一、漏洞信息
漏洞编号:CVE-2024-26923
漏洞归属组件:kernel
漏洞归属的版本:4.19.140,4.19.194,4.19.90,5.10.0,6.1.0,6.1.14,6.1.19,6.1.5,6.1.6,6.1.8,6.4.0,6.6.0
CVSS V2.0分值:
BaseScore:0.0 Low
Vector:CVSS:2.0/
漏洞简述:
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:af_unix: Fix garbage collector racing against connect()Garbage collector does not take into account the risk of embryo gettingenqueued during the garbage collection. If such embryo has a peer thatcarries SCM_RIGHTS, two consecutive passes of scan_children() may see adifferent set of children. Leading to an incorrectly elevated inflightcount, and then a dangling pointer within the gc_inflight_list.sockets are AF_UNIX/SOCK_STREAMS is an unconnected socketL is a listening in-flight socket bound to addr, not in fdtableV s fd will be passed via sendmsg(), gets inflight count bumpedconnect(S, addr) sendmsg(S, [V]); close(V) __unix_gc()---------------- ------------------------- -----------NS = unix_create1()skb1 = sock_wmalloc(NS)L = unix_find_other(addr)unix_state_lock(L)unix_peer(S) = NS // V count=1 inflight=0 NS = unix_peer(S) skb2 = sock_alloc() skb_queue_tail(NS, skb2[V]) // V became in-flight // V count=2 inflight=1 close(V) // V count=1 inflight=1 // GC candidate condition met for u in gc_inflight_list: if (total_refs == inflight_refs) add u to gc_candidates // gc_candidates={L, V} for u in gc_candidates: scan_children(u, dec_inflight) // embryo (skb1) was not // reachable from L yet, so V s // inflight remains unchanged__skb_queue_tail(L, skb1)unix_state_unlock(L) for u in gc_candidates: if (u.inflight) scan_children(u, inc_inflight_move_tail) // V count=1 inflight=2 (!)If there is a GC-candidate listening socket, lock/unlock its state. Thismakes GC wait until the end of any ongoing connect() to that socket. Afterflipping the lock, a possibly SCM-laden embryo is already enqueued. And ifthere is another embryo coming, it can not possibly carry SCM_RIGHTS. Atthis point, unix_inflight() can not happen because unix_gc_lock is alreadytaken. Inflight graph remains unaffected.
漏洞公开时间:2024-04-25 14:15:57
漏洞创建时间:2024-04-25 07:28:43
漏洞详情参考链接:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-26923
漏洞分析指导链接:
https://gitee.com/openeuler/cve-manager/blob/master/cve-vulner-manager/doc/md/manual.md
漏洞数据来源:
openBrain开源漏洞感知系统
漏洞补丁信息:
二、漏洞分析结构反馈
影响性分析说明:
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:af_unix: Fix garbage collector racing against connect()Garbage collector does not take into account the risk of embryo gettingenqueued during the garbage collection. If such embryo has a peer thatcarries SCM_RIGHTS, two consecutive passes of scan_children() may see adifferent set of children. Leading to an incorrectly elevated inflightcount, and then a dangling pointer within the gc_inflight_list.sockets are AF_UNIX/SOCK_STREAMS is an unconnected socketL is a listening in-flight socket bound to addr, not in fdtableV s fd will be passed via sendmsg(), gets inflight count bumpedconnect(S, addr)sendmsg(S, [V]); close(V)__unix_gc()----------------------------------------------------NS = unix_create1()skb1 = sock_wmalloc(NS)L = unix_find_other(addr)unix_state_lock(L)unix_peer(S) = NS// V count=1 inflight=0 NS = unix_peer(S) skb2 = sock_alloc()skb_queue_tail(NS, skb2[V])// V became in-flight// V count=2 inflight=1close(V)// V count=1 inflight=1// GC candidate condition metfor u in gc_inflight_list: if (total_refs == inflight_refs) add u to gc_candidates// gc_candidates={L, V}for u in gc_candidates: scan_children(u, dec_inflight)// embryo (skb1) was not// reachable from L yet, so V s// inflight remains unchanged__skb_queue_tail(L, skb1)unix_state_unlock(L)for u in gc_candidates: if (u.inflight) scan_children(u, inc_inflight_move_tail)// V count=1 inflight=2 (!)If there is a GC-candidate listening socket, lock/unlock its state. Thismakes GC wait until the end of any ongoing connect() to that socket. Afterflipping the lock, a possibly SCM-laden embryo is already enqueued. And ifthere is another embryo coming, it can not possibly carry SCM_RIGHTS. Atthis point, unix_inflight() can not happen because unix_gc_lock is alreadytaken. Inflight graph remains unaffected.
