In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:tcp: Use refcount_inc_not_zero() in tcp_twsk_unique().Anderson Nascimento reported a use-after-free splat in tcp_twsk_unique()with nice analysis.Since commit ec94c2696f0b ( tcp/dccp: avoid one atomic operation fortimewait hashdance ), inet_twsk_hashdance() sets TIME-WAIT socket ssk_refcnt after putting it into ehash and releasing the bucket lock.Thus, there is a small race window where other threads could try toreuse the port during connect() and call sock_hold() in tcp_twsk_unique()for the TIME-WAIT socket with zero refcnt.If that happens, the refcnt taken by tcp_twsk_unique() is overwrittenand sock_put() will cause underflow, triggering a real use-after-freesomewhere else.To avoid the use-after-free, we need to use refcount_inc_not_zero() intcp_twsk_unique() and give up on reusing the port if it returns false.[0]:refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 Comm: trigger Not tainted 6.8.6-200.fc39.x86_64 #1Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS VMW201.00V.21805430.B64.2305221830 05/22/2023RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110Code: 42 8e ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d aa 13 ea 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 f8 8e b7 82 c6 05 96 13 ea 01 01 e8 7b 42 8e ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c7 50 8f b7 82 c6 05 7a 13 ea 01 01 e8RSP: 0018:ffffc90006b43b60 EFLAGS: 00010282RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888009bb3ef0 RCX: 0000000000000027RDX: ffff88807be218c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88807be218c0RBP: 0000000000069d70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc90006b439f0R10: ffffc90006b439e8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8880029ede84R13: 0000000000004e20 R14: ffffffff84356dc0 R15: ffff888009bb3ef0FS: 00007f62c10926c0(0000) GS:ffff88807be00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033CR2: 0000000020ccb000 CR3: 000000004628c005 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0PKRU: 55555554Call Trace: <TASK> ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? __warn+0x81/0x130 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80 ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 tcp_twsk_unique+0x186/0x190 __inet_check_established+0x176/0x2d0 __inet_hash_connect+0x74/0x7d0 ? __pfx___inet_check_established+0x10/0x10 tcp_v4_connect+0x278/0x530 __inet_stream_connect+0x10f/0x3d0 inet_stream_connect+0x3a/0x60 __sys_connect+0xa8/0xd0 __x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0x80RIP: 0033:0x7f62c11a885dCode: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a3 45 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48RSP: 002b:00007f62c1091e58 EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002aRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020ccb004 RCX: 00007f62c11a885dRDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020ccb000 RDI: 0000000000000003RBP: 00007f62c1091e90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000296 R12: 00007f62c10926c0R13: ffffffffffffff88 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffe237885b0 </TASK>
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:tcp: Use refcount_inc_not_zero() in tcp_twsk_unique().Anderson Nascimento reported a use-after-free splat in tcp_twsk_unique()with nice analysis.Since commit ec94c2696f0b ( tcp/dccp: avoid one atomic operation fortimewait hashdance ), inet_twsk_hashdance() sets TIME-WAIT socket ssk_refcnt after putting it into ehash and releasing the bucket lock.Thus, there is a small race window where other threads could try toreuse the port during connect() and call sock_hold() in tcp_twsk_unique()for the TIME-WAIT socket with zero refcnt.If that happens, the refcnt taken by tcp_twsk_unique() is overwrittenand sock_put() will cause underflow, triggering a real use-after-freesomewhere else.To avoid the use-after-free, we need to use refcount_inc_not_zero() intcp_twsk_unique() and give up on reusing the port if it returns false.[0]:refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 Comm: trigger Not tainted 6.8.6-200.fc39.x86_64 #1Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS VMW201.00V.21805430.B64.2305221830 05/22/2023RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110Code: 42 8e ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d aa 13 ea 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 f8 8e b7 82 c6 05 96 13 ea 01 01 e8 7b 42 8e ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c7 50 8f b7 82 c6 05 7a 13 ea 01 01 e8RSP: 0018:ffffc90006b43b60 EFLAGS: 00010282RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888009bb3ef0 RCX: 0000000000000027RDX: ffff88807be218c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88807be218c0RBP: 0000000000069d70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc90006b439f0R10: ffffc90006b439e8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8880029ede84R13: 0000000000004e20 R14: ffffffff84356dc0 R15: ffff888009bb3ef0FS: 00007f62c10926c0(0000) GS:ffff88807be00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033CR2: 0000000020ccb000 CR3: 000000004628c005 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0PKRU: 55555554Call Trace: <TASK> ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? __warn+0x81/0x130 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80 ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 tcp_twsk_unique+0x186/0x190 __inet_check_established+0x176/0x2d0 __inet_hash_connect+0x74/0x7d0 ? __pfx___inet_check_established+0x10/0x10 tcp_v4_connect+0x278/0x530 __inet_stream_connect+0x10f/0x3d0 inet_stream_connect+0x3a/0x60 __sys_connect+0xa8/0xd0 __x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0x80RIP: 0033:0x7f62c11a885dCode: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a3 45 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48RSP: 002b:00007f62c1091e58 EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002aRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020ccb004 RCX: 00007f62c11a885dRDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020ccb000 RDI: 0000000000000003RBP: 00007f62c1091e90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000296 R12: 00007f62c10926c0R13: ffffffffffffff88 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffe237885b0 </TASK>
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:tcp: Use refcount_inc_not_zero() in tcp_twsk_unique().Anderson Nascimento reported a use-after-free splat in tcp_twsk_unique()with nice analysis.Since commit ec94c2696f0b ( tcp/dccp: avoid one atomic operation fortimewait hashdance ), inet_twsk_hashdance() sets TIME-WAIT socket ssk_refcnt after putting it into ehash and releasing the bucket lock.Thus, there is a small race window where other threads could try toreuse the port during connect() and call sock_hold() in tcp_twsk_unique()for the TIME-WAIT socket with zero refcnt.If that happens, the refcnt taken by tcp_twsk_unique() is overwrittenand sock_put() will cause underflow, triggering a real use-after-freesomewhere else.To avoid the use-after-free, we need to use refcount_inc_not_zero() intcp_twsk_unique() and give up on reusing the port if it returns false.[0]:refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 Comm: trigger Not tainted 6.8.6-200.fc39.x86_64 #1Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS VMW201.00V.21805430.B64.2305221830 05/22/2023RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110Code: 42 8e ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d aa 13 ea 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 f8 8e b7 82 c6 05 96 13 ea 01 01 e8 7b 42 8e ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c7 50 8f b7 82 c6 05 7a 13 ea 01 01 e8RSP: 0018:ffffc90006b43b60 EFLAGS: 00010282RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888009bb3ef0 RCX: 0000000000000027RDX: ffff88807be218c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88807be218c0RBP: 0000000000069d70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc90006b439f0R10: ffffc90006b439e8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8880029ede84R13: 0000000000004e20 R14: ffffffff84356dc0 R15: ffff888009bb3ef0FS: 00007f62c10926c0(0000) GS:ffff88807be00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033CR2: 0000000020ccb000 CR3: 000000004628c005 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0PKRU: 55555554Call Trace: <TASK> ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? __warn+0x81/0x130 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80 ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 tcp_twsk_unique+0x186/0x190 __inet_check_established+0x176/0x2d0 __inet_hash_connect+0x74/0x7d0 ? __pfx___inet_check_established+0x10/0x10 tcp_v4_connect+0x278/0x530 __inet_stream_connect+0x10f/0x3d0 inet_stream_connect+0x3a/0x60 __sys_connect+0xa8/0xd0 __x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0x80RIP: 0033:0x7f62c11a885dCode: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a3 45 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48RSP: 002b:00007f62c1091e58 EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002aRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020ccb004 RCX: 00007f62c11a885dRDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020ccb000 RDI: 0000000000000003RBP: 00007f62c1091e90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000296 R12: 00007f62c10926c0R13: ffffffffffffff88 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffe237885b0 </TASK>
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:tcp: Use refcount_inc_not_zero() in tcp_twsk_unique().Anderson Nascimento reported a use-after-free splat in tcp_twsk_unique()with nice analysis.Since commit ec94c2696f0b ( tcp/dccp: avoid one atomic operation fortimewait hashdance ), inet_twsk_hashdance() sets TIME-WAIT socket ssk_refcnt after putting it into ehash and releasing the bucket lock.Thus, there is a small race window where other threads could try toreuse the port during connect() and call sock_hold() in tcp_twsk_unique()for the TIME-WAIT socket with zero refcnt.If that happens, the refcnt taken by tcp_twsk_unique() is overwrittenand sock_put() will cause underflow, triggering a real use-after-freesomewhere else.To avoid the use-after-free, we need to use refcount_inc_not_zero() intcp_twsk_unique() and give up on reusing the port if it returns false.[0]:refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 Comm: trigger Not tainted 6.8.6-200.fc39.x86_64 #1Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS VMW201.00V.21805430.B64.2305221830 05/22/2023RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110Code: 42 8e ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d aa 13 ea 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 f8 8e b7 82 c6 05 96 13 ea 01 01 e8 7b 42 8e ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c7 50 8f b7 82 c6 05 7a 13 ea 01 01 e8RSP: 0018:ffffc90006b43b60 EFLAGS: 00010282RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888009bb3ef0 RCX: 0000000000000027RDX: ffff88807be218c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88807be218c0RBP: 0000000000069d70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc90006b439f0R10: ffffc90006b439e8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8880029ede84R13: 0000000000004e20 R14: ffffffff84356dc0 R15: ffff888009bb3ef0FS: 00007f62c10926c0(0000) GS:ffff88807be00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033CR2: 0000000020ccb000 CR3: 000000004628c005 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0PKRU: 55555554Call Trace: <TASK> ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? __warn+0x81/0x130 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80 ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 tcp_twsk_unique+0x186/0x190 __inet_check_established+0x176/0x2d0 __inet_hash_connect+0x74/0x7d0 ? __pfx___inet_check_established+0x10/0x10 tcp_v4_connect+0x278/0x530 __inet_stream_connect+0x10f/0x3d0 inet_stream_connect+0x3a/0x60 __sys_connect+0xa8/0xd0 __x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0x80RIP: 0033:0x7f62c11a885dCode: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a3 45 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48RSP: 002b:00007f62c1091e58 EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002aRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020ccb004 RCX: 00007f62c11a885dRDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020ccb000 RDI: 0000000000000003RBP: 00007f62c1091e90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000296 R12: 00007f62c10926c0R13: ffffffffffffff88 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffe237885b0 </TASK>
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:tcp: Use refcount_inc_not_zero() in tcp_twsk_unique().Anderson Nascimento reported a use-after-free splat in tcp_twsk_unique()with nice analysis.Since commit ec94c2696f0b ( tcp/dccp: avoid one atomic operation fortimewait hashdance ), inet_twsk_hashdance() sets TIME-WAIT socket ssk_refcnt after putting it into ehash and releasing the bucket lock.Thus, there is a small race window where other threads could try toreuse the port during connect() and call sock_hold() in tcp_twsk_unique()for the TIME-WAIT socket with zero refcnt.If that happens, the refcnt taken by tcp_twsk_unique() is overwrittenand sock_put() will cause underflow, triggering a real use-after-freesomewhere else.To avoid the use-after-free, we need to use refcount_inc_not_zero() intcp_twsk_unique() and give up on reusing the port if it returns false.[0]:refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 Comm: trigger Not tainted 6.8.6-200.fc39.x86_64 #1Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS VMW201.00V.21805430.B64.2305221830 05/22/2023RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110Code: 42 8e ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d aa 13 ea 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 f8 8e b7 82 c6 05 96 13 ea 01 01 e8 7b 42 8e ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c7 50 8f b7 82 c6 05 7a 13 ea 01 01 e8RSP: 0018:ffffc90006b43b60 EFLAGS: 00010282RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888009bb3ef0 RCX: 0000000000000027RDX: ffff88807be218c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88807be218c0RBP: 0000000000069d70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc90006b439f0R10: ffffc90006b439e8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8880029ede84R13: 0000000000004e20 R14: ffffffff84356dc0 R15: ffff888009bb3ef0FS: 00007f62c10926c0(0000) GS:ffff88807be00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033CR2: 0000000020ccb000 CR3: 000000004628c005 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0PKRU: 55555554Call Trace: <TASK> ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? __warn+0x81/0x130 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80 ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 tcp_twsk_unique+0x186/0x190 __inet_check_established+0x176/0x2d0 __inet_hash_connect+0x74/0x7d0 ? __pfx___inet_check_established+0x10/0x10 tcp_v4_connect+0x278/0x530 __inet_stream_connect+0x10f/0x3d0 inet_stream_connect+0x3a/0x60 __sys_connect+0xa8/0xd0 __x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0x80RIP: 0033:0x7f62c11a885dCode: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a3 45 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48RSP: 002b:00007f62c1091e58 EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002aRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020ccb004 RCX: 00007f62c11a885dRDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020ccb000 RDI: 0000000000000003RBP: 00007f62c1091e90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000296 R12: 00007f62c10926c0R13: ffffffffffffff88 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffe237885b0 </TASK>
