUFFERs now */ ++ for (i = 0; i < num_buffers; i++) ++ p->pac->buffers[i].offset += PAC_INFO_BUFFER_SIZE; ++ + /* +- * make place for new PAC INFO BUFFER header ++ * Make place for new PAC INFO BUFFER header + */ +- header_end = PACTYPE_SIZE + (PAC_INFO_BUFFER_SIZE * p->pac->numbuffers); +- memmove((unsigned char *)p->data.data + header_end + PAC_INFO_BUFFER_SIZE, +- (unsigned char *)p->data.data + header_end , +- old_end - header_end); +- memset((unsigned char *)p->data.data + header_end, 0, PAC_INFO_BUFFER_SIZE); ++ header_size -= PAC_INFO_BUFFER_SIZE; ++ memmove((unsigned char *)p->data.data + header_size + PAC_INFO_BUFFER_SIZE, ++ (unsigned char *)p->data.data + header_size , ++ old_len - header_size); ++ /* Clear the space where we would put the new PAC_INFO_BUFFER[] element */ ++ memset((unsigned char *)p->data.data + header_size, 0, ++ PAC_INFO_BUFFER_SIZE); + + /* +- * copy in new data part ++ * Copy in new data part + */ +- +- memcpy((unsigned char *)p->data.data + offset, +- data->data, data->length); +- memset((unsigned char *)p->data.data + offset + data->length, +- 0, p->data.length - offset - data->length); +- ++ memcpy((unsigned char *)p->data.data + offset, nd->data, nd->length); + p->pac->numbuffers += 1; +- + return 0; + } + +@@ -451,8 +553,8 @@ krb5_pac_add_buffer(krb5_context context, krb5_pac p, + * @param type type of buffer to get + * @param data return data, free with krb5_data_free(). + * +- * @return Returns 0 to indicate success. Otherwise an kerberos et +- * error code is returned, see krb5_get_error_message(). ++ * @return Returns 0 to indicate success, ENOENT to indicate that a buffer of ++ * the given type was not found, or a Kerberos or system error code. + * + * @ingroup krb5_pac + */ +@@ -465,21 +567,19 @@ krb5_pac_get_buffer(krb5_context context, krb5_const_pac p, + uint32_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < p->pac->numbuffers; i++) { +- const size_t len = p->pac->buffers[i].buffersize; +- const size_t offset = p->pac->buffers[i].offset_lo; ++ size_t len = p->pac->buffers[i].buffersize; ++ size_t offset = p->pac->buffers[i].offset; + + if (p->pac->buffers[i].type != type) + continue; + +- if (data) { +- ret = krb5_data_copy(data, (unsigned char *)p->data.data + offset, len); +- if (ret) { +- krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, N_("malloc: out of memory", "")); +- return ret; +- } +- } ++ if (!data) ++ return 0; + +- return 0; ++ ret = krb5_data_copy(data, (unsigned char *)p->data.data + offset, len); ++ if (ret) ++ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, N_("malloc: out of memory", "")); ++ return ret; + } + krb5_set_error_message(context, ENOENT, "No PAC buffer of type %lu was found", + (unsigned long)type); +@@ -578,7 +678,7 @@ verify_checksum(krb5_context context, + + memset(&cksum, 0, sizeof(cksum)); + +- sp = krb5_storage_from_mem((char *)data->data + sig->offset_lo, ++ sp = krb5_storage_from_mem((char *)data->data + sig->offset, + sig->buffersize); + if (sp == NULL) + return krb5_enomem(context); +@@ -738,7 +838,7 @@ parse_upn_dns_info(krb5_context context, + *canon_princ = NULL; + krb5_data_zero(sid); + +- sp = krb5_storage_from_readonly_mem((const char *)data->data + upndnsinfo->offset_lo, ++ sp = krb5_storage_from_readonly_mem((const char *)data->data + upndnsinfo->offset, + upndnsinfo->buffersize); + if (sp == NULL) + return krb5_enomem(context); +@@ -842,7 +942,7 @@ verify_logonname(krb5_context context, + char *principal_string = NULL; + char *logon_string = NULL; + +- sp = krb5_storage_from_readonly_mem((const char *)data->data + logon_name->offset_lo, ++ sp = krb5_storage_from_readonly_mem((const char *)data->data + logon_name->offset, + logon_name->buffersize); + if (sp == NULL) + return krb5_enomem(context); +@@ -1062,7 +1162,7 @@ parse_attributes_info(krb5_context context, + + *pac_attributes = 0; + +- sp = krb5_storage_from_readonly_mem((const char *)data->data + attributes_info->offset_lo, ++ sp = krb5_storage_from_readonly_mem((const char *)data->data + attributes_info->offset, + attributes_info->buffersize); + if (sp == NULL) + return krb5_enomem(context); +@@ -1147,11 +1247,11 @@ krb5_pac_verify(krb5_context context, + if (ret) + return ret; + +- memset((char *)copy->data + pac->server_checksum->offset_lo + 4, ++ memset((char *)copy->data + pac->server_checksum->offset + 4, + 0, + pac->server_checksum->buffersize - 4); + +- memset((char *)copy->data + pac->privsvr_checksum->offset_lo + 4, ++ memset((char *)copy->data + pac->privsvr_checksum->offset + 4, + 0, + pac->privsvr_checksum->buffersize - 4); + +@@ -1171,7 +1271,7 @@ krb5_pac_verify(krb5_context context, + pac->privsvr_checksum, + &pac->data, + (char *)pac->data.data +- + pac->server_checksum->offset_lo + 4, ++ + pac->server_checksum->offset + 4, + pac->server_checksum->buffersize - 4, + privsvr); + if (ret) +@@ -1286,13 +1386,20 @@ _krb5_pac_sign(krb5_context context, + size_t server_size, priv_size; + uint32_t server_offset = 0, priv_offset = 0, ticket_offset = 0; + uint32_t server_cksumtype = 0, priv_cksumtype = 0; +- int num = 0; +- size_t i, sz; ++ uint32_t num = 0; ++ uint32_t i, sz; + krb5_data logon, d; + + krb5_data_zero(&d); + krb5_data_zero(&logon); + ++ /* ++ * Set convenience buffer pointers. ++ * ++ * This could really stand to be moved to krb5_pac_add_buffer() and/or ++ * utility function, so that when this function gets called they must ++ * already have been set. ++ */ + for (i = 0; i < p->pac->numbuffers; i++) { + if (p->pac->buffers[i].type == PAC_SERVER_CHECKSUM) { + if (p->server_checksum == NULL) { +@@ -1357,6 +1464,7 @@ _krb5_pac_sign(krb5_context context, + } + } + ++ /* Count missing-but-necessary buffers */ + if (p->logon_name == NULL) + num++; + if (p->server_checksum == NULL) +@@ -1366,35 +1474,45 @@ _krb5_pac_sign(krb5_context context, + if (p->ticket_sign_data.length != 0 && p->ticket_checksum == NULL) + num++; + ++ /* Allocate any missing-but-necessary buffers */ + if (num) { + void *ptr; ++ uint32_t old_len, len; + +- ptr = realloc(p->pac, sizeof(*p->pac) + (sizeof(p->pac->buffers[0]) * (p->pac->numbuffers + num - 1))); ++ if (p->pac->numbuffers > UINT32_MAX - num) { ++ ret = EINVAL; ++ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "integer overrun"); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ret = pac_header_size(context, p->pac->numbuffers, &old_len); ++ if (ret == 0) ++ ret = pac_header_size(context, p->pac->numbuffers + num, &len); ++ if (ret) ++ goto out; ++ ++ ptr = realloc(p->pac, len); + if (ptr == NULL) { + ret = krb5_enomem(context); + goto out; + } +- ++ memset((char *)ptr + old_len, 0, len - old_len); + p->pac = ptr; + ++ + if (p->logon_name == NULL) { + p->logon_name = &p->pac->buffers[p->pac->numbuffers++]; +- memset(p->logon_name, 0, sizeof(*p->logon_name)); + p->logon_name->type = PAC_LOGON_NAME; + } + if (p->server_checksum == NULL) { + p->server_checksum = &p->pac->buffers[p->pac->numbuffers++]; +- memset(p->server_checksum, 