openEuler评分:
7.0
Vector:CVSS:2.0/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
受影响版本排查(受影响/不受影响):
1.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP1(4.19.90):受影响
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:受影响
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS(5.10.0):受影响
4.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1(5.10.0):受影响
5.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2(5.10.0):受影响
6.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:受影响
7.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响
8.master(6.1.0):不受影响
9.openEuler-22.03-LTS-Next(5.10.0):不受影响
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS(6.6.0):不受影响
11.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next(6.6.0):不受影响
修复是否涉及abi变化(是/否):
1.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP1(4.19.90):否
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:否
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS(5.10.0):否
4.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1(5.10.0):否
5.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2(5.10.0):否
6.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:否
7.master(6.1.0):否
8.openEuler-22.03-LTS-Next(5.10.0):否
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS(6.6.0):否
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next(6.6.0):否
11.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:否
三、漏洞修复
安全公告链接:https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/safety-bulletin/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1681
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影响性分析说明:
openEuler评分: (评分和向量)
受影响版本排查(受影响/不受影响):
1.master(6.1.0):
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP1(4.19.90):
3.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4(4.19.90):
4.openEuler-22.03-LTS(5.10.0):
5.openEuler-22.03-LTS-Next(5.10.0):
6.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1(5.10.0):
7.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2(5.10.0):
8.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3(5.10.0):
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS:
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:
修复是否涉及abi变化(是/否):
1.master(6.1.0):
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP1(4.19.90):
3.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4(4.19.90):
4.openEuler-22.03-LTS(5.10.0):
5.openEuler-22.03-LTS-Next(5.10.0):
6.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1(5.10.0):
7.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2(5.10.0):
8.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3(5.10.0):
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS:
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:
issue处理具体操作请参考:
https://gitee.com/openeuler/cve-manager/blob/master/cve-vulner-manager/doc/md/manual.md
pr关联issue具体操作请参考:
https://gitee.com/help/articles/4142
参考网址 | 关联pr | 状态 | 补丁链接 |
---|---|---|---|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-26923 | |||
https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2024-26923 | None | None | https://discourse.ubuntu.com/c/ubuntu-pro |
https://www.opencve.io/cve/CVE-2024-26923 | |||
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2024-26923 | |||
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2024-26923 |
说明:补丁链接仅供初步排查参考,实际可用性请人工再次确认,补丁下载验证可使用CVE补丁工具。
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请确认分支信息是否填写完整,否则将无法关闭当前issue.
CVE-2024-26923
影响性分析说明:
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
af_unix: Fix garbage collector racing against connect()
Garbage collector does not take into account the risk of embryo getting
enqueued during the garbage collection. If such embryo has a peer that
carries SCM_RIGHTS, two consecutive passes of scan_children() may see a
different set of children. Leading to an incorrectly elevated inflight
count, and then a dangling pointer within the gc_inflight_list.