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:tcp: Use refcount_inc_not_zero() in tcp_twsk_unique().Anderson Nascimento reported a use-after-free splat in tcp_twsk_unique()with nice analysis.Since commit ec94c2696f0b ( tcp/dccp: avoid one atomic operation fortimewait hashdance ), inet_twsk_hashdance() sets TIME-WAIT socket ssk_refcnt after putting it into ehash and releasing the bucket lock.Thus, there is a small race window where other threads could try toreuse the port during connect() and call sock_hold() in tcp_twsk_unique()for the TIME-WAIT socket with zero refcnt.If that happens, the refcnt taken by tcp_twsk_unique() is overwrittenand sock_put() will cause underflow, triggering a real use-after-freesomewhere else.To avoid the use-after-free, we need to use refcount_inc_not_zero() intcp_twsk_unique() and give up on reusing the port if it returns false.[0]:refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 Comm: trigger Not tainted 6.8.6-200.fc39.x86_64 #1Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS VMW201.00V.21805430.B64.2305221830 05/22/2023RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110Code: 42 8e ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d aa 13 ea 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 f8 8e b7 82 c6 05 96 13 ea 01 01 e8 7b 42 8e ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c7 50 8f b7 82 c6 05 7a 13 ea 01 01 e8RSP: 0018:ffffc90006b43b60 EFLAGS: 00010282RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888009bb3ef0 RCX: 0000000000000027RDX: ffff88807be218c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88807be218c0RBP: 0000000000069d70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc90006b439f0R10: ffffc90006b439e8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8880029ede84R13: 0000000000004e20 R14: ffffffff84356dc0 R15: ffff888009bb3ef0FS: 00007f62c10926c0(0000) GS:ffff88807be00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033CR2: 0000000020ccb000 CR3: 000000004628c005 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0PKRU: 55555554Call Trace: <TASK> ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? __warn+0x81/0x130 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80 ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 tcp_twsk_unique+0x186/0x190 __inet_check_established+0x176/0x2d0 __inet_hash_connect+0x74/0x7d0 ? __pfx___inet_check_established+0x10/0x10 tcp_v4_connect+0x278/0x530 __inet_stream_connect+0x10f/0x3d0 inet_stream_connect+0x3a/0x60 __sys_connect+0xa8/0xd0 __x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0x80RIP: 0033:0x7f62c11a885dCode: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a3 45 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48RSP: 002b:00007f62c1091e58 EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002aRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020ccb004 RCX: 00007f62c11a885dRDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020ccb000 RDI: 0000000000000003RBP: 00007f62c1091e90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000296 R12: 00007f62c10926c0R13: ffffffffffffff88 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffe237885b0 </TASK>
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:tcp: Use refcount_inc_not_zero() in tcp_twsk_unique().Anderson Nascimento reported a use-after-free splat in tcp_twsk_unique()with nice analysis.Since commit ec94c2696f0b ( tcp/dccp: avoid one atomic operation fortimewait hashdance ), inet_twsk_hashdance() sets TIME-WAIT socket ssk_refcnt after putting it into ehash and releasing the bucket lock.Thus, there is a small race window where other threads could try toreuse the port during connect() and call sock_hold() in tcp_twsk_unique()for the TIME-WAIT socket with zero refcnt.If that happens, the refcnt taken by tcp_twsk_unique() is overwrittenand sock_put() will cause underflow, triggering a real use-after-freesomewhere else.To avoid the use-after-free, we need to use refcount_inc_not_zero() intcp_twsk_unique() and give up on reusing the port if it returns false.[0]:refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 Comm: trigger Not tainted 6.8.6-200.fc39.x86_64 #1Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS VMW201.00V.21805430.B64.2305221830 05/22/2023RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110Code: 42 8e ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d aa 13 ea 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 f8 8e b7 82 c6 05 96 13 ea 01 01 e8 7b 42 8e ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c7 50 8f b7 82 c6 05 7a 13 ea 01 01 e8RSP: 0018:ffffc90006b43b60 EFLAGS: 00010282RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888009bb3ef0 RCX: 0000000000000027RDX: ffff88807be218c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88807be218c0RBP: 0000000000069d70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc90006b439f0R10: ffffc90006b439e8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8880029ede84R13: 0000000000004e20 R14: ffffffff84356dc0 R15: ffff888009bb3ef0FS: 00007f62c10926c0(0000) GS:ffff88807be00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033CR2: 0000000020ccb000 CR3: 000000004628c005 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0PKRU: 55555554Call Trace: <TASK> ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? __warn+0x81/0x130 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80 ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 tcp_twsk_unique+0x186/0x190 __inet_check_established+0x176/0x2d0 __inet_hash_connect+0x74/0x7d0 ? __pfx___inet_check_established+0x10/0x10 tcp_v4_connect+0x278/0x530 __inet_stream_connect+0x10f/0x3d0 inet_stream_connect+0x3a/0x60 __sys_connect+0xa8/0xd0 __x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0x80RIP: 0033:0x7f62c11a885dCode: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a3 45 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48RSP: 002b:00007f62c1091e58 EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002aRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020ccb004 RCX: 00007f62c11a885dRDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020ccb000 RDI: 0000000000000003RBP: 00007f62c1091e90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000296 R12: 00007f62c10926c0R13: ffffffffffffff88 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffe237885b0 </TASK>
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:tcp: Use refcount_inc_not_zero() in tcp_twsk_unique().Anderson Nascimento reported a use-after-free splat in tcp_twsk_unique()with nice analysis.Since commit ec94c2696f0b ( tcp/dccp: avoid one atomic operation fortimewait hashdance ), inet_twsk_hashdance() sets TIME-WAIT socket ssk_refcnt after putting it into ehash and releasing the bucket lock.Thus, there is a small race window where other threads could try toreuse the port during connect() and call sock_hold() in tcp_twsk_unique()for the TIME-WAIT socket with zero refcnt.If that happens, the refcnt taken by tcp_twsk_unique() is overwrittenand sock_put() will cause underflow, triggering a real use-after-freesomewhere else.To avoid the use-after-free, we need to use refcount_inc_not_zero() intcp_twsk_unique() and give up on reusing the port if it returns false.[0]:refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 Comm: trigger Not tainted 6.8.6-200.fc39.x86_64 #1Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS VMW201.00V.21805430.B64.2305221830 05/22/2023RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110Code: 42 8e ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d aa 13 ea 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 f8 8e b7 82 c6 05 96 13 ea 01 01 e8 7b 42 8e ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c7 50 8f b7 82 c6 05 7a 13 ea 01 01 e8RSP: 0018:ffffc90006b43b60 EFLAGS: 00010282RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888009bb3ef0 RCX: 0000000000000027RDX: ffff88807be218c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88807be218c0RBP: 0000000000069d70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc90006b439f0R10: ffffc90006b439e8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8880029ede84R13: 0000000000004e20 R14: ffffffff84356dc0 R15: ffff888009bb3ef0FS: 00007f62c10926c0(0000) GS:ffff88807be00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033CR2: 0000000020ccb000 CR3: 000000004628c005 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0PKRU: 55555554Call Trace: <TASK> ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? __warn+0x81/0x130 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80 ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 tcp_twsk_unique+0x186/0x190 __inet_check_established+0x176/0x2d0 __inet_hash_connect+0x74/0x7d0 ? __pfx___inet_check_established+0x10/0x10 tcp_v4_connect+0x278/0x530 __inet_stream_connect+0x10f/0x3d0 inet_stream_connect+0x3a/0x60 __sys_connect+0xa8/0xd0 __x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0x80RIP: 0033:0x7f62c11a885dCode: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a3 45 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48RSP: 002b:00007f62c1091e58 EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002aRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020ccb004 RCX: 00007f62c11a885dRDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020ccb000 RDI: 0000000000000003RBP: 00007f62c1091e90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000296 R12: 00007f62c10926c0R13: ffffffffffffff88 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffe237885b0 </TASK>
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:tcp: Use refcount_inc_not_zero() in tcp_twsk_unique().Anderson Nascimento reported a use-after-free splat in tcp_twsk_unique()with nice analysis.Since commit ec94c2696f0b ( tcp/dccp: avoid one atomic operation fortimewait hashdance ), inet_twsk_hashdance() sets TIME-WAIT socket ssk_refcnt after putting it into ehash and releasing the bucket lock.Thus, there is a small race window where other threads could try toreuse the port during connect() and call sock_hold() in tcp_twsk_unique()for the TIME-WAIT socket with zero refcnt.If that happens, the refcnt taken by tcp_twsk_unique() is overwrittenand sock_put() will cause underflow, triggering a real use-after-freesomewhere else.To avoid the use-after-free, we need to use refcount_inc_not_zero() intcp_twsk_unique() and give up on reusing the port if it returns false.[0]:refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 Comm: trigger Not tainted 6.8.6-200.fc39.x86_64 #1Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS VMW201.00V.21805430.B64.2305221830 05/22/2023RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110Code: 42 8e ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d aa 13 ea 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 f8 8e b7 82 c6 05 96 13 ea 01 01 e8 7b 42 8e ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c7 50 8f b7 82 c6 05 7a 13 ea 01 01 e8RSP: 0018:ffffc90006b43b60 EFLAGS: 00010282RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888009bb3ef0 RCX: 0000000000000027RDX: ffff88807be218c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88807be218c0RBP: 0000000000069d70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc90006b439f0R10: ffffc90006b439e8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8880029ede84R13: 0000000000004e20 R14: ffffffff84356dc0 R15: ffff888009bb3ef0FS: 00007f62c10926c0(0000) GS:ffff88807be00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033CR2: 0000000020ccb000 CR3: 000000004628c005 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0PKRU: 55555554Call Trace: <TASK> ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? __warn+0x81/0x130 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80 ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 tcp_twsk_unique+0x186/0x190 __inet_check_established+0x176/0x2d0 __inet_hash_connect+0x74/0x7d0 ? __pfx___inet_check_established+0x10/0x10 tcp_v4_connect+0x278/0x530 __inet_stream_connect+0x10f/0x3d0 inet_stream_connect+0x3a/0x60 __sys_connect+0xa8/0xd0 __x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0x80RIP: 0033:0x7f62c11a885dCode: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a3 45 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48RSP: 002b:00007f62c1091e58 EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002aRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020ccb004 RCX: 00007f62c11a885dRDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020ccb000 RDI: 0000000000000003RBP: 00007f62c1091e90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000296 R12: 00007f62c10926c0R13: ffffffffffffff88 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffe237885b0 </TASK>