0, sizeof(*p->server_checksum)); + p->server_checksum->type = PAC_SERVER_CHECKSUM; + } + if (p->privsvr_checksum == NULL) { + p->privsvr_checksum = &p->pac->buffers[p->pac->numbuffers++]; +- memset(p->privsvr_checksum, 0, sizeof(*p->privsvr_checksum)); + p->privsvr_checksum->type = PAC_PRIVSVR_CHECKSUM; + } + if (p->ticket_sign_data.length != 0 && p->ticket_checksum == NULL) { + p->ticket_checksum = &p->pac->buffers[p->pac->numbuffers++]; +- memset(p->ticket_checksum, 0, sizeof(*p->ticket_checksum)); + p->ticket_checksum->type = PAC_TICKET_CHECKSUM; + } + } +@@ -1428,11 +1546,36 @@ _krb5_pac_sign(krb5_context context, + + krb5_storage_set_flags(spdata, KRB5_STORAGE_BYTEORDER_LE); + ++ /* `sp' has the header, `spdata' has the buffers */ + CHECK(ret, krb5_store_uint32(sp, p->pac->numbuffers), out); + CHECK(ret, krb5_store_uint32(sp, p->pac->version), out); + +- end = PACTYPE_SIZE + (PAC_INFO_BUFFER_SIZE * p->pac->numbuffers); ++ ret = pac_header_size(context, p->pac->numbuffers, &end); ++ if (ret) ++ goto out; + ++ /* ++ * For each buffer we write its contents to `spdata' and then append the ++ * PAC_INFO_BUFFER for that buffer into the header in `sp'. The logical ++ * end of the whole thing is kept in `end', which functions as the offset ++ * to write in the buffer's PAC_INFO_BUFFER, then we update it at the ++ * bottom so that the next buffer can be written there. ++ * ++ * TODO? Maybe rewrite all of this so that: ++ * ++ * - we use krb5_pac_add_buffer() to add the buffers we produce ++ * - we use the krb5_data of the concatenated buffers that's maintained by ++ * krb5_pac_add_buffer() so we don't need `spdata' here ++ * ++ * We do way too much here, and that makes this code hard to read. Plus we ++ * throw away all the work done in krb5_pac_add_buffer(). On the other ++ * hand, krb5_pac_add_buffer() has to loop over all the buffers, so if we ++ * call krb5_pac_add_buffer() here in a loop, we'll be accidentally ++ * quadratic, but we only need to loop over adding the buffers we add, ++ * which is very few, so not quite quadratic. We should also cap the ++ * number of buffers we're willing to accept in a PAC we parse to something ++ * reasonable, like a few tens. ++ */ + for (i = 0; i < p->pac->numbuffers; i++) { + uint32_t len; + size_t sret; +@@ -1441,26 +1584,66 @@ _krb5_pac_sign(krb5_context context, + /* store data */ + + if (p->pac->buffers[i].type == PAC_SERVER_CHECKSUM) { ++ if (server_size > UINT32_MAX - 4) { ++ ret = EINVAL; ++ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "integer overrun"); ++ goto out; ++ } + len = server_size + 4; ++ if (end > UINT32_MAX - 4) { ++ ret = EINVAL; ++ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "integer overrun"); ++ goto out; ++ } + server_offset = end + 4; + CHECK(ret, krb5_store_uint32(spdata, server_cksumtype), out); + CHECK(ret, fill_zeros(context, spdata, server_size), out); + } else if (p->pac->buffers[i].type == PAC_PRIVSVR_CHECKSUM) { ++ if (priv_size > UINT32_MAX - 4) { ++ ret = EINVAL; ++ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "integer overrun"); ++ goto out; ++ } + len = priv_size + 4; ++ if (end > UINT32_MAX - 4) { ++ ret = EINVAL; ++ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "integer overrun"); ++ goto out; ++ } + priv_offset = end + 4; + CHECK(ret, krb5_store_uint32(spdata, priv_cksumtype), out); + CHECK(ret, fill_zeros(context, spdata, priv_size), out); + if (rodc_id != 0) { ++ if (len > UINT32_MAX - sizeof(rodc_id)) { ++ ret = EINVAL; ++ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "integer overrun"); ++ goto out; ++ } + len += sizeof(rodc_id); + CHECK(ret, fill_zeros(context, spdata, sizeof(rodc_id)), out); + } + } else if (p->ticket_sign_data.length != 0 && + p->pac->buffers[i].type == PAC_TICKET_CHECKSUM) { ++ if (priv_size > UINT32_MAX - 4) { ++ ret = EINVAL; ++ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "integer overrun"); ++ goto out; ++ } + len = priv_size + 4; ++ if (end > UINT32_MAX - 4) { ++ ret = EINVAL; ++ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "integer overrun"); ++ goto out; ++ } + ticket_offset = end + 4; + CHECK(ret, krb5_store_uint32(spdata, priv_cksumtype), out); + CHECK(ret, fill_zeros(context, spdata, priv_size), out); + if (rodc_id != 0) { ++ if (len > UINT32_MAX - sizeof(rodc_id)) { ++ ret = EINVAL; ++ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "integer overrun"); ++ goto out; ++ } + len += sizeof(rodc_id); + CHECK(ret, krb5_store_uint16(spdata, rodc_id), out); + } +@@ -1472,7 +1655,7 @@ _krb5_pac_sign(krb5_context context, + } + } else { + len = p->pac->buffers[i].buffersize; +- ptr = (char *)p->data.data + p->pac->buffers[i].offset_lo; ++ ptr = (char *)p->data.data + p->pac->buffers[i].offset; + + sret = krb5_storage_write(spdata, ptr, len); + if (sret != len) { +@@ -1485,18 +1668,17 @@ _krb5_pac_sign(krb5_context context, + /* write header */ + CHECK(ret, krb5_store_uint32(sp, p->pac->buffers[i].type), out); + CHECK(ret, krb5_store_uint32(sp, len), out); +- CHECK(ret, krb5_store_uint32(sp, end), out); +- CHECK(ret, krb5_store_uint32(sp, 0), out); ++ CHECK(ret, krb5_store_uint64(sp, end), out); /* offset */ + + /* advance data endpointer and align */ + { +- int32_t e; ++ uint32_t e; + +- end += len; +- e = ((end + PAC_ALIGNMENT - 1) / PAC_ALIGNMENT) * PAC_ALIGNMENT; +- if ((int32_t)end != e) { +- CHECK(ret, fill_zeros(context, spdata, e - end), out); +- } ++ ret = pac_aligned_size(context, end, len, &e); ++ if (ret == 0 && end + len != e) ++ ret = fill_zeros(context, spdata, e - (end + len)); ++ if (ret) ++ goto out; + end = e; + } + +@@ -1596,7 +1778,7 @@ krb5_pac_get_kdc_checksum_info(krb5_context context, + return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION; + } + +- sp = krb5_storage_from_mem((char *)pac->data.data + sig->offset_lo, ++ sp = krb5_storage_from_mem((char *)pac->data.data + sig->offset, + sig->buffersize); + if (sp == NULL) + return krb5_enomem(context); +diff --git a/third_party/heimdal/lib/krb5/test_pac.c b/third_party/heimdal/lib/krb5/test_pac.c +index 51b4fff16fc..70da1cb6266 100644 +--- a/third_party/heimdal/lib/krb5/test_pac.c ++++ b/third_party/heimdal/lib/krb5/test_pac.c +@@ -838,6 +838,7 @@ check_ticket_signature(krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto; + krb5_data data, orig_pac_ad; + Ticket ticket; ++ AuthorizationDataElement ad; + EncTicketPart et; + krb5_principal client; + krb5_pac pac; +@@ -889,8 +890,10 @@ check_ticket_signature(krb5_context context, + heim_assert(rodc_id == tkt->rodc_id, "Wrong RODCIdentifier"); + + /* Try to resign the PAC */ +- orig_pac_ad = et.authorization_data->val[0].ad_data; +- et.authorization_data->val[0].ad_data.data = NULL; ++ ret = copy_AuthorizationDataElement(&et.authorization_data->val[0], &ad); ++ if (ret) ++ t_err(context, tkt->name, "remove_AuthorizationData", ret); ++ orig_pac_ad = ad.ad_data; + + ret = remove_AuthorizationData(et.authorization_data, 