sockets are AF_UNIX/SOCK_STREAM
S is an unconnected socket
L is a listening in-flight socket bound to addr, not in fdtable
V's fd will be passed via sendmsg(), gets inflight count bumped
connect(S, addr) sendmsg(S, [V]); close(V) __unix_gc()
NS = unix_create1()
skb1 = sock_wmalloc(NS)
L = unix_find_other(addr)
unix_state_lock(L)
unix_peer(S) = NS
// V count=1 inflight=0
NS = unix_peer(S)
skb2 = sock_alloc()
skb_queue_tail(NS, skb2[V])
// V became in-flight
// V count=2 inflight=1
close(V)
// V count=1 inflight=1
// GC candidate condition met
for u in gc_inflight_list:
if (total_refs == inflight_refs)
add u to gc_candidates
// gc_candidates={L, V}
for u in gc_candidates:
scan_children(u, dec_inflight)
// embryo (skb1) was not
// reachable from L yet, so V's
// inflight remains unchanged
__skb_queue_tail(L, skb1)
unix_state_unlock(L)
for u in gc_candidates:
if (u.inflight)
scan_children(u, inc_inflight_move_tail)
// V count=1 inflight=2 (!)
If there is a GC-candidate listening socket, lock/unlock its state. This
makes GC wait until the end of any ongoing connect() to that socket. After
flipping the lock, a possibly SCM-laden embryo is already enqueued. And if
there is another embryo coming, it can not possibly carry SCM_RIGHTS. At
this point, unix_inflight() can not happen because unix_gc_lock is already
taken. Inflight graph remains unaffected.
openEuler评分:(评分和向量)
7.0
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
受影响版本排查(受影响/不受影响):
1.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP1:受影响
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:受影响
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS:受影响
4.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1:受影响
5.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2:受影响
6.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:受影响
7.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:不受影响
8.master(6.1.0):不受影响
9.openEuler-22.03-LTS-Next:不受影响
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS:不受影响
11.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响
修复是否涉及abi变化(是/否):
1.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP1(4.19.90):否
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:否
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS:否
4.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1:否
5.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2:否
6.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:否
7.master(6.1.0):否
8.openEuler-22.03-LTS-Next:否
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS:否
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:否
11.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:否
===========================================================
@ 经过 cve-manager 解析, 已分析的内容如下表所示:
状态 | 需分析 | 内容 |
---|---|---|
已分析 | 1.影响性分析说明 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:af_unix: Fix garbage collector racing against connect()Garbage collector does not take into account the risk of embryo gettingenqueued during the garbage collection. If such embryo has a peer thatcarries SCM_RIGHTS, two consecutive passes of scan_children() may see adifferent set of children. Leading to an incorrectly elevated inflightcount, and then a dangling pointer within the gc_inflight_list.sockets are AF_UNIX/SOCK_STREAMS is an unconnected socketL is a listening in-flight socket bound to addr, not in fdtableV's fd will be passed via sendmsg(), gets inflight count bumpedconnect(S, addr)sendmsg(S, [V]); close(V)__unix_gc()----------------------------------------------------NS = unix_create1()skb1 = sock_wmalloc(NS)L = unix_find_other(addr)unix_state_lock(L)unix_peer(S) = NS// V count=1 inflight=0 NS = unix_peer(S) skb2 = sock_alloc()skb_queue_tail(NS, skb2[V])// V became in-flight// V count=2 inflight=1close(V)// V count=1 inflight=1// GC candidate condition metfor u in gc_inflight_list: if (total_refs == inflight_refs) add u to gc_candidates// gc_candidates={L, V}for u in gc_candidates: scan_children(u, dec_inflight)// embryo (skb1) was not// reachable from L yet, so V's// inflight remains unchanged__skb_queue_tail(L, skb1)unix_state_unlock(L)for u in gc_candidates: if (u.inflight) scan_children(u, inc_inflight_move_tail)// V count=1 inflight=2 (!)If there is a GC-candidate listening socket, lock/unlock its state. Thismakes GC wait until the end of any ongoing connect() to that socket. Afterflipping the lock, a possibly SCM-laden embryo is already enqueued. And ifthere is another embryo coming, it can not possibly carry SCM_RIGHTS. Atthis point, unix_inflight() can not happen because unix_gc_lock is alreadytaken. Inflight graph remains unaffected. |
已分析 | 2.openEulerScore | 7 |
已分析 | 3.openEulerVector | AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
已分析 | 4.受影响版本排查 | openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP1:受影响,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:受影响,openEuler-22.03-LTS:受影响,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1:受影响,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2:受影响,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:受影响,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:不受影响,master:不受影响,openEuler-22.03-LTS-Next:不受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS:不受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响 |
已分析 | 5.修复是否涉及abi变化 | openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP1:否,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:否,openEuler-22.03-LTS:否,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1:否,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2:否,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:否,master:否,openEuler-22.03-LTS-Next:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:否,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:否 |
请确认分析内容的准确性, 确认无误后, 您可以进行后续步骤, 否则您可以继续分析.