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:tcp: Use refcount_inc_not_zero() in tcp_twsk_unique().Anderson Nascimento reported a use-after-free splat in tcp_twsk_unique()with nice analysis.Since commit ec94c2696f0b ( tcp/dccp: avoid one atomic operation fortimewait hashdance ), inet_twsk_hashdance() sets TIME-WAIT socket ssk_refcnt after putting it into ehash and releasing the bucket lock.Thus, there is a small race window where other threads could try toreuse the port during connect() and call sock_hold() in tcp_twsk_unique()for the TIME-WAIT socket with zero refcnt.If that happens, the refcnt taken by tcp_twsk_unique() is overwrittenand sock_put() will cause underflow, triggering a real use-after-freesomewhere else.To avoid the use-after-free, we need to use refcount_inc_not_zero() intcp_twsk_unique() and give up on reusing the port if it returns false.[0]:refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 Comm: trigger Not tainted 6.8.6-200.fc39.x86_64 #1Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS VMW201.00V.21805430.B64.2305221830 05/22/2023RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110Code: 42 8e ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d aa 13 ea 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 f8 8e b7 82 c6 05 96 13 ea 01 01 e8 7b 42 8e ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c7 50 8f b7 82 c6 05 7a 13 ea 01 01 e8RSP: 0018:ffffc90006b43b60 EFLAGS: 00010282RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888009bb3ef0 RCX: 0000000000000027RDX: ffff88807be218c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88807be218c0RBP: 0000000000069d70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc90006b439f0R10: ffffc90006b439e8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8880029ede84R13: 0000000000004e20 R14: ffffffff84356dc0 R15: ffff888009bb3ef0FS: 00007f62c10926c0(0000) GS:ffff88807be00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033CR2: 0000000020ccb000 CR3: 000000004628c005 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0PKRU: 55555554Call Trace: <TASK> ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? __warn+0x81/0x130 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80 ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 tcp_twsk_unique+0x186/0x190 __inet_check_established+0x176/0x2d0 __inet_hash_connect+0x74/0x7d0 ? __pfx___inet_check_established+0x10/0x10 tcp_v4_connect+0x278/0x530 __inet_stream_connect+0x10f/0x3d0 inet_stream_connect+0x3a/0x60 __sys_connect+0xa8/0xd0 __x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0x80RIP: 0033:0x7f62c11a885dCode: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a3 45 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48RSP: 002b:00007f62c1091e58 EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002aRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020ccb004 RCX: 00007f62c11a885dRDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020ccb000 RDI: 0000000000000003RBP: 00007f62c1091e90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000296 R12: 00007f62c10926c0R13: ffffffffffffff88 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffe237885b0 </TASK>
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:tcp: Use refcount_inc_not_zero() in tcp_twsk_unique().Anderson Nascimento reported a use-after-free splat in tcp_twsk_unique()with nice analysis.Since commit ec94c2696f0b ( tcp/dccp: avoid one atomic operation fortimewait hashdance ), inet_twsk_hashdance() sets TIME-WAIT socket ssk_refcnt after putting it into ehash and releasing the bucket lock.Thus, there is a small race window where other threads could try toreuse the port during connect() and call sock_hold() in tcp_twsk_unique()for the TIME-WAIT socket with zero refcnt.If that happens, the refcnt taken by tcp_twsk_unique() is overwrittenand sock_put() will cause underflow, triggering a real use-after-freesomewhere else.To avoid the use-after-free, we need to use refcount_inc_not_zero() intcp_twsk_unique() and give up on reusing the port if it returns false.[0]:refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 Comm: trigger Not tainted 6.8.6-200.fc39.x86_64 #1Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS VMW201.00V.21805430.B64.2305221830 05/22/2023RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110Code: 42 8e ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d aa 13 ea 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 f8 8e b7 82 c6 05 96 13 ea 01 01 e8 7b 42 8e ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c7 50 8f b7 82 c6 05 7a 13 ea 01 01 e8RSP: 0018:ffffc90006b43b60 EFLAGS: 00010282RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888009bb3ef0 RCX: 0000000000000027RDX: ffff88807be218c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88807be218c0RBP: 0000000000069d70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc90006b439f0R10: ffffc90006b439e8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8880029ede84R13: 0000000000004e20 R14: ffffffff84356dc0 R15: ffff888009bb3ef0FS: 00007f62c10926c0(0000) GS:ffff88807be00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033CR2: 0000000020ccb000 CR3: 000000004628c005 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0PKRU: 55555554Call Trace: <TASK> ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? __warn+0x81/0x130 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80 ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 tcp_twsk_unique+0x186/0x190 __inet_check_established+0x176/0x2d0 __inet_hash_connect+0x74/0x7d0 ? __pfx___inet_check_established+0x10/0x10 tcp_v4_connect+0x278/0x530 __inet_stream_connect+0x10f/0x3d0 inet_stream_connect+0x3a/0x60 __sys_connect+0xa8/0xd0 __x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0x80RIP: 0033:0x7f62c11a885dCode: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a3 45 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48RSP: 002b:00007f62c1091e58 EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002aRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020ccb004 RCX: 00007f62c11a885dRDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020ccb000 RDI: 0000000000000003RBP: 00007f62c1091e90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000296 R12: 00007f62c10926c0R13: ffffffffffffff88 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffe237885b0 </TASK>
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:tcp: Use refcount_inc_not_zero() in tcp_twsk_unique().Anderson Nascimento reported a use-after-free splat in tcp_twsk_unique()with nice analysis.Since commit ec94c2696f0b ( tcp/dccp: avoid one atomic operation fortimewait hashdance ), inet_twsk_hashdance() sets TIME-WAIT socket ssk_refcnt after putting it into ehash and releasing the bucket lock.Thus, there is a small race window where other threads could try toreuse the port during connect() and call sock_hold() in tcp_twsk_unique()for the TIME-WAIT socket with zero refcnt.If that happens, the refcnt taken by tcp_twsk_unique() is overwrittenand sock_put() will cause underflow, triggering a real use-after-freesomewhere else.To avoid the use-after-free, we need to use refcount_inc_not_zero() intcp_twsk_unique() and give up on reusing the port if it returns false.[0]:refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 Comm: trigger Not tainted 6.8.6-200.fc39.x86_64 #1Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS VMW201.00V.21805430.B64.2305221830 05/22/2023RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110Code: 42 8e ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d aa 13 ea 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 f8 8e b7 82 c6 05 96 13 ea 01 01 e8 7b 42 8e ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c7 50 8f b7 82 c6 05 7a 13 ea 01 01 e8RSP: 0018:ffffc90006b43b60 EFLAGS: 00010282RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888009bb3ef0 RCX: 0000000000000027RDX: ffff88807be218c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88807be218c0RBP: 0000000000069d70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc90006b439f0R10: ffffc90006b439e8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8880029ede84R13: 0000000000004e20 R14: ffffffff84356dc0 R15: ffff888009bb3ef0FS: 00007f62c10926c0(0000) GS:ffff88807be00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033CR2: 0000000020ccb000 CR3: 000000004628c005 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0PKRU: 55555554Call Trace: <TASK> ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? __warn+0x81/0x130 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80 ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 tcp_twsk_unique+0x186/0x190 __inet_check_established+0x176/0x2d0 __inet_hash_connect+0x74/0x7d0 ? __pfx___inet_check_established+0x10/0x10 tcp_v4_connect+0x278/0x530 __inet_stream_connect+0x10f/0x3d0 inet_stream_connect+0x3a/0x60 __sys_connect+0xa8/0xd0 __x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0x80RIP: 0033:0x7f62c11a885dCode: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a3 45 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48RSP: 002b:00007f62c1091e58 EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002aRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020ccb004 RCX: 00007f62c11a885dRDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020ccb000 RDI: 0000000000000003RBP: 00007f62c1091e90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000296 R12: 00007f62c10926c0R13: ffffffffffffff88 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffe237885b0 </TASK>
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:tcp: Use refcount_inc_not_zero() in tcp_twsk_unique().Anderson Nascimento reported a use-after-free splat in tcp_twsk_unique()with nice analysis.Since commit ec94c2696f0b ( tcp/dccp: avoid one atomic operation fortimewait hashdance ), inet_twsk_hashdance() sets TIME-WAIT socket ssk_refcnt after putting it into ehash and releasing the bucket lock.Thus, there is a small race window where other threads could try toreuse the port during connect() and call sock_hold() in tcp_twsk_unique()for the TIME-WAIT socket with zero refcnt.If that happens, the refcnt taken by tcp_twsk_unique() is overwrittenand sock_put() will cause underflow, triggering a real use-after-freesomewhere else.To avoid the use-after-free, we need to use refcount_inc_not_zero() intcp_twsk_unique() and give up on reusing the port if it returns false.[0]:refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 Comm: trigger Not tainted 6.8.6-200.fc39.x86_64 #1Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS VMW201.00V.21805430.B64.2305221830 05/22/2023RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110Code: 42 8e ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d aa 13 ea 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 f8 8e b7 82 c6 05 96 13 ea 01 01 e8 7b 42 8e ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c7 50 8f b7 82 c6 05 7a 13 ea 01 01 e8RSP: 0018:ffffc90006b43b60 EFLAGS: 00010282RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888009bb3ef0 RCX: 0000000000000027RDX: ffff88807be218c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88807be218c0RBP: 0000000000069d70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc90006b439f0R10: ffffc90006b439e8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8880029ede84R13: 0000000000004e20 R14: ffffffff84356dc0 R15: ffff888009bb3ef0FS: 00007f62c10926c0(0000) GS:ffff88807be00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033CR2: 0000000020ccb000 CR3: 000000004628c005 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0PKRU: 55555554Call Trace: <TASK> ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? __warn+0x81/0x130 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80 ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 tcp_twsk_unique+0x186/0x190 __inet_check_established+0x176/0x2d0 __inet_hash_connect+0x74/0x7d0 ? __pfx___inet_check_established+0x10/0x10 tcp_v4_connect+0x278/0x530 __inet_stream_connect+0x10f/0x3d0 inet_stream_connect+0x3a/0x60 __sys_connect+0xa8/0xd0 __x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0x80RIP: 0033:0x7f62c11a885dCode: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a3 45 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48RSP: 002b:00007f62c1091e58 EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002aRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020ccb004 RCX: 00007f62c11a885dRDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020ccb000 RDI: 0000000000000003RBP: 00007f62c1091e90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000296 R12: 00007f62c10926c0R13: ffffffffffffff88 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffe237885b0 </TASK>
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:tcp: Use refcount_inc_not_zero() in tcp_twsk_unique().Anderson Nascimento reported a use-after-free splat in tcp_twsk_unique()with nice analysis.Since commit ec94c2696f0b ( tcp/dccp: avoid one atomic operation fortimewait hashdance ), inet_twsk_hashdance() sets TIME-WAIT socket ssk_refcnt after putting it into ehash and releasing the bucket lock.Thus, there is a small race window where other threads could try toreuse the port during connect() and call sock_hold() in tcp_twsk_unique()for the TIME-WAIT socket with zero refcnt.If that happens, the refcnt taken by tcp_twsk_unique() is overwrittenand sock_put() will cause underflow, triggering a real use-after-freesomewhere else.To avoid the use-after-free, we need to use refcount_inc_not_zero() intcp_twsk_unique() and give up on reusing the port if it returns false.[0]:refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 Comm: trigger Not tainted 6.8.6-200.fc39.x86_64 #1Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS VMW201.00V.21805430.B64.2305221830 05/22/2023RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110Code: 42 8e ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d aa 13 ea 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 f8 8e b7 82 c6 05 96 13 ea 01 01 e8 7b 42 8e ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c7 50 8f b7 82 c6 05 7a 13 ea 01 01 e8RSP: 0018:ffffc90006b43b60 EFLAGS: 00010282RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888009bb3ef0 RCX: 0000000000000027RDX: ffff88807be218c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88807be218c0RBP: 0000000000069d70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc90006b439f0R10: ffffc90006b439e8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8880029ede84R13: 0000000000004e20 R14: ffffffff84356dc0 R15: ffff888009bb3ef0FS: 00007f62c10926c0(0000) GS:ffff88807be00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033CR2: 0000000020ccb000 CR3: 000000004628c005 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0PKRU: 55555554Call Trace: <TASK> ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? __warn+0x81/0x130 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80 ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 tcp_twsk_unique+0x186/0x190 __inet_check_established+0x176/0x2d0 __inet_hash_connect+0x74/0x7d0 ? __pfx___inet_check_established+0x10/0x10 tcp_v4_connect+0x278/0x530 __inet_stream_connect+0x10f/0x3d0 inet_stream_connect+0x3a/0x60 __sys_connect+0xa8/0xd0 __x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0x80RIP: 0033:0x7f62c11a885dCode: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a3 45 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48RSP: 002b:00007f62c1091e58 EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002aRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020ccb004 RCX: 00007f62c11a885dRDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020ccb000 RDI: 0000000000000003RBP: 00007f62c1091e90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000296 R12: 00007f62c10926c0R13: ffffffffffffff88 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffe237885b0 </TASK>