0); + if (ret) +@@ -905,6 +908,8 @@ check_ticket_signature(krb5_context context, + heim_assert(krb5_data_cmp(&et.authorization_data->val[0].ad_data, + &orig_pac_ad) == 0, "PACs differ"); + ++ free_AuthorizationDataElement(&ad); ++ + /* Sign and verify a clean PAC */ + krb5_pac_free(context, pac); + ret = krb5_pac_init(context, &pac); +@@ -958,6 +963,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) + krb5_pac pac; + krb5_data data; + krb5_principal p, p2; ++ unsigned char bad_pac[sizeof(saved_pac)]; + + ret = krb5_init_context(&context); + if (ret) +@@ -970,6 +976,44 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) + if (ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_parse_name"); + ++ /* Attempt to parse a truncated PAC */ ++ ret = krb5_pac_parse(context, saved_pac, sizeof(saved_pac) >> 1, &pac); ++ if (ret == 0) ++ krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_pac_parse parsed a short PAC"); ++ ++ /* Attempt to parse a PAC with a buffer claiming too large a length */ ++ memcpy(bad_pac, saved_pac, sizeof(saved_pac)); ++ bad_pac[13] += 1; ++ ++ ret = krb5_pac_parse(context, bad_pac, sizeof(saved_pac), &pac); ++ if (ret == 0) ++ krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_pac_parse parsed a malicious PAC"); ++ ++ /* Attempt to parse a PAC with a buffer offset too far in */ ++ memcpy(bad_pac, saved_pac, sizeof(saved_pac)); ++ bad_pac[16] += 1; ++ ++ ret = krb5_pac_parse(context, bad_pac, sizeof(saved_pac), &pac); ++ if (ret == 0) ++ krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_pac_parse parsed a malicious PAC"); ++ ++ /* Attempt to parse a PAC with a buffer offset too far back */ ++ memcpy(bad_pac, saved_pac, sizeof(saved_pac)); ++ bad_pac[16] -= 1; ++ ++ ret = krb5_pac_parse(context, bad_pac, sizeof(saved_pac), &pac); ++ if (ret == 0) ++ krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_pac_parse parsed a malicious PAC"); ++ ++ /* Attempt to parse a PAC with an incorrect buffer count */ ++ memcpy(bad_pac, saved_pac, sizeof(saved_pac)); ++ bad_pac[0] += 1; ++ ++ ret = krb5_pac_parse(context, bad_pac, sizeof(saved_pac), &pac); ++ if (ret == 0) ++ krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_pac_parse parsed a malicious PAC"); ++ ++ /* Parse a well-formed PAC */ + ret = krb5_pac_parse(context, saved_pac, sizeof(saved_pac), &pac); + if (ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_pac_parse"); +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/samba.spec b/samba.spec index 25638f480bc83d53d6c31db864958a9a656e07e6..0a894916242d9a22ae502fec70130fec265f1b09 100644 --- a/samba.spec +++ b/samba.spec @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ Name: samba Version: 4.17.2 -Release: 1 +Release: 2 Summary: A suite for Linux to interoperate with Windows License: GPLv3+ and LGPLv3+ @@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ Source8: usershares.conf.vendor Source201: README.downgrade +Patch0001: backport-CVE-2022-42898-third_party-heimdal-PAC-parse-integer.patch BuildRequires: avahi-devel bison dbus-devel docbook-style-xsl e2fsprogs-devel flex gawk gnupg2 gnutls-devel >= 3.4.7 gpgme-devel BuildRequires: jansson-devel krb5-devel >= %{required_mit_krb5} libacl-devel libaio-devel libarchive-devel libattr-devel @@ -3468,6 +3469,12 @@ fi %endif %changelog +* Mon Nov 21 2022 zhouyihang - 4.17.2-2 +- Type:cves +- ID:CVE-2022-42898 +- SUG:NA +- DESC:fix CVE-2022-42898 + * Tue Nov 08 2022 xinghe - 4.17.2-1 - Type:enhancement - ID:NA