CVE-2024-26923
影响性分析说明:
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
af_unix: Fix garbage collector racing against connect()
Garbage collector does not take into account the risk of embryo getting
enqueued during the garbage collection. If such embryo has a peer that
carries SCM_RIGHTS, two consecutive passes of scan_children() may see a
different set of children. Leading to an incorrectly elevated inflight
count, and then a dangling pointer within the gc_inflight_list.
sockets are AF_UNIX/SOCK_STREAM
S is an unconnected socket
L is a listening in-flight socket bound to addr, not in fdtable
V's fd will be passed via sendmsg(), gets inflight count bumped
connect(S, addr) sendmsg(S, [V]); close(V) __unix_gc()
NS = unix_create1()
skb1 = sock_wmalloc(NS)
L = unix_find_other(addr)
unix_state_lock(L)
unix_peer(S) = NS
// V count=1 inflight=0
NS = unix_peer(S)
skb2 = sock_alloc()
skb_queue_tail(NS, skb2[V])
// V became in-flight
// V count=2 inflight=1
close(V)
// V count=1 inflight=1
// GC candidate condition met
for u in gc_inflight_list:
if (total_refs == inflight_refs)
add u to gc_candidates
// gc_candidates={L, V}
for u in gc_candidates:
scan_children(u, dec_inflight)
// embryo (skb1) was not
// reachable from L yet, so V's
// inflight remains unchanged
__skb_queue_tail(L, skb1)
unix_state_unlock(L)
for u in gc_candidates:
if (u.inflight)
scan_children(u, inc_inflight_move_tail)
// V count=1 inflight=2 (!)
If there is a GC-candidate listening socket, lock/unlock its state. This
makes GC wait until the end of any ongoing connect() to that socket. After
flipping the lock, a possibly SCM-laden embryo is already enqueued. And if
there is another embryo coming, it can not possibly carry SCM_RIGHTS. At
this point, unix_inflight() can not happen because unix_gc_lock is already
taken. Inflight graph remains unaffected.
openEuler评分:(评分和向量)
7.0
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
受影响版本排查(受影响/不受影响):
1.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP1:受影响
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:受影响
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS:受影响
4.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1:受影响
5.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2:受影响
6.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:受影响
7.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响
8.master(6.1.0):不受影响
9.openEuler-22.03-LTS-Next:不受影响
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS:不受影响
11.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响
修复是否涉及abi变化(是/否):
1.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP1(4.19.90):否
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:否
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS:否
4.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1:否
5.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2:否
6.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:否
7.master(6.1.0):否
8.openEuler-22.03-LTS-Next:否
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS:否
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:否
11.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:否
===========================================================
@ 经过 cve-manager 解析, 已分析的内容如下表所示:
状态 | 需分析 | 内容 |
---|---|---|
已分析 | 1.影响性分析说明 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:af_unix: Fix garbage collector racing against connect()Garbage collector does not take into account the risk of embryo gettingenqueued during the garbage collection. If such embryo has a peer thatcarries SCM_RIGHTS, two consecutive passes of scan_children() may see adifferent set of children. Leading to an incorrectly elevated inflightcount, and then a dangling pointer within the gc_inflight_list.sockets are AF_UNIX/SOCK_STREAMS is an unconnected socketL is a listening in-flight socket bound to addr, not in fdtableV's fd will be passed via sendmsg(), gets inflight count bumpedconnect(S, addr)sendmsg(S, [V]); close(V)__unix_gc()----------------------------------------------------NS = unix_create1()skb1 = sock_wmalloc(NS)L = unix_find_other(addr)unix_state_lock(L)unix_peer(S) = NS// V count=1 inflight=0 NS = unix_peer(S) skb2 = sock_alloc()skb_queue_tail(NS, skb2[V])// V became in-flight// V count=2 inflight=1close(V)// V count=1 inflight=1// GC candidate condition metfor u in gc_inflight_list: if (total_refs == inflight_refs) add u to gc_candidates// gc_candidates={L, V}for u in gc_candidates: scan_children(u, dec_inflight)// embryo (skb1) was not// reachable from L yet, so V's// inflight remains unchanged__skb_queue_tail(L, skb1)unix_state_unlock(L)for u in gc_candidates: if (u.inflight) scan_children(u, inc_inflight_move_tail)// V count=1 inflight=2 (!)If there is a GC-candidate listening socket, lock/unlock its state. Thismakes GC wait until the end of any ongoing connect() to that socket. Afterflipping the lock, a possibly SCM-laden embryo is already enqueued. And ifthere is another embryo coming, it can not possibly carry SCM_RIGHTS. Atthis point, unix_inflight() can not happen because unix_gc_lock is alreadytaken. Inflight graph remains unaffected. |
已分析 | 2.openEulerScore | 7 |
已分析 | 3.openEulerVector | AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
已分析 | 4.受影响版本排查 | openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP1:受影响,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:受影响,openEuler-22.03-LTS:受影响,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1:受影响,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2:受影响,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:受影响,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响,master:不受影响,openEuler-22.03-LTS-Next:不受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS:不受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响 |
已分析 | 5.修复是否涉及abi变化 | openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP1:否,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:否,openEuler-22.03-LTS:否,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1:否,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2:否,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:否,master:否,openEuler-22.03-LTS-Next:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:否,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:否 |
请确认分析内容的准确性, 确认无误后, 您可以进行后续步骤, 否则您可以继续分析.
@成坚 (CHENG Jian) ,@Xie XiuQi ,@YangYingliang ,@pi3orama ,@jiaoff ,@郭梦琪
关闭issue前,需要将受影响的分支在合并pr时关联上当前issue编号: #I9JFG0:CVE-2024-26923
受影响分支: openEuler-22.03-LTS/openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1/openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2
具体操作参考: https://gitee.com/help/articles/4142
CVE-2024-26923
影响性分析说明:
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
af_unix: Fix garbage collector racing against connect()
Garbage collector does not take into account the risk of embryo getting
enqueued during the garbage collection. If such embryo has a peer that
carries SCM_RIGHTS, two consecutive passes of scan_children() may see a
different set of children. Leading to an incorrectly elevated inflight
count, and then a dangling pointer within the gc_inflight_list.
sockets are AF_UNIX/SOCK_STREAM
S is an unconnected socket
L is a listening in-flight socket bound to addr, not in fdtable
V's fd will be passed via sendmsg(), gets inflight count bumped
connect(S, addr) sendmsg(S, [V]); close(V) __unix_gc()
NS = unix_create1()
skb1 = sock_wmalloc(NS)
L = unix_find_other(addr)
unix_state_lock(L)
unix_peer(S) = NS
// V count=1 inflight=0
NS = unix_peer(S)
skb2 = sock_alloc()
skb_queue_tail(NS, skb2[V])
// V became in-flight
// V count=2 inflight=1
close(V)
// V count=1 inflight=1
// GC candidate condition met
for u in gc_inflight_list:
if (total_refs == inflight_refs)
add u to gc_candidates
// gc_candidates={L, V}
for u in gc_candidates:
scan_children(u, dec_inflight)
// embryo (skb1) was not
// reachable from L yet, so V's
// inflight remains unchanged
__skb_queue_tail(L, skb1)
unix_state_unlock(L)
for u in gc_candidates:
if (u.inflight)
scan_children(u, inc_inflight_move_tail)
// V count=1 inflight=2 (!)