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:tcp: Use refcount_inc_not_zero() in tcp_twsk_unique().Anderson Nascimento reported a use-after-free splat in tcp_twsk_unique()with nice analysis.Since commit ec94c2696f0b ( tcp/dccp: avoid one atomic operation fortimewait hashdance ), inet_twsk_hashdance() sets TIME-WAIT socket ssk_refcnt after putting it into ehash and releasing the bucket lock.Thus, there is a small race window where other threads could try toreuse the port during connect() and call sock_hold() in tcp_twsk_unique()for the TIME-WAIT socket with zero refcnt.If that happens, the refcnt taken by tcp_twsk_unique() is overwrittenand sock_put() will cause underflow, triggering a real use-after-freesomewhere else.To avoid the use-after-free, we need to use refcount_inc_not_zero() intcp_twsk_unique() and give up on reusing the port if it returns false.[0]:refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 Comm: trigger Not tainted 6.8.6-200.fc39.x86_64 #1Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS VMW201.00V.21805430.B64.2305221830 05/22/2023RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110Code: 42 8e ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d aa 13 ea 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 f8 8e b7 82 c6 05 96 13 ea 01 01 e8 7b 42 8e ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c7 50 8f b7 82 c6 05 7a 13 ea 01 01 e8RSP: 0018:ffffc90006b43b60 EFLAGS: 00010282RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888009bb3ef0 RCX: 0000000000000027RDX: ffff88807be218c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88807be218c0RBP: 0000000000069d70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc90006b439f0R10: ffffc90006b439e8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8880029ede84R13: 0000000000004e20 R14: ffffffff84356dc0 R15: ffff888009bb3ef0FS: 00007f62c10926c0(0000) GS:ffff88807be00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033CR2: 0000000020ccb000 CR3: 000000004628c005 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0PKRU: 55555554Call Trace: <TASK> ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? __warn+0x81/0x130 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80 ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 tcp_twsk_unique+0x186/0x190 __inet_check_established+0x176/0x2d0 __inet_hash_connect+0x74/0x7d0 ? __pfx___inet_check_established+0x10/0x10 tcp_v4_connect+0x278/0x530 __inet_stream_connect+0x10f/0x3d0 inet_stream_connect+0x3a/0x60 __sys_connect+0xa8/0xd0 __x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0x80RIP: 0033:0x7f62c11a885dCode: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a3 45 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48RSP: 002b:00007f62c1091e58 EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002aRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020ccb004 RCX: 00007f62c11a885dRDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020ccb000 RDI: 0000000000000003RBP: 00007f62c1091e90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000296 R12: 00007f62c10926c0R13: ffffffffffffff88 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffe237885b0 </TASK>
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:tcp: Use refcount_inc_not_zero() in tcp_twsk_unique().Anderson Nascimento reported a use-after-free splat in tcp_twsk_unique()with nice analysis.Since commit ec94c2696f0b ( tcp/dccp: avoid one atomic operation fortimewait hashdance ), inet_twsk_hashdance() sets TIME-WAIT socket ssk_refcnt after putting it into ehash and releasing the bucket lock.Thus, there is a small race window where other threads could try toreuse the port during connect() and call sock_hold() in tcp_twsk_unique()for the TIME-WAIT socket with zero refcnt.If that happens, the refcnt taken by tcp_twsk_unique() is overwrittenand sock_put() will cause underflow, triggering a real use-after-freesomewhere else.To avoid the use-after-free, we need to use refcount_inc_not_zero() intcp_twsk_unique() and give up on reusing the port if it returns false.[0]:refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 Comm: trigger Not tainted 6.8.6-200.fc39.x86_64 #1Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS VMW201.00V.21805430.B64.2305221830 05/22/2023RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110Code: 42 8e ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d aa 13 ea 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 f8 8e b7 82 c6 05 96 13 ea 01 01 e8 7b 42 8e ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c7 50 8f b7 82 c6 05 7a 13 ea 01 01 e8RSP: 0018:ffffc90006b43b60 EFLAGS: 00010282RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888009bb3ef0 RCX: 0000000000000027RDX: ffff88807be218c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88807be218c0RBP: 0000000000069d70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc90006b439f0R10: ffffc90006b439e8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8880029ede84R13: 0000000000004e20 R14: ffffffff84356dc0 R15: ffff888009bb3ef0FS: 00007f62c10926c0(0000) GS:ffff88807be00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033CR2: 0000000020ccb000 CR3: 000000004628c005 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0PKRU: 55555554Call Trace: <TASK> ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? __warn+0x81/0x130 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80 ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 tcp_twsk_unique+0x186/0x190 __inet_check_established+0x176/0x2d0 __inet_hash_connect+0x74/0x7d0 ? __pfx___inet_check_established+0x10/0x10 tcp_v4_connect+0x278/0x530 __inet_stream_connect+0x10f/0x3d0 inet_stream_connect+0x3a/0x60 __sys_connect+0xa8/0xd0 __x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0x80RIP: 0033:0x7f62c11a885dCode: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a3 45 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48RSP: 002b:00007f62c1091e58 EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002aRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020ccb004 RCX: 00007f62c11a885dRDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020ccb000 RDI: 0000000000000003RBP: 00007f62c1091e90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000296 R12: 00007f62c10926c0R13: ffffffffffffff88 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffe237885b0 </TASK>
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:tcp: Use refcount_inc_not_zero() in tcp_twsk_unique().Anderson Nascimento reported a use-after-free splat in tcp_twsk_unique()with nice analysis.Since commit ec94c2696f0b ( tcp/dccp: avoid one atomic operation fortimewait hashdance ), inet_twsk_hashdance() sets TIME-WAIT socket ssk_refcnt after putting it into ehash and releasing the bucket lock.Thus, there is a small race window where other threads could try toreuse the port during connect() and call sock_hold() in tcp_twsk_unique()for the TIME-WAIT socket with zero refcnt.If that happens, the refcnt taken by tcp_twsk_unique() is overwrittenand sock_put() will cause underflow, triggering a real use-after-freesomewhere else.To avoid the use-after-free, we need to use refcount_inc_not_zero() intcp_twsk_unique() and give up on reusing the port if it returns false.[0]:refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 Comm: trigger Not tainted 6.8.6-200.fc39.x86_64 #1Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS VMW201.00V.21805430.B64.2305221830 05/22/2023RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110Code: 42 8e ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d aa 13 ea 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 f8 8e b7 82 c6 05 96 13 ea 01 01 e8 7b 42 8e ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c7 50 8f b7 82 c6 05 7a 13 ea 01 01 e8RSP: 0018:ffffc90006b43b60 EFLAGS: 00010282RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888009bb3ef0 RCX: 0000000000000027RDX: ffff88807be218c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88807be218c0RBP: 0000000000069d70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc90006b439f0R10: ffffc90006b439e8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8880029ede84R13: 0000000000004e20 R14: ffffffff84356dc0 R15: ffff888009bb3ef0FS: 00007f62c10926c0(0000) GS:ffff88807be00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033CR2: 0000000020ccb000 CR3: 000000004628c005 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0PKRU: 55555554Call Trace: <TASK> ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? __warn+0x81/0x130 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80 ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 tcp_twsk_unique+0x186/0x190 __inet_check_established+0x176/0x2d0 __inet_hash_connect+0x74/0x7d0 ? __pfx___inet_check_established+0x10/0x10 tcp_v4_connect+0x278/0x530 __inet_stream_connect+0x10f/0x3d0 inet_stream_connect+0x3a/0x60 __sys_connect+0xa8/0xd0 __x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0x80RIP: 0033:0x7f62c11a885dCode: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a3 45 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48RSP: 002b:00007f62c1091e58 EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002aRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020ccb004 RCX: 00007f62c11a885dRDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020ccb000 RDI: 0000000000000003RBP: 00007f62c1091e90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000296 R12: 00007f62c10926c0R13: ffffffffffffff88 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffe237885b0 </TASK>
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:tcp: Use refcount_inc_not_zero() in tcp_twsk_unique().Anderson Nascimento reported a use-after-free splat in tcp_twsk_unique()with nice analysis.Since commit ec94c2696f0b ( tcp/dccp: avoid one atomic operation fortimewait hashdance ), inet_twsk_hashdance() sets TIME-WAIT socket ssk_refcnt after putting it into ehash and releasing the bucket lock.Thus, there is a small race window where other threads could try toreuse the port during connect() and call sock_hold() in tcp_twsk_unique()for the TIME-WAIT socket with zero refcnt.If that happens, the refcnt taken by tcp_twsk_unique() is overwrittenand sock_put() will cause underflow, triggering a real use-after-freesomewhere else.To avoid the use-after-free, we need to use refcount_inc_not_zero() intcp_twsk_unique() and give up on reusing the port if it returns false.[0]:refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 Comm: trigger Not tainted 6.8.6-200.fc39.x86_64 #1Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS VMW201.00V.21805430.B64.2305221830 05/22/2023RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110Code: 42 8e ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d aa 13 ea 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 f8 8e b7 82 c6 05 96 13 ea 01 01 e8 7b 42 8e ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c7 50 8f b7 82 c6 05 7a 13 ea 01 01 e8RSP: 0018:ffffc90006b43b60 EFLAGS: 00010282RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888009bb3ef0 RCX: 0000000000000027RDX: ffff88807be218c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88807be218c0RBP: 0000000000069d70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc90006b439f0R10: ffffc90006b439e8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8880029ede84R13: 0000000000004e20 R14: ffffffff84356dc0 R15: ffff888009bb3ef0FS: 00007f62c10926c0(0000) GS:ffff88807be00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033CR2: 0000000020ccb000 CR3: 000000004628c005 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0PKRU: 55555554Call Trace: <TASK> ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? __warn+0x81/0x130 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80 ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 tcp_twsk_unique+0x186/0x190 __inet_check_established+0x176/0x2d0 __inet_hash_connect+0x74/0x7d0 ? __pfx___inet_check_established+0x10/0x10 tcp_v4_connect+0x278/0x530 __inet_stream_connect+0x10f/0x3d0 inet_stream_connect+0x3a/0x60 __sys_connect+0xa8/0xd0 __x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0x80RIP: 0033:0x7f62c11a885dCode: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a3 45 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48RSP: 002b:00007f62c1091e58 EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002aRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020ccb004 RCX: 00007f62c11a885dRDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020ccb000 RDI: 0000000000000003RBP: 00007f62c1091e90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000296 R12: 00007f62c10926c0R13: ffffffffffffff88 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffe237885b0 </TASK>