If there is a GC-candidate listening socket, lock/unlock its state. This
makes GC wait until the end of any ongoing connect() to that socket. After
flipping the lock, a possibly SCM-laden embryo is already enqueued. And if
there is another embryo coming, it can not possibly carry SCM_RIGHTS. At
this point, unix_inflight() can not happen because unix_gc_lock is already
taken. Inflight graph remains unaffected.
openEuler评分:(评分和向量)
7.0
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
受影响版本排查(受影响/不受影响):
1.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP1:受影响
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:受影响
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS:受影响
4.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1:受影响
5.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2:受影响
6.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:受影响
7.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响
8.master(6.1.0):不受影响
9.openEuler-22.03-LTS-Next:不受影响
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS:不受影响
11.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响
修复是否涉及abi变化(是/否):
1.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP1(4.19.90):否
2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:否
3.openEuler-22.03-LTS:否
4.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1:否
5.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2:否
6.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:否
7.master(6.1.0):否
8.openEuler-22.03-LTS-Next:否
9.openEuler-24.03-LTS:否
10.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:否
11.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:否
===========================================================
@ 经过 cve-manager 解析, 已分析的内容如下表所示:
状态 | 需分析 | 内容 |
---|---|---|
已分析 | 1.影响性分析说明 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:af_unix: Fix garbage collector racing against connect()Garbage collector does not take into account the risk of embryo gettingenqueued during the garbage collection. If such embryo has a peer thatcarries SCM_RIGHTS, two consecutive passes of scan_children() may see adifferent set of children. Leading to an incorrectly elevated inflightcount, and then a dangling pointer within the gc_inflight_list.sockets are AF_UNIX/SOCK_STREAMS is an unconnected socketL is a listening in-flight socket bound to addr, not in fdtableV's fd will be passed via sendmsg(), gets inflight count bumpedconnect(S, addr)sendmsg(S, [V]); close(V)__unix_gc()----------------------------------------------------NS = unix_create1()skb1 = sock_wmalloc(NS)L = unix_find_other(addr)unix_state_lock(L)unix_peer(S) = NS// V count=1 inflight=0 NS = unix_peer(S) skb2 = sock_alloc()skb_queue_tail(NS, skb2[V])// V became in-flight// V count=2 inflight=1close(V)// V count=1 inflight=1// GC candidate condition metfor u in gc_inflight_list: if (total_refs == inflight_refs) add u to gc_candidates// gc_candidates={L, V}for u in gc_candidates: scan_children(u, dec_inflight)// embryo (skb1) was not// reachable from L yet, so V's// inflight remains unchanged__skb_queue_tail(L, skb1)unix_state_unlock(L)for u in gc_candidates: if (u.inflight) scan_children(u, inc_inflight_move_tail)// V count=1 inflight=2 (!)If there is a GC-candidate listening socket, lock/unlock its state. Thismakes GC wait until the end of any ongoing connect() to that socket. Afterflipping the lock, a possibly SCM-laden embryo is already enqueued. And ifthere is another embryo coming, it can not possibly carry SCM_RIGHTS. Atthis point, unix_inflight() can not happen because unix_gc_lock is alreadytaken. Inflight graph remains unaffected. |
已分析 | 2.openEulerScore | 7 |
已分析 | 3.openEulerVector | AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
已分析 | 4.受影响版本排查 | openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP1:受影响,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:受影响,openEuler-22.03-LTS:受影响,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1:受影响,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2:受影响,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:受影响,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:不受影响,master:不受影响,openEuler-22.03-LTS-Next:不受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS:不受影响,openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:不受影响 |
已分析 | 5.修复是否涉及abi变化 | openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP1:否,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4:否,openEuler-22.03-LTS:否,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1:否,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2:否,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3:否,master:否,openEuler-22.03-LTS-Next:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS:否,openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next:否,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4:否 |
请确认分析内容的准确性, 确认无误后, 您可以进行后续步骤, 否则您可以继续分析.
@成坚 (CHENG Jian) ,@Xie XiuQi ,@YangYingliang ,@pi3orama ,@jiaoff ,@openeuler-sync-bot
关闭issue前,需要将受影响的分支在合并pr时关联上当前issue编号: #I9JFG0:CVE-2024-26923
受影响分支: openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1/openEuler-22.03-LTS
具体操作参考: https://gitee.com/help/articles/4142
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