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:tcp: Use refcount_inc_not_zero() in tcp_twsk_unique().Anderson Nascimento reported a use-after-free splat in tcp_twsk_unique()with nice analysis.Since commit ec94c2696f0b ( tcp/dccp: avoid one atomic operation fortimewait hashdance ), inet_twsk_hashdance() sets TIME-WAIT socket ssk_refcnt after putting it into ehash and releasing the bucket lock.Thus, there is a small race window where other threads could try toreuse the port during connect() and call sock_hold() in tcp_twsk_unique()for the TIME-WAIT socket with zero refcnt.If that happens, the refcnt taken by tcp_twsk_unique() is overwrittenand sock_put() will cause underflow, triggering a real use-after-freesomewhere else.To avoid the use-after-free, we need to use refcount_inc_not_zero() intcp_twsk_unique() and give up on reusing the port if it returns false.[0]:refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 Comm: trigger Not tainted 6.8.6-200.fc39.x86_64 #1Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS VMW201.00V.21805430.B64.2305221830 05/22/2023RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110Code: 42 8e ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d aa 13 ea 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 f8 8e b7 82 c6 05 96 13 ea 01 01 e8 7b 42 8e ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c7 50 8f b7 82 c6 05 7a 13 ea 01 01 e8RSP: 0018:ffffc90006b43b60 EFLAGS: 00010282RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888009bb3ef0 RCX: 0000000000000027RDX: ffff88807be218c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88807be218c0RBP: 0000000000069d70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc90006b439f0R10: ffffc90006b439e8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8880029ede84R13: 0000000000004e20 R14: ffffffff84356dc0 R15: ffff888009bb3ef0FS: 00007f62c10926c0(0000) GS:ffff88807be00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033CR2: 0000000020ccb000 CR3: 000000004628c005 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0PKRU: 55555554Call Trace: <TASK> ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? __warn+0x81/0x130 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80 ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 tcp_twsk_unique+0x186/0x190 __inet_check_established+0x176/0x2d0 __inet_hash_connect+0x74/0x7d0 ? __pfx___inet_check_established+0x10/0x10 tcp_v4_connect+0x278/0x530 __inet_stream_connect+0x10f/0x3d0 inet_stream_connect+0x3a/0x60 __sys_connect+0xa8/0xd0 __x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0x80RIP: 0033:0x7f62c11a885dCode: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a3 45 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48RSP: 002b:00007f62c1091e58 EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002aRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020ccb004 RCX: 00007f62c11a885dRDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020ccb000 RDI: 0000000000000003RBP: 00007f62c1091e90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000296 R12: 00007f62c10926c0R13: ffffffffffffff88 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffe237885b0 </TASK>
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:tcp: Use refcount_inc_not_zero() in tcp_twsk_unique().Anderson Nascimento reported a use-after-free splat in tcp_twsk_unique()with nice analysis.Since commit ec94c2696f0b ( tcp/dccp: avoid one atomic operation fortimewait hashdance ), inet_twsk_hashdance() sets TIME-WAIT socket ssk_refcnt after putting it into ehash and releasing the bucket lock.Thus, there is a small race window where other threads could try toreuse the port during connect() and call sock_hold() in tcp_twsk_unique()for the TIME-WAIT socket with zero refcnt.If that happens, the refcnt taken by tcp_twsk_unique() is overwrittenand sock_put() will cause underflow, triggering a real use-after-freesomewhere else.To avoid the use-after-free, we need to use refcount_inc_not_zero() intcp_twsk_unique() and give up on reusing the port if it returns false.[0]:refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 Comm: trigger Not tainted 6.8.6-200.fc39.x86_64 #1Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS VMW201.00V.21805430.B64.2305221830 05/22/2023RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110Code: 42 8e ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d aa 13 ea 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 f8 8e b7 82 c6 05 96 13 ea 01 01 e8 7b 42 8e ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c7 50 8f b7 82 c6 05 7a 13 ea 01 01 e8RSP: 0018:ffffc90006b43b60 EFLAGS: 00010282RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888009bb3ef0 RCX: 0000000000000027RDX: ffff88807be218c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88807be218c0RBP: 0000000000069d70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc90006b439f0R10: ffffc90006b439e8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8880029ede84R13: 0000000000004e20 R14: ffffffff84356dc0 R15: ffff888009bb3ef0FS: 00007f62c10926c0(0000) GS:ffff88807be00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033CR2: 0000000020ccb000 CR3: 000000004628c005 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0PKRU: 55555554Call Trace: <TASK> ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? __warn+0x81/0x130 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80 ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 tcp_twsk_unique+0x186/0x190 __inet_check_established+0x176/0x2d0 __inet_hash_connect+0x74/0x7d0 ? __pfx___inet_check_established+0x10/0x10 tcp_v4_connect+0x278/0x530 __inet_stream_connect+0x10f/0x3d0 inet_stream_connect+0x3a/0x60 __sys_connect+0xa8/0xd0 __x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0x80RIP: 0033:0x7f62c11a885dCode: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a3 45 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48RSP: 002b:00007f62c1091e58 EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002aRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020ccb004 RCX: 00007f62c11a885dRDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020ccb000 RDI: 0000000000000003RBP: 00007f62c1091e90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000296 R12: 00007f62c10926c0R13: ffffffffffffff88 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffe237885b0 </TASK>
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:tcp: Use refcount_inc_not_zero() in tcp_twsk_unique().Anderson Nascimento reported a use-after-free splat in tcp_twsk_unique()with nice analysis.Since commit ec94c2696f0b ( tcp/dccp: avoid one atomic operation fortimewait hashdance ), inet_twsk_hashdance() sets TIME-WAIT socket ssk_refcnt after putting it into ehash and releasing the bucket lock.Thus, there is a small race window where other threads could try toreuse the port during connect() and call sock_hold() in tcp_twsk_unique()for the TIME-WAIT socket with zero refcnt.If that happens, the refcnt taken by tcp_twsk_unique() is overwrittenand sock_put() will cause underflow, triggering a real use-after-freesomewhere else.To avoid the use-after-free, we need to use refcount_inc_not_zero() intcp_twsk_unique() and give up on reusing the port if it returns false.[0]:refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 Comm: trigger Not tainted 6.8.6-200.fc39.x86_64 #1Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS VMW201.00V.21805430.B64.2305221830 05/22/2023RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110Code: 42 8e ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d aa 13 ea 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 f8 8e b7 82 c6 05 96 13 ea 01 01 e8 7b 42 8e ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c7 50 8f b7 82 c6 05 7a 13 ea 01 01 e8RSP: 0018:ffffc90006b43b60 EFLAGS: 00010282RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888009bb3ef0 RCX: 0000000000000027RDX: ffff88807be218c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88807be218c0RBP: 0000000000069d70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc90006b439f0R10: ffffc90006b439e8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8880029ede84R13: 0000000000004e20 R14: ffffffff84356dc0 R15: ffff888009bb3ef0FS: 00007f62c10926c0(0000) GS:ffff88807be00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033CR2: 0000000020ccb000 CR3: 000000004628c005 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0PKRU: 55555554Call Trace: <TASK> ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? __warn+0x81/0x130 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80 ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 tcp_twsk_unique+0x186/0x190 __inet_check_established+0x176/0x2d0 __inet_hash_connect+0x74/0x7d0 ? __pfx___inet_check_established+0x10/0x10 tcp_v4_connect+0x278/0x530 __inet_stream_connect+0x10f/0x3d0 inet_stream_connect+0x3a/0x60 __sys_connect+0xa8/0xd0 __x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0x80RIP: 0033:0x7f62c11a885dCode: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a3 45 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48RSP: 002b:00007f62c1091e58 EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002aRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020ccb004 RCX: 00007f62c11a885dRDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020ccb000 RDI: 0000000000000003RBP: 00007f62c1091e90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000296 R12: 00007f62c10926c0R13: ffffffffffffff88 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffe237885b0 </TASK>
| linux | | https://git.kernel.org/linus/f2db7230f73a80dbb179deab78f88a7947f0ab7e | https://git.kernel.org/linus/ec94c2696f0bcd5ae92a553244e4ac30d2171a2d | ubuntu |
</details>
二、漏洞分析结构反馈
影响性分析说明：
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:tcp: Use refcount_inc_not_zero() in tcp_twsk_unique().Anderson Nascimento reported a use-after-free splat in tcp_twsk_unique()with nice analysis.Since commit ec94c2696f0b ( tcp/dccp: avoid one atomic operation fortimewait hashdance ), inet_twsk_hashdance() sets TIME-WAIT socket ssk_refcnt after putting it into ehash and releasing the bucket lock.Thus, there is a small race window where other threads could try toreuse the port during connect() and call sock_hold() in tcp_twsk_unique()for the TIME-WAIT socket with zero refcnt.If that happens, the refcnt taken by tcp_twsk_unique() is overwrittenand sock_put() will cause underflow, triggering a real use-after-freesomewhere else.To avoid the use-after-free, we need to use refcount_inc_not_zero() intcp_twsk_unique() and give up on reusing the port if it returns false.[0]:refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 Comm: trigger Not tainted 6.8.6-200.fc39.x86_64 #1Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS VMW201.00V.21805430.B64.2305221830 05/22/2023RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110Code: 42 8e ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d aa 13 ea 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 f8 8e b7 82 c6 05 96 13 ea 01 01 e8 7b 42 8e ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c7 50 8f b7 82 c6 05 7a 13 ea 01 01 e8RSP: 0018:ffffc90006b43b60 EFLAGS: 00010282RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888009bb3ef0 RCX: 0000000000000027RDX: ffff88807be218c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88807be218c0RBP: 0000000000069d70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc90006b439f0R10: ffffc90006b439e8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8880029ede84R13: 0000000000004e20 R14: ffffffff84356dc0 R15: ffff888009bb3ef0FS: 00007f62c10926c0(0000) GS:ffff88807be00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033CR2: 0000000020ccb000 CR3: 000000004628c005 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0PKRU: 55555554Call Trace: <TASK> ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? __warn+0x81/0x130 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80 ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 tcp_twsk_unique+0x186/0x190 __inet_check_established+0x176/0x2d0 __inet_hash_connect+0x74/0x7d0 ? __pfx___inet_check_established+0x10/0x10 tcp_v4_connect+0x278/0x530 __inet_stream_connect+0x10f/0x3d0 inet_stream_connect+0x3a/0x60 __sys_connect+0xa8/0xd0 __x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0x80RIP: 0033:0x7f62c11a885dCode: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a3 45 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48RSP: 002b:00007f62c1091e58 EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002aRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020ccb004 RCX: 00007f62c11a885dRDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020ccb000 RDI: 0000000000000003RBP: 00007f62c1091e90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000296 R12: 00007f62c10926c0R13: ffffffffffffff88 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffe237885b0 </TASK>
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:tcp: Use refcount_inc_not_zero() in tcp_twsk_unique().Anderson Nascimento reported a use-after-free splat in tcp_twsk_unique()with nice analysis.Since commit ec94c2696f0b ( tcp/dccp: avoid one atomic operation fortimewait hashdance ), inet_twsk_hashdance() sets TIME-WAIT socket ssk_refcnt after putting it into ehash and releasing the bucket lock.Thus, there is a small race window where other threads could try toreuse the port during connect() and call sock_hold() in tcp_twsk_unique()for the TIME-WAIT socket with zero refcnt.If that happens, the refcnt taken by tcp_twsk_unique() is overwrittenand sock_put() will cause underflow, triggering a real use-after-freesomewhere else.To avoid the use-after-free, we need to use refcount_inc_not_zero() intcp_twsk_unique() and give up on reusing the port if it returns false.[0]:refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 Comm: trigger Not tainted 6.8.6-200.fc39.x86_64 #1Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS VMW201.00V.21805430.B64.2305221830 05/22/2023RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110Code: 42 8e ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d aa 13 ea 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 f8 8e b7 82 c6 05 96 13 ea 01 01 e8 7b 42 8e ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c7 50 8f b7 82 c6 05 7a 13 ea 01 01 e8RSP: 0018:ffffc90006b43b60 EFLAGS: 00010282RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888009bb3ef0 RCX: 0000000000000027RDX: ffff88807be218c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88807be218c0RBP: 0000000000069d70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc90006b439f0R10: ffffc90006b439e8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8880029ede84R13: 0000000000004e20 R14: ffffffff84356dc0 R15: ffff888009bb3ef0FS: 00007f62c10926c0(0000) GS:ffff88807be00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033CR2: 0000000020ccb000 CR3: 000000004628c005 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0PKRU: 55555554Call Trace: <TASK> ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? __warn+0x81/0x130 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80 ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 tcp_twsk_unique+0x186/0x190 __inet_check_established+0x176/0x2d0 __inet_hash_connect+0x74/0x7d0 ? __pfx___inet_check_established+0x10/0x10 tcp_v4_connect+0x278/0x530 __inet_stream_connect+0x10f/0x3d0 inet_stream_connect+0x3a/0x60 __sys_connect+0xa8/0xd0 __x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0x80RIP: 0033:0x7f62c11a885dCode: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a3 45 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48RSP: 002b:00007f62c1091e58 EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002aRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020ccb004 RCX: 00007f62c11a885dRDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020ccb000 RDI: 0000000000000003RBP: 00007f62c1091e90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000296 R12: 00007f62c10926c0R13: ffffffffffffff88 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffe237885b0 </TASK>
| linux | | https://git.kernel.org/linus/f2db7230f73a80dbb179deab78f88a7947f0ab7e | https://git.kernel.org/linus/ec94c2696f0bcd5ae92a553244e4ac30d2171a2d | ubuntu |
</details>
二、漏洞分析结构反馈
影响性分析说明：
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:tcp: Use refcount_inc_not_zero() in tcp_twsk_unique().Anderson Nascimento reported a use-after-free splat in tcp_twsk_unique()with nice analysis.Since commit ec94c2696f0b ( tcp/dccp: avoid one atomic operation fortimewait hashdance ), inet_twsk_hashdance() sets TIME-WAIT socket ssk_refcnt after putting it into ehash and releasing the bucket lock.Thus, there is a small race window where other threads could try toreuse the port during connect() and call sock_hold() in tcp_twsk_unique()for the TIME-WAIT socket with zero refcnt.If that happens, the refcnt taken by tcp_twsk_unique() is overwrittenand sock_put() will cause underflow, triggering a real use-after-freesomewhere else.To avoid the use-after-free, we need to use refcount_inc_not_zero() intcp_twsk_unique() and give up on reusing the port if it returns false.[0]:refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 Comm: trigger Not tainted 6.8.6-200.fc39.x86_64 #1Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS VMW201.00V.21805430.B64.2305221830 05/22/2023RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110Code: 42 8e ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d aa 13 ea 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 f8 8e b7 82 c6 05 96 13 ea 01 01 e8 7b 42 8e ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c7 50 8f b7 82 c6 05 7a 13 ea 01 01 e8RSP: 0018:ffffc90006b43b60 EFLAGS: 00010282RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888009bb3ef0 RCX: 0000000000000027RDX: ffff88807be218c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88807be218c0RBP: 0000000000069d70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc90006b439f0R10: ffffc90006b439e8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8880029ede84R13: 0000000000004e20 R14: ffffffff84356dc0 R15: ffff888009bb3ef0FS: 00007f62c10926c0(0000) GS:ffff88807be00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033CR2: 0000000020ccb000 CR3: 000000004628c005 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0PKRU: 55555554Call Trace: <TASK> ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? __warn+0x81/0x130 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80 ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 tcp_twsk_unique+0x186/0x190 __inet_check_established+0x176/0x2d0 __inet_hash_connect+0x74/0x7d0 ? __pfx___inet_check_established+0x10/0x10 tcp_v4_connect+0x278/0x530 __inet_stream_connect+0x10f/0x3d0 inet_stream_connect+0x3a/0x60 __sys_connect+0xa8/0xd0 __x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0x80RIP: 0033:0x7f62c11a885dCode: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a3 45 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48RSP: 002b:00007f62c1091e58 EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002aRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020ccb004 RCX: 00007f62c11a885dRDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020ccb000 RDI: 0000000000000003RBP: 00007f62c1091e90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000296 R12: 00007f62c10926c0R13: ffffffffffffff88 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffe237885b0 </TASK>
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:tcp: Use refcount_inc_not_zero() in tcp_twsk_unique().Anderson Nascimento reported a use-after-free splat in tcp_twsk_unique()with nice analysis.Since commit ec94c2696f0b ( tcp/dccp: avoid one atomic operation fortimewait hashdance ), inet_twsk_hashdance() sets TIME-WAIT socket ssk_refcnt after putting it into ehash and releasing the bucket lock.Thus, there is a small race window where other threads could try toreuse the port during connect() and call sock_hold() in tcp_twsk_unique()for the TIME-WAIT socket with zero refcnt.If that happens, the refcnt taken by tcp_twsk_unique() is overwrittenand sock_put() will cause underflow, triggering a real use-after-freesomewhere else.To avoid the use-after-free, we need to use refcount_inc_not_zero() intcp_twsk_unique() and give up on reusing the port if it returns false.[0]:refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 Comm: trigger Not tainted 6.8.6-200.fc39.x86_64 #1Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS VMW201.00V.21805430.B64.2305221830 05/22/2023RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110Code: 42 8e ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d aa 13 ea 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 f8 8e b7 82 c6 05 96 13 ea 01 01 e8 7b 42 8e ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c7 50 8f b7 82 c6 05 7a 13 ea 01 01 e8RSP: 0018:ffffc90006b43b60 EFLAGS: 00010282RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888009bb3ef0 RCX: 0000000000000027RDX: ffff88807be218c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88807be218c0RBP: 0000000000069d70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc90006b439f0R10: ffffc90006b439e8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8880029ede84R13: 0000000000004e20 R14: ffffffff84356dc0 R15: ffff888009bb3ef0FS: 00007f62c10926c0(0000) GS:ffff88807be00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033CR2: 0000000020ccb000 CR3: 000000004628c005 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0PKRU: 55555554Call Trace: <TASK> ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? __warn+0x81/0x130 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80 ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 tcp_twsk_unique+0x186/0x190 __inet_check_established+0x176/0x2d0 __inet_hash_connect+0x74/0x7d0 ? __pfx___inet_check_established+0x10/0x10 tcp_v4_connect+0x278/0x530 __inet_stream_connect+0x10f/0x3d0 inet_stream_connect+0x3a/0x60 __sys_connect+0xa8/0xd0 __x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0x80RIP: 0033:0x7f62c11a885dCode: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a3 45 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48RSP: 002b:00007f62c1091e58 EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002aRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020ccb004 RCX: 00007f62c11a885dRDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020ccb000 RDI: 0000000000000003RBP: 00007f62c1091e90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000296 R12: 00007f62c10926c0R13: ffffffffffffff88 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffe237885b0 </TASK>
| linux | | https://git.kernel.org/linus/f2db7230f73a80dbb179deab78f88a7947f0ab7e | https://git.kernel.org/linus/ec94c2696f0bcd5ae92a553244e4ac30d2171a2d | ubuntu |
</details>
二、漏洞分析结构反馈
影响性分析说明：
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:tcp: Use refcount_inc_not_zero() in tcp_twsk_unique().Anderson Nascimento reported a use-after-free splat in tcp_twsk_unique()with nice analysis.Since commit ec94c2696f0b ( tcp/dccp: avoid one atomic operation fortimewait hashdance ), inet_twsk_hashdance() sets TIME-WAIT socket ssk_refcnt after putting it into ehash and releasing the bucket lock.Thus, there is a small race window where other threads could try toreuse the port during connect() and call sock_hold() in tcp_twsk_unique()for the TIME-WAIT socket with zero refcnt.If that happens, the refcnt taken by tcp_twsk_unique() is overwrittenand sock_put() will cause underflow, triggering a real use-after-freesomewhere else.To avoid the use-after-free, we need to use refcount_inc_not_zero() intcp_twsk_unique() and give up on reusing the port if it returns false.[0]:refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 Comm: trigger Not tainted 6.8.6-200.fc39.x86_64 #1Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS VMW201.00V.21805430.B64.2305221830 05/22/2023RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110Code: 42 8e ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d aa 13 ea 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 f8 8e b7 82 c6 05 96 13 ea 01 01 e8 7b 42 8e ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c7 50 8f b7 82 c6 05 7a 13 ea 01 01 e8RSP: 0018:ffffc90006b43b60 EFLAGS: 00010282RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888009bb3ef0 RCX: 0000000000000027RDX: ffff88807be218c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88807be218c0RBP: 0000000000069d70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc90006b439f0R10: ffffc90006b439e8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8880029ede84R13: 0000000000004e20 R14: ffffffff84356dc0 R15: ffff888009bb3ef0FS: 00007f62c10926c0(0000) GS:ffff88807be00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033CR2: 0000000020ccb000 CR3: 000000004628c005 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0PKRU: 55555554Call Trace: <TASK> ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? __warn+0x81/0x130 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80 ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 tcp_twsk_unique+0x186/0x190 __inet_check_established+0x176/0x2d0 __inet_hash_connect+0x74/0x7d0 ? __pfx___inet_check_established+0x10/0x10 tcp_v4_connect+0x278/0x530 __inet_stream_connect+0x10f/0x3d0 inet_stream_connect+0x3a/0x60 __sys_connect+0xa8/0xd0 __x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0x80RIP: 0033:0x7f62c11a885dCode: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a3 45 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48RSP: 002b:00007f62c1091e58 EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002aRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020ccb004 RCX: 00007f62c11a885dRDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020ccb000 RDI: 0000000000000003RBP: 00007f62c1091e90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000296 R12: 00007f62c10926c0R13: ffffffffffffff88 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffe237885b0 </TASK>
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:tcp: Use refcount_inc_not_zero() in tcp_twsk_unique().Anderson Nascimento reported a use-after-free splat in tcp_twsk_unique()with nice analysis.Since commit ec94c2696f0b ( tcp/dccp: avoid one atomic operation fortimewait hashdance ), inet_twsk_hashdance() sets TIME-WAIT socket ssk_refcnt after putting it into ehash and releasing the bucket lock.Thus, there is a small race window where other threads could try toreuse the port during connect() and call sock_hold() in tcp_twsk_unique()for the TIME-WAIT socket with zero refcnt.If that happens, the refcnt taken by tcp_twsk_unique() is overwrittenand sock_put() will cause underflow, triggering a real use-after-freesomewhere else.To avoid the use-after-free, we need to use refcount_inc_not_zero() intcp_twsk_unique() and give up on reusing the port if it returns false.[0]:refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 Comm: trigger Not tainted 6.8.6-200.fc39.x86_64 #1Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS VMW201.00V.21805430.B64.2305221830 05/22/2023RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110Code: 42 8e ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d aa 13 ea 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 f8 8e b7 82 c6 05 96 13 ea 01 01 e8 7b 42 8e ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c7 50 8f b7 82 c6 05 7a 13 ea 01 01 e8RSP: 0018:ffffc90006b43b60 EFLAGS: 00010282RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888009bb3ef0 RCX: 0000000000000027RDX: ffff88807be218c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88807be218c0RBP: 0000000000069d70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc90006b439f0R10: ffffc90006b439e8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8880029ede84R13: 0000000000004e20 R14: ffffffff84356dc0 R15: ffff888009bb3ef0FS: 00007f62c10926c0(0000) GS:ffff88807be00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033CR2: 0000000020ccb000 CR3: 000000004628c005 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0PKRU: 55555554Call Trace: <TASK> ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? __warn+0x81/0x130 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80 ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 tcp_twsk_unique+0x186/0x190 __inet_check_established+0x176/0x2d0 __inet_hash_connect+0x74/0x7d0 ? __pfx___inet_check_established+0x10/0x10 tcp_v4_connect+0x278/0x530 __inet_stream_connect+0x10f/0x3d0 inet_stream_connect+0x3a/0x60 __sys_connect+0xa8/0xd0 __x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0x80RIP: 0033:0x7f62c11a885dCode: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a3 45 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48RSP: 002b:00007f62c1091e58 EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002aRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020ccb004 RCX: 00007f62c11a885dRDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020ccb000 RDI: 0000000000000003RBP: 00007f62c1091e90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000296 R12: 00007f62c10926c0R13: ffffffffffffff88 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffe237885b0 </TASK>
| linux | | https://git.kernel.org/linus/f2db7230f73a80dbb179deab78f88a7947f0ab7e | https://git.kernel.org/linus/ec94c2696f0bcd5ae92a553244e4ac30d2171a2d | ubuntu |
</details>
二、漏洞分析结构反馈
影响性分析说明：
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:tcp: Use refcount_inc_not_zero() in tcp_twsk_unique().Anderson Nascimento reported a use-after-free splat in tcp_twsk_unique()with nice analysis.Since commit ec94c2696f0b ( tcp/dccp: avoid one atomic operation fortimewait hashdance ), inet_twsk_hashdance() sets TIME-WAIT socket ssk_refcnt after putting it into ehash and releasing the bucket lock.Thus, there is a small race window where other threads could try toreuse the port during connect() and call sock_hold() in tcp_twsk_unique()for the TIME-WAIT socket with zero refcnt.If that happens, the refcnt taken by tcp_twsk_unique() is overwrittenand sock_put() will cause underflow, triggering a real use-after-freesomewhere else.To avoid the use-after-free, we need to use refcount_inc_not_zero() intcp_twsk_unique() and give up on reusing the port if it returns false.[0]:refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 Comm: trigger Not tainted 6.8.6-200.fc39.x86_64 #1Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS VMW201.00V.21805430.B64.2305221830 05/22/2023RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110Code: 42 8e ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d aa 13 ea 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 f8 8e b7 82 c6 05 96 13 ea 01 01 e8 7b 42 8e ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c7 50 8f b7 82 c6 05 7a 13 ea 01 01 e8RSP: 0018:ffffc90006b43b60 EFLAGS: 00010282RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888009bb3ef0 RCX: 0000000000000027RDX: ffff88807be218c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88807be218c0RBP: 0000000000069d70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc90006b439f0R10: ffffc90006b439e8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8880029ede84R13: 0000000000004e20 R14: ffffffff84356dc0 R15: ffff888009bb3ef0FS: 00007f62c10926c0(0000) GS:ffff88807be00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033CR2: 0000000020ccb000 CR3: 000000004628c005 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0PKRU: 55555554Call Trace: <TASK> ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? __warn+0x81/0x130 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80 ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 tcp_twsk_unique+0x186/0x190 __inet_check_established+0x176/0x2d0 __inet_hash_connect+0x74/0x7d0 ? __pfx___inet_check_established+0x10/0x10 tcp_v4_connect+0x278/0x530 __inet_stream_connect+0x10f/0x3d0 inet_stream_connect+0x3a/0x60 __sys_connect+0xa8/0xd0 __x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0x80RIP: 0033:0x7f62c11a885dCode: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a3 45 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48RSP: 002b:00007f62c1091e58 EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002aRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020ccb004 RCX: 00007f62c11a885dRDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020ccb000 RDI: 0000000000000003RBP: 00007f62c1091e90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000296 R12: 00007f62c10926c0R13: ffffffffffffff88 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffe237885b0 </TASK>
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:tcp: Use refcount_inc_not_zero() in tcp_twsk_unique().Anderson Nascimento reported a use-after-free splat in tcp_twsk_unique()with nice analysis.Since commit ec94c2696f0b ( tcp/dccp: avoid one atomic operation fortimewait hashdance ), inet_twsk_hashdance() sets TIME-WAIT socket ssk_refcnt after putting it into ehash and releasing the bucket lock.Thus, there is a small race window where other threads could try toreuse the port during connect() and call sock_hold() in tcp_twsk_unique()for the TIME-WAIT socket with zero refcnt.If that happens, the refcnt taken by tcp_twsk_unique() is overwrittenand sock_put() will cause underflow, triggering a real use-after-freesomewhere else.To avoid the use-after-free, we need to use refcount_inc_not_zero() intcp_twsk_unique() and give up on reusing the port if it returns false.[0]:refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 Comm: trigger Not tainted 6.8.6-200.fc39.x86_64 #1Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS VMW201.00V.21805430.B64.2305221830 05/22/2023RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110Code: 42 8e ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d aa 13 ea 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 f8 8e b7 82 c6 05 96 13 ea 01 01 e8 7b 42 8e ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c7 50 8f b7 82 c6 05 7a 13 ea 01 01 e8RSP: 0018:ffffc90006b43b60 EFLAGS: 00010282RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888009bb3ef0 RCX: 0000000000000027RDX: ffff88807be218c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88807be218c0RBP: 0000000000069d70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc90006b439f0R10: ffffc90006b439e8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8880029ede84R13: 0000000000004e20 R14: ffffffff84356dc0 R15: ffff888009bb3ef0FS: 00007f62c10926c0(0000) GS:ffff88807be00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033CR2: 0000000020ccb000 CR3: 000000004628c005 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0PKRU: 55555554Call Trace: <TASK> ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? __warn+0x81/0x130 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80 ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 tcp_twsk_unique+0x186/0x190 __inet_check_established+0x176/0x2d0 __inet_hash_connect+0x74/0x7d0 ? __pfx___inet_check_established+0x10/0x10 tcp_v4_connect+0x278/0x530 __inet_stream_connect+0x10f/0x3d0 inet_stream_connect+0x3a/0x60 __sys_connect+0xa8/0xd0 __x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0x80RIP: 0033:0x7f62c11a885dCode: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a3 45 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48RSP: 002b:00007f62c1091e58 EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002aRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020ccb004 RCX: 00007f62c11a885dRDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020ccb000 RDI: 0000000000000003RBP: 00007f62c1091e90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000296 R12: 00007f62c10926c0R13: ffffffffffffff88 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffe237885b0 </TASK>
| linux | | https://git.kernel.org/linus/f2db7230f73a80dbb179deab78f88a7947f0ab7e | https://git.kernel.org/linus/ec94c2696f0bcd5ae92a553244e4ac30d2171a2d | ubuntu |
</details>
二、漏洞分析结构反馈
影响性分析说明：
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:tcp: Use refcount_inc_not_zero() in tcp_twsk_unique().Anderson Nascimento reported ause-after-free splat in tcp_twsk_unique()with nice analysis.Since commit ec94c2696f0b (tcp/dccp: avoid one atomic operation fortimewait hashdance ), inet_twsk_hashdance() sets TIME-WAIT socket ssk_refcnt after putting it into ehash and releasing the bucket lock.Thus, there is asmall race window where other threads could try toreuse the port during connect() and call sock_hold() in tcp_twsk_unique()for the TIME-WAIT socket with zero refcnt.If that happens, the refcnt taken by tcp_twsk_unique() is overwrittenand sock_put() will cause underflow, triggering areal use-after-freesomewhereelse.To avoid the use-after-free, we need to use refcount_inc_not_zero() intcp_twsk_unique() and give up on reusing the port if it returns false.[0]:refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.WARNING: CPU: 0PID: 1039313 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110CPU: 0PID: 1039313 Comm: trigger Not tainted 6.8.6-200.fc39.x86_64 #1Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS VMW201.00V.21805430.B64.2305221830 05/22/2023RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110Code: 42 8e ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d aa 13 ea 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 f8 8e b7 82 c6 05 96 13 ea 01 01 e8 7b 42 8e ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c7 50 8f b7 82 c6 05 7a 13 ea 01 01 e8RSP: 0018:ffffc90006b43b60 EFLAGS: 00010282RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888009bb3ef0 RCX: 0000000000000027RDX: ffff88807be218c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88807be218c0RBP: 0000000000069d70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc90006b439f0R10: ffffc90006b439e8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8880029ede84R13: 0000000000004e20 R14: ffffffff84356dc0 R15: ffff888009bb3ef0FS: 00007f62c10926c0(0000) GS:ffff88807be00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033CR2: 0000000020ccb000 CR3: 000000004628c005 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0PKRU: 55555554Call Trace: <TASK> ?refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ?__warn+0x81/0x130 ?refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ?report_bug+0x171/0x1a0 ?refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ?handle_bug+0x3c/0x80 ?exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 ?asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ?refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 tcp_twsk_unique+0x186/0x190 __inet_check_established+0x176/0x2d0 __inet_hash_connect+0x74/0x7d0 ?__pfx___inet_check_established+0x10/0x10 tcp_v4_connect+0x278/0x530 __inet_stream_connect+0x10f/0x3d0 inet_stream_connect+0x3a/0x60 __sys_connect+0xa8/0xd0 __x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0x80RIP: 0033:0x7f62c11a885dCode: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a3 45 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48RSP: 002b:00007f62c1091e58 EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002aRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020ccb004 RCX: 00007f62c11a885dRDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020ccb000 RDI: 0000000000000003RBP: 00007f62c1091e90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000296 R12: 00007f62c10926c0R13: ffffffffffffff88 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffe237885b0 </TASK>
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:tcp: Use refcount_inc_not_zero() in tcp_twsk_unique().Anderson Nascimento reported a use-after-free splat in tcp_twsk_unique()with nice analysis.Since commit ec94c2696f0b ( tcp/dccp: avoid one atomic operation fortimewait hashdance ), inet_twsk_hashdance() sets TIME-WAIT socket ssk_refcnt after putting it into ehash and releasing the bucket lock.Thus, there is a small race window where other threads could try toreuse the port during connect() and call sock_hold() in tcp_twsk_unique()for the TIME-WAIT socket with zero refcnt.If that happens, the refcnt taken by tcp_twsk_unique() is overwrittenand sock_put() will cause underflow, triggering a real use-after-freesomewhere else.To avoid the use-after-free, we need to use refcount_inc_not_zero() intcp_twsk_unique() and give up on reusing the port if it returns false.[0]:refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 Comm: trigger Not tainted 6.8.6-200.fc39.x86_64 #1Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS VMW201.00V.21805430.B64.2305221830 05/22/2023RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110Code: 42 8e ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d aa 13 ea 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 f8 8e b7 82 c6 05 96 13 ea 01 01 e8 7b 42 8e ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c7 50 8f b7 82 c6 05 7a 13 ea 01 01 e8RSP: 0018:ffffc90006b43b60 EFLAGS: 00010282RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888009bb3ef0 RCX: 0000000000000027RDX: ffff88807be218c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88807be218c0RBP: 0000000000069d70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc90006b439f0R10: ffffc90006b439e8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8880029ede84R13: 0000000000004e20 R14: ffffffff84356dc0 R15: ffff888009bb3ef0FS: 00007f62c10926c0(0000) GS:ffff88807be00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033CR2: 0000000020ccb000 CR3: 000000004628c005 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0PKRU: 55555554Call Trace: <TASK> ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? __warn+0x81/0x130 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80 ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 tcp_twsk_unique+0x186/0x190 __inet_check_established+0x176/0x2d0 __inet_hash_connect+0x74/0x7d0 ? __pfx___inet_check_established+0x10/0x10 tcp_v4_connect+0x278/0x530 __inet_stream_connect+0x10f/0x3d0 inet_stream_connect+0x3a/0x60 __sys_connect+0xa8/0xd0 __x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0x80RIP: 0033:0x7f62c11a885dCode: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a3 45 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48RSP: 002b:00007f62c1091e58 EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002aRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020ccb004 RCX: 00007f62c11a885dRDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020ccb000 RDI: 0000000000000003RBP: 00007f62c1091e90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000296 R12: 00007f62c10926c0R13: ffffffffffffff88 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffe237885b0 </TASK>
| linux | | https://git.kernel.org/linus/f2db7230f73a80dbb179deab78f88a7947f0ab7e | https://git.kernel.org/linus/ec94c2696f0bcd5ae92a553244e4ac30d2171a2d | ubuntu |
</details>
二、漏洞分析结构反馈
影响性分析说明：
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:tcp: Use refcount_inc_not_zero() in tcp_twsk_unique().Anderson Nascimento reporteda use-after-free splat in tcp_twsk_unique()with nice analysis.Since commit ec94c2696f0b( tcp/dccp: avoid one atomic operation fortimewait hashdance ), inet_twsk_hashdance() sets TIME-WAIT socket ssk_refcnt after putting it into ehash and releasing the bucket lock.Thus, there isa small race window where other threads could try toreuse the port during connect() and call sock_hold() in tcp_twsk_unique()for the TIME-WAIT socket with zero refcnt.If that happens, the refcnt taken by tcp_twsk_unique() is overwrittenand sock_put() will cause underflow, triggeringa real use-after-freesomewhere else.To avoid the use-after-free, we need to use refcount_inc_not_zero() intcp_twsk_unique() and give up on reusing the port if it returns false.[0]:refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.WARNING: CPU:0 PID: 1039313 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110CPU:0 PID: 1039313 Comm: trigger Not tainted 6.8.6-200.fc39.x86_64 #1Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS VMW201.00V.21805430.B64.2305221830 05/22/2023RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110Code: 42 8e ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d aa 13 ea 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 f8 8e b7 82 c6 05 96 13 ea 01 01 e8 7b 42 8e ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c7 50 8f b7 82 c6 05 7a 13 ea 01 01 e8RSP: 0018:ffffc90006b43b60 EFLAGS: 00010282RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888009bb3ef0 RCX: 0000000000000027RDX: ffff88807be218c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88807be218c0RBP: 0000000000069d70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc90006b439f0R10: ffffc90006b439e8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8880029ede84R13: 0000000000004e20 R14: ffffffff84356dc0 R15: ffff888009bb3ef0FS: 00007f62c10926c0(0000) GS:ffff88807be00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033CR2: 0000000020ccb000 CR3: 000000004628c005 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0PKRU: 55555554Call Trace: <TASK>? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110? __warn+0x81/0x130? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 tcp_twsk_unique+0x186/0x190 __inet_check_established+0x176/0x2d0 __inet_hash_connect+0x74/0x7d0? __pfx___inet_check_established+0x10/0x10 tcp_v4_connect+0x278/0x530 __inet_stream_connect+0x10f/0x3d0 inet_stream_connect+0x3a/0x60 __sys_connect+0xa8/0xd0 __x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0x80RIP: 0033:0x7f62c11a885dCode: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a3 45 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48RSP: 002b:00007f62c1091e58 EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002aRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020ccb004 RCX: 00007f62c11a885dRDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020ccb000 RDI: 0000000000000003RBP: 00007f62c1091e90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000296 R12: 00007f62c10926c0R13: ffffffffffffff88 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffe237885b0 </TASK>
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:tcp: Use refcount_inc_not_zero() in tcp_twsk_unique().Anderson Nascimento reported a use-after-free splat in tcp_twsk_unique()with nice analysis.Since commit ec94c2696f0b ( tcp/dccp: avoid one atomic operation fortimewait hashdance ), inet_twsk_hashdance() sets TIME-WAIT socket ssk_refcnt after putting it into ehash and releasing the bucket lock.Thus, there is a small race window where other threads could try toreuse the port during connect() and call sock_hold() in tcp_twsk_unique()for the TIME-WAIT socket with zero refcnt.If that happens, the refcnt taken by tcp_twsk_unique() is overwrittenand sock_put() will cause underflow, triggering a real use-after-freesomewhere else.To avoid the use-after-free, we need to use refcount_inc_not_zero() intcp_twsk_unique() and give up on reusing the port if it returns false.[0]:refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 Comm: trigger Not tainted 6.8.6-200.fc39.x86_64 #1Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS VMW201.00V.21805430.B64.2305221830 05/22/2023RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110Code: 42 8e ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d aa 13 ea 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 f8 8e b7 82 c6 05 96 13 ea 01 01 e8 7b 42 8e ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c7 50 8f b7 82 c6 05 7a 13 ea 01 01 e8RSP: 0018:ffffc90006b43b60 EFLAGS: 00010282RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888009bb3ef0 RCX: 0000000000000027RDX: ffff88807be218c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88807be218c0RBP: 0000000000069d70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc90006b439f0R10: ffffc90006b439e8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8880029ede84R13: 0000000000004e20 R14: ffffffff84356dc0 R15: ffff888009bb3ef0FS: 00007f62c10926c0(0000) GS:ffff88807be00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033CR2: 0000000020ccb000 CR3: 000000004628c005 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0PKRU: 55555554Call Trace: <TASK> ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? __warn+0x81/0x130 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80 ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 tcp_twsk_unique+0x186/0x190 __inet_check_established+0x176/0x2d0 __inet_hash_connect+0x74/0x7d0 ? __pfx___inet_check_established+0x10/0x10 tcp_v4_connect+0x278/0x530 __inet_stream_connect+0x10f/0x3d0 inet_stream_connect+0x3a/0x60 __sys_connect+0xa8/0xd0 __x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0x80RIP: 0033:0x7f62c11a885dCode: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a3 45 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48RSP: 002b:00007f62c1091e58 EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002aRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020ccb004 RCX: 00007f62c11a885dRDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020ccb000 RDI: 0000000000000003RBP: 00007f62c1091e90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000296 R12: 00007f62c10926c0R13: ffffffffffffff88 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffe237885b0 </TASK>
| linux | | https://git.kernel.org/linus/f2db7230f73a80dbb179deab78f88a7947f0ab7e | https://git.kernel.org/linus/ec94c2696f0bcd5ae92a553244e4ac30d2171a2d | ubuntu |
</details>
二、漏洞分析结构反馈
影响性分析说明：
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:tcp: Use refcount_inc_not_zero() in tcp_twsk_unique().Anderson Nascimento reported ause-after-free splat in tcp_twsk_unique()with nice analysis.Since commit ec94c2696f0b (tcp/dccp: avoid one atomic operation fortimewait hashdance ), inet_twsk_hashdance() sets TIME-WAIT socket ssk_refcnt after putting it into ehash and releasing the bucket lock.Thus, there is asmall race window where other threads could try toreuse the port during connect() and call sock_hold() in tcp_twsk_unique()for the TIME-WAIT socket with zero refcnt.If that happens, the refcnt taken by tcp_twsk_unique() is overwrittenand sock_put() will cause underflow, triggering areal use-after-freesomewhereelse.To avoid the use-after-free, we need to use refcount_inc_not_zero() intcp_twsk_unique() and give up on reusing the port if it returns false.[0]:refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.WARNING: CPU: 0PID: 1039313 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110CPU: 0PID: 1039313 Comm: trigger Not tainted 6.8.6-200.fc39.x86_64 #1Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS VMW201.00V.21805430.B64.2305221830 05/22/2023RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110Code: 42 8e ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d aa 13 ea 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 f8 8e b7 82 c6 05 96 13 ea 01 01 e8 7b 42 8e ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c7 50 8f b7 82 c6 05 7a 13 ea 01 01 e8RSP: 0018:ffffc90006b43b60 EFLAGS: 00010282RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888009bb3ef0 RCX: 0000000000000027RDX: ffff88807be218c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88807be218c0RBP: 0000000000069d70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc90006b439f0R10: ffffc90006b439e8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8880029ede84R13: 0000000000004e20 R14: ffffffff84356dc0 R15: ffff888009bb3ef0FS: 00007f62c10926c0(0000) GS:ffff88807be00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033CR2: 0000000020ccb000 CR3: 000000004628c005 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0PKRU: 55555554Call Trace: <TASK> ?refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ?__warn+0x81/0x130 ?refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ?report_bug+0x171/0x1a0 ?refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ?handle_bug+0x3c/0x80 ?exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 ?asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ?refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 tcp_twsk_unique+0x186/0x190 __inet_check_established+0x176/0x2d0 __inet_hash_connect+0x74/0x7d0 ?__pfx___inet_check_established+0x10/0x10 tcp_v4_connect+0x278/0x530 __inet_stream_connect+0x10f/0x3d0 inet_stream_connect+0x3a/0x60 __sys_connect+0xa8/0xd0 __x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0x80RIP: 0033:0x7f62c11a885dCode: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a3 45 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48RSP: 002b:00007f62c1091e58 EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002aRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020ccb004 RCX: 00007f62c11a885dRDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020ccb000 RDI: 0000000000000003RBP: 00007f62c1091e90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000296 R12: 00007f62c10926c0R13: ffffffffffffff88 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffe237885b0 </TASK>
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:tcp: Use refcount_inc_not_zero() in tcp_twsk_unique().Anderson Nascimento reported a use-after-free splat in tcp_twsk_unique()with nice analysis.Since commit ec94c2696f0b ( tcp/dccp: avoid one atomic operation fortimewait hashdance ), inet_twsk_hashdance() sets TIME-WAIT socket ssk_refcnt after putting it into ehash and releasing the bucket lock.Thus, there is a small race window where other threads could try toreuse the port during connect() and call sock_hold() in tcp_twsk_unique()for the TIME-WAIT socket with zero refcnt.If that happens, the refcnt taken by tcp_twsk_unique() is overwrittenand sock_put() will cause underflow, triggering a real use-after-freesomewhere else.To avoid the use-after-free, we need to use refcount_inc_not_zero() intcp_twsk_unique() and give up on reusing the port if it returns false.[0]:refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 Comm: trigger Not tainted 6.8.6-200.fc39.x86_64 #1Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS VMW201.00V.21805430.B64.2305221830 05/22/2023RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110Code: 42 8e ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d aa 13 ea 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 f8 8e b7 82 c6 05 96 13 ea 01 01 e8 7b 42 8e ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c7 50 8f b7 82 c6 05 7a 13 ea 01 01 e8RSP: 0018:ffffc90006b43b60 EFLAGS: 00010282RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888009bb3ef0 RCX: 0000000000000027RDX: ffff88807be218c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88807be218c0RBP: 0000000000069d70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc90006b439f0R10: ffffc90006b439e8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8880029ede84R13: 0000000000004e20 R14: ffffffff84356dc0 R15: ffff888009bb3ef0FS: 00007f62c10926c0(0000) GS:ffff88807be00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033CR2: 0000000020ccb000 CR3: 000000004628c005 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0PKRU: 55555554Call Trace: <TASK> ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? __warn+0x81/0x130 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80 ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 tcp_twsk_unique+0x186/0x190 __inet_check_established+0x176/0x2d0 __inet_hash_connect+0x74/0x7d0 ? __pfx___inet_check_established+0x10/0x10 tcp_v4_connect+0x278/0x530 __inet_stream_connect+0x10f/0x3d0 inet_stream_connect+0x3a/0x60 __sys_connect+0xa8/0xd0 __x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0x80RIP: 0033:0x7f62c11a885dCode: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a3 45 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48RSP: 002b:00007f62c1091e58 EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002aRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020ccb004 RCX: 00007f62c11a885dRDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020ccb000 RDI: 0000000000000003RBP: 00007f62c1091e90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000296 R12: 00007f62c10926c0R13: ffffffffffffff88 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffe237885b0 </TASK>
| linux | | https://git.kernel.org/linus/f2db7230f73a80dbb179deab78f88a7947f0ab7e | https://git.kernel.org/linus/ec94c2696f0bcd5ae92a553244e4ac30d2171a2d | ubuntu |
</details>
二、漏洞分析结构反馈
影响性分析说明：
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:tcp: Use refcount_inc_not_zero() in tcp_twsk_unique().Anderson Nascimento reporteda use-after-free splat in tcp_twsk_unique()with nice analysis.Since commit ec94c2696f0b( tcp/dccp: avoid one atomic operation fortimewait hashdance ), inet_twsk_hashdance() sets TIME-WAIT socket ssk_refcnt after putting it into ehash and releasing the bucket lock.Thus, there isa small race window where other threads could try toreuse the port during connect() and call sock_hold() in tcp_twsk_unique()for the TIME-WAIT socket with zero refcnt.If that happens, the refcnt taken by tcp_twsk_unique() is overwrittenand sock_put() will cause underflow, triggeringa real use-after-freesomewhere else.To avoid the use-after-free, we need to use refcount_inc_not_zero() intcp_twsk_unique() and give up on reusing the port if it returns false.[0]:refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.WARNING: CPU:0 PID: 1039313 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110CPU:0 PID: 1039313 Comm: trigger Not tainted 6.8.6-200.fc39.x86_64 #1Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS VMW201.00V.21805430.B64.2305221830 05/22/2023RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110Code: 42 8e ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d aa 13 ea 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 f8 8e b7 82 c6 05 96 13 ea 01 01 e8 7b 42 8e ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c7 50 8f b7 82 c6 05 7a 13 ea 01 01 e8RSP: 0018:ffffc90006b43b60 EFLAGS: 00010282RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888009bb3ef0 RCX: 0000000000000027RDX: ffff88807be218c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88807be218c0RBP: 0000000000069d70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc90006b439f0R10: ffffc90006b439e8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8880029ede84R13: 0000000000004e20 R14: ffffffff84356dc0 R15: ffff888009bb3ef0FS: 00007f62c10926c0(0000) GS:ffff88807be00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033CR2: 0000000020ccb000 CR3: 000000004628c005 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0PKRU: 55555554Call Trace: <TASK>? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110? __warn+0x81/0x130? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 tcp_twsk_unique+0x186/0x190 __inet_check_established+0x176/0x2d0 __inet_hash_connect+0x74/0x7d0? __pfx___inet_check_established+0x10/0x10 tcp_v4_connect+0x278/0x530 __inet_stream_connect+0x10f/0x3d0 inet_stream_connect+0x3a/0x60 __sys_connect+0xa8/0xd0 __x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0x80RIP: 0033:0x7f62c11a885dCode: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a3 45 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48RSP: 002b:00007f62c1091e58 EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002aRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020ccb004 RCX: 00007f62c11a885dRDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020ccb000 RDI: 0000000000000003RBP: 00007f62c1091e90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000296 R12: 00007f62c10926c0R13: ffffffffffffff88 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffe237885b0 </TASK>
